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This study analyzes resource allocation within schools, and it is one of the first in 
the literature to analyze the equity of monetary resources at the individual student level.  
The study calculates teacher resource expenditures (TREs) per pupil by allocating teacher 
salaries to individual students for each high school student in a large urban public school 
district.  Next, the study compares the degree of within-school variation in per-pupil 
TREs to the variation between schools and concludes that the variation within schools is 
much larger than the variation between schools.  The study then uses Berne and Stiefel’s 
(1984) equity evaluation framework and develops an analytic approach that is appropriate 
for conducting a within-school equity analysis of per- upil TREs.  The findings indicate 
that inequities in the allocation of teacher salaries at the student level do exist.  
Specifically, the study finds violations of horizontal equity, vertical equity for low-
income students, and equal opportunity for students of differing achievement levels.  
 
These findings also suggest that district leaders may be unaware of how resources are 
ultimately allocated to students.   
This study also evaluates the equity of the within-school allocation of specific 
resources to identify if resources are equitably alloc ted in academic courses that are 
critical for academic success.  This study evaluates th  equity of the allocation of class 
size, teacher experience, and social capital in students’ English and math courses only as 
well as the number of advanced placement (AP) courses taken by students, which 
indicates access to rigorous curricula.  In analyzing the equity of these specific resources 
within each school in the district, this study determines if multiple resource advantages or 
disadvantages exist for some students. 
Findings indicate that multiple resource inequities may exist for low-performing, 
low-income, and minority students.  Further, the study finds that schools with greater 
socioeconomic and racial diversity have more occurrences of within-school resource 
inequities for low-income and minority students than schools with homogeneous student 
populations.  The study is among the first to analyze the equity of the within-school 
allocation of multiple resources simultaneously to gain a better understanding of whether 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Federal, state, and local governments collectively spend hundreds of billions of 
dollars every year on public elementary and secondary education, yet we know 
“remarkably little” about how these funds are allocated to individual students (Picus, 
2000, p. 75).  One structural impediment to tracking expenditures to the individual 
student level is the collective–federal, state, and local–nature of K-12 public education 
funding itself; as Roza (2010) noted, “No one governmental level takes full responsibility 
for funding” (p. 33).  As a result, district leaders may be unaware of spending differences 
between schools (Roza, Hill, Sclafani, & Speakman, 2004), as well as between individual 
students within a school.  Roza, Guin, and Davis (2008) conclude: “A straightforward 
answer to the question of how much is spent on different student types” is needed (p. 2).   
This lack of knowledge regarding student-specific expenditures is troubling, 
because–to put it bluntly–money matters.  If allocated effectively, money can help 
improve student achievement through purchasing resou ces that promote student learning 
(Rice & Schwartz, 2008; Slavin, 1999).  The most important of these resources are 
teachers (Rice, 2003), and research has shown that higher salaries can attract and retain 
more effective teachers (Slavin, 1999; Theobald & Gritz, 1996).  Both class sizes 
(Krueger, 2002) as well as access to academically rigorous courses are also known to 
affect student achievement (Gamoran, 1987; Madigan, 1997; Muller, Stage, & Kinzie, 
2001; Tyson, 2013), but these resources are costly.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
numerous studies establish the positive association between money spent on instruction 
and student outcomes (Archibald, 2006; Deke, 2003; Fortune & O’Neil, 1994; Hogrebe, 
Kyei-Blankson, & Zou, 2008; Knoeppel, Verstegen, & Rinehart, 2007). 
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Because money can matter, education leaders should ensure that money spent on 
public education is equitably allocated.  Equity is defined in the literature as the “fair 
distribution of goods, services, and burdens” (Rice, 2004, p. 136), and it is one of the 
three public goals of education finance: equity, efficiency, and liberty (Springer, Houck, 
& Guthrie, 2008).  Yet it is one of the “most compelling, consistent, and complicated 
issues related to K-12 public school finance in the United States” (Rice, 2004, p. 134).  
Equity in education is “compelling” in part because it is a national value.  The idea that 
every child should receive equitable educational opportunities “lies at the core of 
American schooling” (Welner & Carter, 2013, p. 5).  Education has been referred to as 
the “central engine” for achieving equal opportunity and realizing the “American Dream” 
(Koski & Reich, 2006, p. 607).  When inequities in access to educational opportunities 
exist, American scholars have described these inequti s as being “un-American” (Carter 
& Welner, 2013; Ladson-Billings, 2013).  
Not only is equity in education an American value, it can implicate legal rights as 
well.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental right 
under the federal Constitution (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
1973), every state constitution contains at least one provision regarding education, and 
courts in a majority of states have held the applicable state constitutional language to 
provide some form of a right to education (Friedman & Solow, 2013).  In turn, in the 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren stated that education, “where the state h s undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms” (1954, p. 493).  While subsequent 
lawsuits raising state law claims with regard to funding equity have met with mixed 
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results (National Education Access Network, 2014), some state courts–including, for 
example, the high courts of California (Serrano v. Priest, 1976), New Jersey (Abbott v. 
Burke, 1994), and Vermont (Brigham v. State, 1997)–have held that large interdistrict 
disparities in the state’s public education funding system violated the state constitution 
(Friedman & Solow, 2013).   
These judicial rulings are perhaps unsurprising, as education quality and 
attainment have economic as well as non-monetary implications for both individuals and 
society.  Regarding economic matters, education quality and attainment can increase 
workers’ employability and productivity and ultimately, national economic growth 
(Hanushek & Woessmann, 2006), while dropping out of high school is associated with 
lower earnings and income tax payments; greater dependency on Medicaid and 
unemployment programs; and increased criminal activity and spending on incarceration 
(Belfield & Levin, 2013; H. Levin, 2009).  One study estimated that preventing one high 
school student from dropping out would result in a cost savings to society of $129,230 
over the lifetime of the student (Belfield & Levin, 2013).  
Education quality and attainment are also associated with non-monetary benefits 
to individuals and society.  Education attainment is correlated with better overall health 
for individuals and their families, improved child cognitive development, increased 
happiness, and more civic engagement (Brewer & McEwan, 2010).  Further, greater 
inequality in education quality and attainment are ssociated with “lower levels of social 
cohesion and trust” (B. Levin, 2003, p. 5), which are necessary components for 
successful governance.  Finally, B. Levin (2003) notes, “Inasfar as opportunity is not 
distributed fairly there will be an underutilization f talent; some people will not develop 
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their skills and abilities with consequent loss notonly to them but to society generally” (p. 
5).  Thus, it is critical that all individuals experience equitable opportunities in education.   
In their book, Closing the Opportunity Gap, Welner and Carter (2013) argue that 
current inequities in student education outcomes ar the result of cumulative inequitable 
educational resources and opportunities and that the effects of differential educational 
experiences for students of different races are already evident.  As of 2010, the high 
school graduation rates were 93.5% for White students, 83% for Asian students. 71.4% 
for Latino students, and 66.1% for African American students, and the dropout rates for 
minority students were more than double the national average (Welner & Carter, 2013).  
Furthermore, in large urban areas, at least half of high school students did not graduate 
from high school (Welner & Carter, 2013).   
Yet despite the knowledge that large discrepancies in student educational 
outcomes exist in the U.S., inequities in resources ar  commonplace.  Inequities in per-
pupil expenditures (PPEs) exist at every organization l level–in states, in districts, and in 
schools (Ladd, Chalk, & Hansen, 1999).  Until relatively recently, education researchers 
examined the equity of PPEs using district-level aver ges (Odden & Picus, 2008), but 
district-level averages do not inform the variation n resources between and within 
schools.  As school-level data have become more widly available over the past two 
decades, a growing body of research has investigated the equitable distribution of 
monetary resources between schools in the same district.  In many cases, PPEs are lower 
in schools enrolling large proportions of low-income, minority, and/or low-performing 
students compared to other schools in the same district (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Condron 
& Roscigno, 2003; Heuer & Stullich, 2011; Klein, 2008; Owens & Maiden, 1999; 
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Rubenstein, 1998; Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012).  Even when studies found that PPEs were 
higher in schools with larger proportions of low-income and minority students, 
researchers found that these schools employed less experienced and less well-paid 
teachers and therefore had lower instructional PPEs–or PPEs dedicated to instructional 
purposes only–than schools serving middle-class and White student populations (Baker, 
2012; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Stiefel, Schwartz, Portas, & Kim, 2003).  
In addition to inequities in PPEs across schools, re earchers have found inequities 
in the allocation of certain resources among individual students within the same school. 
For example, studies have already shown that, within schools, low-income, minority, and 
low-performing students are assigned to less qualified teachers (Feng, 2010; Kalogrides 
& Loeb, 2013; Koedel & Betts, 2009; Player, 2010; Rothstein, 2008), have larger class 
sizes (Boozer & Rouse, 1995; Roza, 2009), take fewer academic courses (Darling-
Hammond, 2007; Gamoran, 1987) and more low-track academic courses (Brent, Roellke, 
& Monk, 1997; Buckley, 2010; Carter, 2013; Ingersoll, 1999; Lee et al., 1997; Tyson, 
2013), and have lower-achieving peers than their middle-class, White, and high-
achieving counterparts (Conger, 2005; Kalogrides, Loeb, & Beteille, 2013).  Given that 
such inequities exist with respect to certain resources within schools, we can conclude 
that inequities in real instructional expenditures exist for individual students within the 
same school.  This conclusion is bolstered by reseach that analyzes program and course 
level resource allocation.  Marguerite Roza has argued that inequities and efficiencies in 
resource allocation exist for various curricula and extracurricular programs: She found 
that schools spend more money in terms of teacher sala ies per student on advanced 
courses than on regular or remedial track courses (Roza, 2009).   
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Little research, however, has examined the equity of he allocation of student-
specific expenditures despite the knowledge that student-level resource inequities exist.  
The sole published study to date to calculate student-specific PPEs descriptively found 
considerable variation in student-level expenditures for students within the same school.  
After analyzing the data from a single high school, the authors found that individual 
student PPEs ranged from $3,615 to $16,734 and thus concluded that there may be 
“considerable” differences in PPEs for students in the same school (Picus, McCroskey, 
Robillard, Yoo, & Marsenich, 2002, p. 200). 
This gap in the literature regarding the equity of the allocation of student-specific 
expenditures stems from the limited availability of student-level data, the complexity of 
cleaning and combining raw district and school datasets, and the challenges of calculating 
student-level expenditures.  Detailed student-level data that allow for analyses of resource 
equity at the student level are generally not availble.  Until 2009, federal legislation only 
required districts to report district-wide average teacher salary, as opposed to actual 
individual or school-level average teacher salaries, and districts did not typically keep 
track of resources at the school level (Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012).  Further, individual 
schools do not record differences in instructional resources across classrooms, let alone 
merge such records for each resource (Cooper et al., 1994).  Detailed, comprehensive 
data that link individual students with their courses and teachers, are needed in order to 
analyze the equity of student-level expenditures, yt data are rarely collected and 
organized in this manner.  Accordingly, the research community has noted the need not 
only for more analyses using student-level data (Burke & White, 2001; Picus, 2000; 
Verstegen & King, 1998), but specifically for studies that examine the relationships 
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between student-level expenditures, student achievem nt, and demographic 
characteristics (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998).   
In addition to the lack of research employing student-l vel expenditure data, few 
studies evaluate how the equity of one resource relates to the existence or non-existence 
of other resources.  Students may experience multiple s multaneous resource advantages 
or disadvantages, yet Rodriguez (2004) remarks that the missing link in the literature is a 
study that develops a “deeper understanding of the workings of schools” by integrating 
all of the elements of the schooling process–“highly qualified teachers, school and class 
sizes, allocation of time and dollars toward specific urricular areas, investments in 
professional development, and so on” (p. 20).  Similarly, Odden and Borman (2004) have 
noted, “Too much previous research has tended to assess the effects of student, classroom, 
and school variables in isolation from other variables” (p. 4).  Clearly, more research that 
examines the equity of the interplay of various educational resources is needed.   
This study seeks to address these gaps in the literatur  by analyzing the equity of 
the results of the within-school allocation process for all high school students in a large 
urban school district.  The study first defines teacher resource expenditures (TREs) as the 
amount spent per pupil on teacher salaries and then allocates teacher salaries to individual 
students accounting for class sizes and length and duration of courses, among other 
factors.  In doing so, the study calculates a pair of student-specific expenditures–one for 
instruction in all classes and one for instruction in core-academic subjects only–for each 
high school student in the district.  To determine if a thorough investigation of the equity 
of the allocation of per-pupil TREs within schools is warranted, the study then 
investigates whether the variation in per-pupil TREs is practically significant compared 
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to the variation between schools.  This analysis clarifies whether most of the variation in 
per-pupil TREs is due to resource allocation differences between schools or within 
schools in one district.   
The study then conducts an equity analysis of per-pupil TREs.  Specifically, it 
builds on Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) widely used framework as well as Toutkoushian and 
Michael’s (2007) modification thereof to develop an analytic approach appropriate for 
evaluating the within-school equity of per-pupil TREs.  Berne and Stiefel’s framework 
involves three principles of equity: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equal 
opportunity.  The presence of horizontal equity indicates that students with similar 
characteristics get the same amount of resources; in other words, for similar students, 
there should be little to no variation in their per- upil TREs.  Vertical equity is achieved 
if students with greater educational needs actually receive more resources, and this study 
examines vertical equity for certain student subgroups who are widely recognized as 
requiring greater educational resources.  The study investigates equal opportunity by 
evaluating whether per-pupil TREs are associated with student characteristics that should 
not be predictive of funding such as student gender or race.  The study then turns to an 
analysis of whether within-school allocation patterns of per-pupil TREs are similar or 
different across schools, particularly across schools with different characteristics.  If 
within-school allocation patterns remain relatively constant, particularly across different 
types of schools, then school and district leaders may attempt to address any inequities 
differently than if such patterns vary. 
Lastly, the study assesses the equity of the within-school allocation of a specific 
set of resources.  Though an equity analysis of per-pupil TREs is informative, it does not 
 
 9
inform resource tradeoffs.  For example, per-pupil TREs may not highlight resource 
differentiation for students who have higher paid teachers and larger class sizes if the 
higher costs of teachers balance the lower costs of large class sizes.  In addition, some 
courses are likely to affect student educational outcomes more than others, and per-pupil 
TREs do not reflect resource differences across individual courses.  For these reasons, the 
study analyzes the equity of the within-school allocation of a set of specific resources–
class sizes, teacher experience, and social capital–in students’ English and math classes 
because graduating from high school and post-secondary opportunities depend on 
mastering content in these courses.  Further, though class size and teacher experience in 
students’ English and math courses are related to each student’s per-pupil TRE, they may 
vary in ways not captured by the variation in per-pupil TREs, and an examination of the 
allocation of these resources may shed light into res urce equity. Finally, this study 
examines the number of advanced placement (AP) courses taken by each student, which 
reveals at least to some extent students’ access to academically rigorous curricula, which 
is known to impact student success (Gamoran, 1987; Madigan, 1997; Muller, Stage, & 
Kinzie, 2001; Tyson, 2013). 
By evaluating the equity of the within-school allocation of multiple resources–
including per-pupil TREs; class sizes, teacher experience, and social capital in students’ 
English and math classes; and number of AP courses tak n by each student–the study 
assesses whether the results of the within-school res urce allocation process are equitable 
for high schools students in one district.  The study also demonstrates whether certain 
students have multiple resource advantages or disadvantages compared to others and how 
the equity of the allocation of one resource relates to the existence or non-existence of 
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other resources.  Accordingly, the study may help school and district leaders better 
understand not only “who gets what” but also how to reduce inequity in within-school 
resource allocation.   
Research Purposes 
 This study has four main purposes.  The first purpose is to compare the variation in 
per-pupil TREs within schools to the variation betwen schools.  Next, the study seeks to 
evaluate the equity of per-pupil TREs within schools and at the student level.  The third 
purpose is to analyze whether within-school allocati n patterns of per-pupil TREs vary 
across schools.  Finally, the study seeks to evaluate the equity of the allocation of class 
size, teacher experience, and peer achievement in students’ English and math courses as 
well as the number of AP courses taken by each studen .  
Research Questions 
 To address these purposes, this study poses four research questions:  
1. How does the within-school variation in teacher resource expenditures per pupil 
compare to the variation between schools? 
2. Are teacher resource expenditures per pupil equitably distributed within schools?   
3. Do within-school allocation patterns of teacher resource expenditures per pupil 
vary across schools?   
4. Are specific resources equitably allocated within schools, and do multiple resource 
advantages or disadvantages exist for some students?  
Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework for this study draws from three bodies of literature.  
First, using the logic of education production functions from the economics of education 
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literature, the author argues that the levels of certain inputs are related to student 
outcomes.  Second, this study draws on school finance literature to explain how monetary 
resources are allocated to both districts and schools and why inequity in monetary 
resources may exist between districts, schools, or even students.  Finally, this study draws 
from the equity in education literature to account for the equity of the allocation of other 
resources–class sizes, teacher experience, number of AP courses, and peer achievement–
between and within schools. 
Illustrated in the following conceptual model, this study assumes that interdistrict 
and intradistrict fiscal resource allocation processes affect the quality of a school’s 
available resources.  Educational leaders and administrators allocate resources to districts, 
schools, and classrooms. Within a classroom, studens benefit from monetary resources 
that fund teachers’ salaries and class sizes.  In addition, there are non-monetary resources 
like the experience of the teacher, the rigor of the curriculum, and the academic ability of 
a student’s peers.  This study analyzes whether the results of the within-school allocation 




Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
Notes: In the model above, rectangles represent thigs (e.g., resources, outcomes) and circles represent 
resource allocation processes.   
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achievement in students’ English and math classes; and the number of AP courses taken 
by each student.  This study uses peer achievement as a proxy for social capital, teacher 
experience as a proxy for teacher quality, and the number of AP courses taken by each 
student as a proxy for exposure to rigorous curricula.  Taken together, these resources can 
impact student learning and outcomes. 
Significance 
 While there is ample research on the equity of the allocation of per-pupil 
expenditures (PPEs) across districts and schools, there is very little research on the equity 
of student-level expenditures within schools.  Therefore, the study contributes to school 
finance literature by conducting an equity analysis of tudent-level TREs.  The study also 
contributes to school finance literature by documenting the degree of the variation in per-
pupil TREs within schools relative to the variation between schools.  Finally, the study 
adds to literature on equity in education because it explores within-school allocation of 
specific resources and herein provides an in-depth quity analysis of resources allocated 
to students within the same school.  Though past studies have investigated the equity of 
the allocation of certain resources within schools, few studies have examined the 
interplay of multiple resources with regard to equity.   
This study may also have practical implications for educational leaders and 
policymakers as well.  State, district, and school officials make numerous decisions 
affecting resource allocation, and studies, such as t is one, that examine resource 
allocation at the student level may enable education l leaders at all levels to better target 
their resources to attain state, district, or school funding goals and to improve the equity 
of resource allocation for students in their jurisdictions.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter summarizes the research on equity in education and shows that more 
research is needed to understand the equity of the allocation of resources within schools, 
particularly the equity of per-pupil TREs.  First, this chapter summarizes Berne and 
Stiefel’s (1984) framework, which is a widely used tool to evaluate equity in education.  
Next, it summarizes the existing research on the efficacy and equity of resources that are 
known to matter for student success, including teach rs, class sizes, rigorous academic 
courses, peers, and per-pupil expenditures (PPEs).  There is evidence that these resources 
are often inequitably distributed between districts and schools, and research even 
suggests that some resources are inequitably distributed within schools.  Finally, this 
chapter discusses the factors that influence the within-school resource allocation process 
and whether students within the same school receive equitable resources.   
How Should Equity in Education Be Evaluated? 
Scholars have noted that defining “what, specifically, constitutes equity [in 
education] has been an evolving process” (Rice, Monk, & Zhang, 2010, p. 217).  Decades 
ago, scholars in various fields, including tax policy and legal theory as well as education, 
debated the definition of equity in education (Baker & Green, 2008).  In 1984, Berne and 
Stiefel, reviewed and synthesized much of this literature into what is now the most 
widely used framework for evaluating equity in education (Baker & Green, 2008), and 
this study employs their framework to develop an approach to determine within-school 
resource equity.  
Overview.  Berne and Stiefel (1984) pose four questions for defining and 
evaluating equity–Who? What? How? and How Much?–and the “How” question involves 
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three principals of equity–horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equal opportunity.  With 
“who,” Berne and Stiefel refer to whom should be trea ed equitably–the taxpayer or the 
child–and what should be the level of organization (e.g., district, school, or child) in 
which equity should be evaluated (Baker & Green, 2008).  School finance literature has 
generally focused on equity for children, because children are the “customers” of schools 
(Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 63).  Equity has “historically and traditionally” been analyzed 
at the district level (Odden & Picus, 2008), and only more recently at the school level 
(Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Condron & Roscigno, 2003; Klein, 2008; R. Miller, 2010; Odden, 
Archibald, Fermanich, & Gross, 2003b; Owens & Maiden, 1999; Rubenstein, Schwartz, 
Stiefel, & Amor, 2007; Rubenstein, 1998; Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012; Stiefel, Rubenstein, 
& Berne, 1998; The Education Trust, 2008).  However, Baker and Green (2008) note that, 
“ideally, equity [should] be measured across each indiv dual child or taxpayer using 
precise measures of the educational inputs available to each child” (p. 204).     
Berne and Stiefel’s framework then seeks to define the “what,” or the object that 
is to be distributed equitably.  For example, researchers may investigate whether fiscal 
and physical inputs or student outcomes are equitably distributed.  The equity of fiscal 
resources, which are usually denominated in terms of district-level average PPEs, can be 
analyzed “on a total basis (current operating expenditures per pupil), by function 
(expenditures on administration, instruction, operation and maintenance, transportation, 
etc.), or by program (regular, special education, cmpensatory education, bilingual 
education, etc.)” and are ideally analyzed separately for elementary, middle, and high 
school students because some districts spend more mon y on high schools than 
elementary schools (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 60).  School finance research has mainly 
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employed district-level averages of PPEs because these data are typically available 
(Odden & Picus, 2008).   
Other fiscal and physical inputs may also be used a the object of equity.  These 
inputs may include student-level resources (number of courses a student takes or 
participation in special courses), classroom-level resources (class sizes and quality of 
teacher and curriculum), and school-level resources (professional development, 
instructional leadership, textbooks, and facilities), among others (Baker & Green, 2008; 
Odden & Picus, 2008).  Finally, the “what” may refer to student outcome variables, 
including high school graduation rates, number of academic courses taken, college 
attendance rate, and student achievement on standardized tests (Odden & Picus, 2008).   
Once the object of equity and the resource that is to be equitably distributed are 
selected, the “how” question in Berne and Stiefel’s framework asks which type of equity 
is the goal: horizontal equity, vertical equity, or equal opportunity.  Finally, Berne and 
Stiefel’s “how much” inquiry refers to the degree of inequity that is permissible before 
equity is violated.  The next three subsections address these related concepts.   
Horizontal equity.  Horizontal equity is the equal treatment of equals, which 
means that students with equal needs receive the sam amount of resources (Baker & 
Green, 2008).  However, Odden and Picus (2008) point out that not “all children are 
alike;” hence, horizontal equity analyses are “best applied to subgroups of students” (p. 
66).  Children differ in grade level, prior performance level, disability status, 
socioeconomic background, and English proficiency, and “care must be taken to create a 
legitimate subgroup of students, for which homogeneity claims are valid” (Odden & 
Picus, 2008, p. 67).  Coupled with the fact that dis ricts target funds for a number of 
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reasons (Education Week, 2005), there could potentially be a large number of student 
subgroups when analyzing horizontal equity.  
After a subgroup of “like” students is identified, there are a number of available 
statistics to gauge horizontal equity for these students.  Horizontal equity statistics are 
calculated and then compared to pre-determined criteria o ascertain if horizontal equity 
is achieved (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Odden & Picus, 2008).  
Common horizontal equity statistics include the federal range ratio, coefficient of 
variation, McLoone index, and the Gini coefficient, though some of these are better for 
capturing variation than others1 (Odden & Picus, 2008).  The federal range ratio is a good 
range statistic, is not sensitive to outliers, but it is only based on two values in the data.  
The McLoone index is best for determining the equity of the bottom half of the 
distribution of values.  The Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation (CV) are good 
measures to assess the overall equity and take into account all values.  Other studies 
employ descriptive statistics, such as the range, restricted range, mean, and standard 
deviation, to assess the degree of variation.   
  
                                                
1 Other less commonly used equity statistics include Th il’s measure and Atkinson’s index (Berne & 
Stiefel, 1984).   
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Table 1: Common Horizontal Equity Statistics and Criterions (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; 
Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Odden & Picus, 2008) 
 
Statistic Calculation Range Criterion 
Federal range 
ratio 
Difference between the value at the 
95th percentile and the value at the 5th 
percentile, divided by the value at the 
5th percentile 





Standard deviation divided by the 
mean 
0 for perfect 
equity, 1 for 
maximum 
inequity 
< .1 or < .15 for cross-state 
and district comparisons but 
< .05 for intradistrict studies 
McLoone 
index 
Ratio of the sum of all values below 
the median to the sum if all values 
were the median 
1 for perfect 
equity, 0 for 
maximum 
inequity 
> .9 or > .95 
Gini 
coefficient 
Area of the graph between the Lorenze 
curve and the 45-degree line divided 
by the area under the 45-degree line 
0 for perfect 
equity, 1 for 
maximum 
inequity 
< .05 though most values in 
school finance literature are 
between .1 and .2 
 
The coefficient of variation (CV) is an easily-understood statistic employed to 
evaluate horizontal equity of PPEs (Baird, 2008; Baker, 2001; Berne & Stiefel, 1984; 
Hirth & Eiler, 2005; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Klein, 2008; Maiden & Evans, 2009; 
Rubenstein, Doering, & Gess, 2000), and it is calcul ted by dividing the standard 
deviation of PPEs by the mean PPE.  The CV is a good overall measure of variation 
because it takes into account all values (Odden & Picus, 2008).  One limitation of 
employing CVs to gauge horizontal equity, however, is that the researcher must 
determine an appropriate criterion on which to compare the value of the CV, and this 
process is subjective.  A common criterion for achieving horizontal equity of PPEs in 
studies of interdistrict equity is a CV of less than 0.10, though several scholars argue that 
this criterion is too large for studies of intradistrict spending (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; 
Odden & Picus, 2008).  For example, if the average PPE is $10,000, a CV of 0.10 would 
be obtained if PPEs differ by $2,000 for two-thirds of students and by $4,000 for one 
third of students.  These amounts are large differences for variation in PPEs within 
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districts, and for studies of intradistrict equity, Odden and Picus (2008) suggest using 
0.05 as the CV criterion.  If the average PPE is $10,000, a CV of 0.05 would be obtained 
if PPEs differ by $1,000 for two-thirds of students and by $2,000 for one third of students.  
However, due to limited research on within-school horizontal equity of PPEs, there is no 
commonly accepted criterion for determining within-school horizontal equity of PPEs.  
This issue is addressed in subsequent chapters.   
Vertical equity.  Vertical equity is the unequal treatment of unequals (Odden & 
Picus, 2008) and is based on the assumption that, “Students who bring certain educational 
needs to the classroom require additional resources to address those needs within the 
educational process” (Rodriguez, 2004, p. 7-8).  This idea stems from Rawl’s (1971) 
concept of redress: “Society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets 
and to those born into the less favorable social positions.  The idea is to redress the bias 
of contingencies in the direction of equality” (p. 17). 
Vertical equity may be determined based on characteristics of children, districts, 
or programs (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Districts that serve large numbers of low-income, 
special education, or English language learner students need additional resources to 
achieve the same outcomes (Taylor, Alexander, Gronberg, Jansen, & Keller, 2002).  For 
example, Baltimore City Public Schools must dedicate 23% of its budget to special 
education services compared to the average 14% dedicat  by other districts in Maryland 
(Slavin, 1999).  In addition, some programs cost more than others; vocational education 
and magnet schools cost more than traditional education programs, and science labs are 
more costly to provide than English or math courses (Odden & Picus, 2008).  There may 
be legitimate reasons for providing some of these programs or courses. 
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Costs also vary across geographic regions, and districts may pay different 
amounts for equivalent items due to variations in tra sportation, energy, property, and 
labor market costs (Liu, 2006; Odden & Picus, 2008).  One study found that in eight 
states, costs varied as much as 40% from one part of the state to another (Taylor, 2006).  
Further, in an evaluation of Texas districts, one study determined that teachers required 
higher salaries for teaching in rural districts and in istricts with higher housing costs 
(Taylor, Alexander, Gronberg, Jansen, & Keller, 200).  Districts located in rural areas 
may also enroll a small number of students and may not be able to benefit from 
economies of scale, resulting in higher PPEs for the same educational resources (Odden 
& Picus, 2008). 
Vertical equity, though simple in theory, is difficult to implement due to 
controversy on the reasons why some students, districts, or programs should receive 
additional resources.  However, some of the widely agreed-upon reasons for unequal 
treatment of children include disabilities, physical or mental handicaps, low-income 
backgrounds, and limited English language proficieny (Baker & Duncombe, 2004; 
Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Carey, 2002; Education Week, 2005).  Many state policymakers 
have agreed that special eduation, low-income, and English language learner (ELL) 
students need additional resources to achieve the in ended outcomes (Education Week, 
2005).  More controversial reasons for unequal treatm nt of students include age, grade 
level, and gifted status (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Odden & Picus, 2008). 
There are two ways to gauge vertical inequity.  First, weights are applied to 
students, districts, or programs according to legitima e needs or variations in costs, and 
then a horizontal equity analysis is conducted once again (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Odden 
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& Picus, 2008).  However, just as there is no consensus on characteristics of students, 
districts, and programs that necessitate additional funding, there is also no consensus on 
what these weights should be.  Berne and Stiefel (1984) note that determining these 
weights is the most difficult aspect of vertical equity analysis.  Another approach to 
assessing vertical equity is to employ multiple linear regression (MLR) to test the 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between PPEs and a student or district 
characteristic that warrants additional funding (Berne & Stiefel, 1984); recent research 
primarily employs this method (Baker, 2012; Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Bundt & Leland, 
2001; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; L. Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Owens & Maiden, 1999; 
Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel et al., 1998).  However, Goertz and Stiefel (1998) point out a 
limitation to studies using this approach: Most studies only assess the direction of the 
linear relationship between PPEs and the student or district characteristic and do not 
further analyze the magnitude of the regression coeffi ients, i.e. the implicit funding 
weights.  Odden and Picus (2008) thus remark that this method “essentially skirts 
analysis of vertical equity” (p. 74).  Therefore, vrtical equity analyses should compare 
implicit funding weights to pre-determined criteria.   
The greatest challenge of vertical equity analyses i  selecting criteria on which to 
base vertical equity analyses (Berne & Stiefel, 1984).  Researchers can look to prior 
studies for guidance on how much more districts should spend on students with various 
characteristics to achieve a specific outcome; however, prior research suffers from some 
inconsistencies.  For example, Odden & Picus (2008) find that studies that estimate the 
cost of providing bilingual education produce result  that range from no additional costs 
to an additional 100 percent per student compared to traditional education (Odden & 
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Picus, 2008).  In addition, Duncombe and Yinger (2004) found that a weight of at least 
185% is needed for special education students, but Odden and Picus (2008) remark that a 
weight of 230% is generally accepted for the averag special education student, but costs 
for special education students vary depending on the type of disability (Duncombe & 
Yinger, 2004; Odden & Picus, 2008).   
An alternative approach for selecting criteria on which to assess vertical equity is 
to compare actual funding weights for students with categorical needs to funding weights 
specified in state funding plans (Odden & Picus, 2008).  State funding plans may assign 
funding weights for allocating dollars to districts based on the categorical needs of the 
student populations.  Twenty-eight states allocate additional funds for special education 
students, 25 states do so for English language learners, and 23 states do so for low-
income students (Education Week, 2005).  Though state weights may not reflect the true 
cost differentials in educating students with different needs (Duncombe & Yinger, 2004), 
they do provide one benchmark for categorical funding.  Some states also differentiate 
funding to districts based on other district characteristics, such as district size, number of 
students in each grade level, geographic isolation, eacher qualifications, gifted programs, 
prior student achievement test scores, and cost of living (Education Week, 2005; Huang, 
2004).  Thus, when evaluating vertical equity, multiple dimensions of student and district 
need must be considered.  
Equal opportunity.  Equal opportunity occurs when “there is an absence of a 
relationship between the object [of equity]” and a student, district, or program 
characteristic that should not be associated with the object of equity (Berne & Stiefel, 
1984, p. 26).  For example, access to educational inputs should not be “a function of the 
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wealth of the community in which a child happens to live” (Baker & Green, 2008, p. 204).  
In addition, student race, ethnicity, and gender should not be related to resources received 
(Odden & Picus, 2008).  There are exceptions, however; additional funds may be 
provided to minorities or to female students to spur participation in science, technology, 
engineering, and math (STEM) programs (Odden & Picus, 2008).   
Traditionally, equal opportunity is calculated by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient, which assesses “the degree to which there is a linear relationship between the 
two variables” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 65).  Pearson correlation coefficients range from 
negative one to positive one.  A Pearson correlation coefficient of negative one indicates 
a perfect and negative linear relationship between th  object of equity and the illegitimate 
district or student characteristic.  A Pearson correlation coefficient of positive one 
indicates a perfect and positive linear relationship between the object of equity and the 
illegitimate district or student characteristic.  A Pearson correlation coefficient of zero 
indicates no relationship between the object of equity and the illegitimate district and 
student characteristic.  To test for equal opportunity, both the direction and magnitude of 
the Pearson correlation coefficient should be examined (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Odden & 
Picus, 2008). 
Summary.  Berne and Stiefel (1984) provide a useful framework f  analyzing 
equity in education.  However, equity analyses are complex and based on assumptions 
about which students require extra resources and how much more students who need 
extra resources should receive.  Horizontal equity analyses should account for multiple 
dimensions of student and district need, and vertical equity should be analyzed against 
clearly articulated funding goals.  Measures of equal opportunity should reflect both 
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direction and magnitude of the relationship between th  object of equity and the district 
or student characteristic.   
Are Key Educational Resources Equitably Distributed?    
There is convincing evidence that certain educationl resources are critical for the 
academic success of students.  This section summarizes the research on the efficacy and 
equity of these key resources, which include teachers, class sizes, academically rigorous 
courses, peers, and per-pupil expenditures.  Each subsection first discusses the efficacy 
and then the equity of each resource.   
Teachers.  It is commonly accepted that teachers are the most i portant school-
based factor impacting student achievement (Rice, 2003).  In his landmark study, 
Hanushek (1992) estimated that having a good teacher ( ompared to having a bad 
teacher) increases student achievement by “more than one grade-level equivalent in test 
performance” (p. 107).  Similarly, Goldhaber (2009) reported that a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher quality results in student achievement that is 30-40% higher 
than the average yearly gain.  Teacher quality is often determined by gains in student 
achievement scores, and research consistently finds that there is substantial variation in 
teacher quality (Goldhaber, 2009; Hanushek, 1992).   
Though it is clear that teachers impact student achievement, teacher quality may 
not be associated with observable characteristics of teachers, such as teachers’ 
educational attainment.  There is evidence, however, that teacher salary and experience 
are associated with student achievement.  A number of studies have found that average 
salary in a district is positively associated with average student achievement (Darling-
Hammond, 2007; Hogrebe et al., 2008; Luca, Takano, Hinshaw, & Raisch, 2010).  
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Further, two studies found that the average starting salary, at either the school or district 
level, is also associated with higher student performance (Figlio, 1999; Grubb, 2006).  
Teacher salary may be associated with student achievem nt because higher salaries can 
help attract and retain effective teachers (Slavin, 1999; Theobald & Gritz, 1996).  
Teacher salary may also be positively related to student achievement because teacher 
salary may be partially determined by years of experience, and teachers tend to improve 
with experience (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Elliott, 1998; Hogrebe et al., 2008; 
Ludwig & Bassi, 1999; Okpala, 2002; Perez & Socias, 2008; Stiefel et al., 2003; Wayne 
& Youngs, 2003).  However, the relationship between teacher experience and student 
achievement is not linear.  Teachers improve the most during their first few years of 
teaching (Rice, 2003), and some researchers estimate th t gains from teacher experience 
level off after six to ten years (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, & Wyckoff, 2007). 
Teacher education, particularly in math and science fields, has also been shown to be 
associated with student achievement (Elliott, 1998; Ferguson & Ladd, 1996; Goldhaber 
& Brewer, 1997; Hogrebe et al., 2008; Okpala, 2002; Raudenbush, Fotiu, & Cheong, 
1998; Stiefel et al., 2003; Wayne & Youngs, 2003).  Thus, teacher salary, experience, and 
education are potentially related to student achievement, and due to collective bargaining 
agreements that determine teacher salary, teacher salary is often related to teacher 
experience and education.   
As teachers are arguably the most important school-based instructional resource, 
effective teachers should be equitably distributed.  Most studies that examine the equity 
of the distribution of teachers employ district and school aggregates of teacher quality; in 
these studies, teacher salary and experience are often used as proxies for teacher quality.  
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Numerous studies indicate that the average teacher salary in schools serving large 
proportions of low-income students is substantially less than in other schools (Berne & 
Stiefel, 1994; Rubenstein et al., 2007; Stiefel et al., 1998; The Education Trust, 2008).  A 
study of California schools found that a 10% increase in the school-wide student poverty 
rate is associated with a $411 decrease in average te cher salary for that particular school, 
controlling for other school and district characteristics; the study also estimated that a 
low-poverty school could spend $76,000 more on teach r salaries than a high-poverty 
school (Miller, 2010).  Though highly paid teachers a e not necessarily more effective 
than comparably less well-paid teachers, these “salary gaps” are noteworthy because 
teacher salary may reflect teacher quality to some ext nt.   
Teacher mobility patterns also contribute to the inequitable distribution of 
effective and experienced teachers across schools.  Teachers tend to leave low-
performing, low-income, and high-minority schools (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 
2005; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007) and move to 
schools with “real or perceived” differences in thequality of students and/or resources 
(Condron & Roscigno, 2003, p. 22).  Teachers also move to schools where “average 
teacher quality is like their own” (Feng & Sass, 2011).  Many teachers move from one 
school to another within the same district.  For example, in 1994-95, 23% of teachers 
who left their schools moved to another school within e same district (Condron & 
Roscigno, 2003).   
 Substantial teacher turnover is problematic for a number of reasons.  Effective  
schools require cohesion and community among studens, teachers, and parents, and high 
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levels of turnover can be disruptive and lower the quality of education (Ingersoll, 2001).  
Research has shown that high turnover rates can cause a lack of continuity in instruction 
as well as lack of teaching expertise necessary to make good curriculum decisions and to 
provide support and mentoring to struggling or new t achers (Loeb, Darling-Hammond, 
& Luczak, 2005).  Barnes, Crowe, and Schaefer (2007) note that, “Low performing 
schools rarely close the student achievement gap becaus  they never close the teaching 
quality gap – they are constantly rebuilding their staff” (p. 2).  Further, given that low-
income and low-performing schools have higher rates of turnover, these schools do not 
benefit from their investments in professional development if teachers continue to leave 
(Darling-Hammond, 2007).  
Teacher mobility patterns also result in qualified and effective teachers 
concentrated in some schools and unqualified and ineffective teachers in others.  Schools 
with large numbers of low-income, high-minority, and low-performing students employ 
less-qualified teachers compared to their counterparts (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Darling-
Hammond, 2007; Koski & Horng, 2007; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; Rice, 2010; 
Rubenstein et al., 2007).  One study found that schools serving low-income students 
employed two to three times the rate of inexperienced teachers as schools serving middle-
class students (The Education Trust, 2008).  Another study found that teachers with at 
least six years of experience were more likely to be teaching in schools with fewer 
English language learner, low-income, and minority students than teachers with less 
experience (Feng, 2010); the same study found that teachers with less than two years of 
experience were more likely to teach in low-performing schools and in schools with a 
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higher number of disciplinary incidents compared to m re experienced teachers (Feng, 
2010).   
Despite these inequities, many districts provide few incentives for experienced 
teachers to remain in low-income, low-achieving, and/or high-poverty schools 
(Rubenstein et al., 2007).  In fact, district policies may incentivize teachers to transfer to 
schools with fewer proportions of low-income and minor ty students, if teacher salary 
and evaluation policies remain stagnant across schools in the district and/or if effective 
school leaders are not present in low-income and high-minority schools.   
Though most of the literature analyzes the equitable distribution of teachers 
across districts and schools, a growing body of research suggests that inequity in teacher 
quality exists for students within the same school.  Recent studies suggest that within a 
school, low-performing students are the most likely to be taught by novice teachers and 
the highest performing students are the least likely to be taught by novice teachers 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Feng, 2010; Kalogrides & Loeb, 2013; Kelly, 2004; 
Player, 2010).  Further, studies of teacher quality for elementary school teachers find that 
high-achieving students are systematically assigned to teachers who are more effective 
(Koedel & Betts, 2009; Rothstein, 2008).  Finally, studies have also found that minority, 
low-income, special education, and ELL students and stu ents with more disciplinary 
incidents are more likely to be taught by novice teachers than other students in the same 
school (Feng, 2010; Kalogrides & Loeb, 2013).  All of this research supports the claim 
that there are “considerable” differences in “teacher and classroom characteristics within 
schools” (Goldhaber and Brewer, 1997b, p. 201), and these differences are likely to be 
related to the substantial variation in student achievement for students within the same 
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school.  In fact, one study found that there is six times more variation in student 
achievement across classrooms in the same school than across schools in the same district 
(Demeuse, Crahay, & Monseur, 2001).   
Access to effective teachers is also mediated by track and/or course assignments.  
Studies indicate that high-track courses are more likely to be taught by teachers with 
higher qualifications (Brent, Roellke, & Monk, 1997; Clotfelter et al., 2006; Ingersoll, 
1999; Kelly, 2004; Lee, Croninger, & Smith, 1997; Player, 2010; Roza, 2009; Talbert & 
Ennis, 1990), which means that low-performing students may not have equitable access 
to qualified teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Kelly, 2004; Player, 2010).  Further, students 
are generally not equitably distributed across academic tracks or courses as student race 
and socioeconomic status are statistically significantly associated with assignment to 
advanced, remedial, college preparatory, or vocation l tracks (Darling-Hammond, 2007; 
Gamoran, 1987; Lee et al., 1997).   
Even within the same academic track, however, students of different races may be 
assigned to teachers with different qualifications.  For example, in one study, Black 
students were 57% more likely than White students to be assigned to a novice teacher in 
math and 37% more likely to be assigned to a novice teacher in English (Lee et al., 1997).  
In summary, as Darling-Hammond (2007) explains, teach rs are scarce resources that are 
“allocated to the students whose parents, advocates, or representatives have the most 
political clout,” which results in “the most highly qualified teachers offering the most 
enriched curricula to the most advantaged students” (p. 324).   
Class sizes.  The impact of class sizes on student achievement has been hotly 
contested over the years.  Hanushek initially fueled the debate on the implications of 
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class size by arguing that class size does not matter for student performance (Hanushek, 
1981; Rice, 2002).  However, today, there is some consensus on the issue, and even 
Hanushek agreed that class size matters in certain sce arios (Hanushek, 2006; Rice & 
Schwartz, 2008): in grades K–3, if there are no more than 15 students per class (Krueger, 
2002), and for low-income and minority students (Odden & Picus, 2008).  
Class size indicates the number of students per instructional class, and classroom-
level data are needed to understand the direct impact of class size on achievement.  
Studies that employ pupil-teacher ratios, or the propo tion of the number of students to 
the number of teachers in the school or district, may be misleading because pupil-teacher 
ratios are not good proxies of class size (Odden & Picus, 2008).  For example, special 
education and reading specialist teachers are included in pupil-teacher ratios, though they 
often do not affect actual class sizes.  For this reason, pupil-teacher ratios are most often 
found not to be correlated with student achievement even though class sizes are (Figlio, 
1999; Greene, Huerta, & Richards, 2007; Grubb, 2006; Hogrebe et al., 2008; Okpala, 
2002).   
Most of the research on class sizes has estimated the impact of class sizes on 
student achievement for elementary school students.  Few studies employ classroom-
level data to investigate the impact of class size at the middle and high school levels, 
though available research indicates that class size in middle and high schools may be 
related to student achievement.  Three studies examine the impact of class size using the 
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88), which contains data on 
middle and high school students in the U.S.  Elliott (1998) found that class size predicted 
achievement in science but not in math and only in high-poverty schools.  Ludwig and 
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Bassi (1999) found that class size predicted achievement for both reading and math but 
that the effect was larger for reading than for math.  Finally, Boozer and Rouse (1995) 
found that smaller classes in the 8th grade were associated with increased gains in studen  
performance in history, math, reading, and science; Boozer and Rouse (1995) also found 
that differences in class size partially explain the Black-White racial achievement gap.  
Discrepancies in these findings may be partially explained by the use of different 
methods, outcome variables, and use of additional dat  sources (See Table 2). 
In addition to the studies employing NELS data, onestudy employed classroom-
level data of New Jersey public high schools to estimate the impact of class sizes on gains 
in student achievement; the authors found no effect of lass size on student achievement 
in multiple subjects (Greene, Huerta, & Richards, 2007).  While it is not yet clear the 
extent to which class size is related to student achievement in middle and high schools, 
three out of the these four studies in this review indicate that class sizes in middle and 
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Several studies use school-level data to analyze the quity of pupil-teacher ratios 
(Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Rubenstein 
et al., 2007), but as previously stated, pupil-teach r ratios are not good proxies for actual 
class sizes.  Few studies examine the equity of class sizes using classroom-level data, 
though existing research suggests that class sizes may be an inequitably distributed 
resource.  For example, Boozer and Rouse (1995) found that Black students, compared to 
White students, are more likely to be in schools with larger than average class sizes and 
are more likely to be in larger classes within schools, controlling for prior achievement.  
In addition, a study of high schools in two districts found that AP courses had smaller 
than average class sizes by five students than other courses (Roza, 2009).  More research 
employing classroom-level data is needed to further analyze the equity of class sizes.   
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Academically rigorous courses.  Students have higher achievement when they 
are exposed to academically rigorous content (Carter, 2013; Darling-Hammond, 2007; 
Gamoran, 1987; Madigan, 1997; Muller et al., 2001; Tyson, 2013), and the effect of 
academically rigorous coursework on student achievem nt may be large.  Gamoran 
(1987) estimated that when academic track, course taking, and dropout rates were held 
constant, the effect of socioeconomic status on student achievement was not statistically 
significant.  Further, placement in the low academic track with non-challenging courses 
has been associated with students’ lack of motivation, higher rates of misconduct and 
absenteeism, and lower rates of completing college (Carter, 2013; Kao & Thompson, 
2003). 
There are three primary reasons why academically rigorous courses impact 
student achievement.  First, students may opt or be encouraged to take different numbers 
of academic courses.  Numerous studies have found that number of academic courses 
taken is related to student achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2007; Gamoran, 1987; 
Madigan, 1997; Muller et al., 2001).  For example, Muller et al. (2001) found that the 
number of science courses taken in high school was the only consistent predictor of gains 
in science test scores across all racial/ethnic by gender subgroups; they also found that 
high school science attainment is associated with college coursework and holding careers 
in science, math, and engineering fields, especially for female students.  Similarly, 
Madigan (1997) found that taking eight or more semesters of science is positively 
associated with an increase in science test scores, ev n after controlling for 
socioeconomic status, prior achievement, gender, and r ce.   
 
 34
Second, the curricula and skills emphasized vary across high-track, regular, and 
remedial courses.  For this reason, tracking “exacerbat s differential access to knowledge” 
because remedial courses often focus on basic skills while advanced courses emphasize 
higher-order thinking (Darling-Hammond, 2007, p. 324).  The result is that students who 
are initially placed in low tracks have difficulty switching tracks later and successfully 
competing with other students who have been exposed t  better learning environments 
(Tyson, 2013).   In addition, students in low tracks are sometimes restricted from taking 
more advanced courses because these courses require t ach r approval and/or high grades 
in subsequent courses (Buckley, 2010).  Further, some tracks are “dead-end” tracks, and 
in one study, students in the lowest math track did not have a math course option after 
completing geometry (Buckley, 2010), which is typically offered as a 9th or 10th grade 
math course.  
Third, students in different tracks and courses are exposed to teachers with 
different levels of effectiveness.  Low-track courses are often taught by the least 
experienced teachers (Brent et al., 1997; Lee et al., 1997), and as noted previously, 
teacher experience is associated with increased student achievement.  Lee et al. (1997) 
remark, “The probability that a student is exposed to an experienced teacher falls 
monotonically across the remedial, standard, and advanced courses” (1997, p. 389).  
Relatedly, Ingersoll (1999), using a national survey, found that, in every subject, students 
in low-track classes were more likely to be taught by eachers who were teaching out of 
their field: in English, 24.7% of low-track teachers were not certified to teach in English 
compared to 11.2% of high-track teachers, and in math, 33.5% of low-track teachers were 
not certified to teach in math compared to 20.4% of high-track teachers.  Finally, Talbert 
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and Ennis (1990) found that teachers themselves were tracked and that low-track students 
were primarily taught by low-track teachers.  Compared to other teachers, low-track 
teachers had less administrative and organizational support, less influence over school 
policies, less classroom autonomy, and lower self-efficacy, and were less able to improve 
student achievement.   
Academically rigorous courses are an inequitably distributed resource because 
minorities and low-income students are disproportionately represented in lower academic 
tracks than their White and middle-class counterparts (Darling-Hammond, 2007; 
Gamoran, 1987; Lee et al., 1997).  The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
reported that 40% of Asian, 31% of White, 19% of Black, 15% of Latino, and 11% of 
Native American high school seniors are engaged in “high-level academic, college 
preparatory coursework” (Carter, 2013, p. 150).  This phenomenon is true even after 
controlling for prior student achievement (Buckley, 2010; Conger, 2005; Darling-
Hammond, 2007; Tyson, 2013).  For example, for students who scored in the 99th 
percentile on the California achievement test, 72% of White students were in the most 
advanced English course compared to only 19% of Black students (Mickelson, 2005).  
Similarly, another study found that 50% of Latino students who scored in the 90th 
percentile on state standardized tests were in the coll ge preparatory track compared to 
90% of White students (Darling-Hammond, 2007).   
Further, inequities in academically rigorous courses caused by within-school 
tracking may be exacerbated by across-school differences in curricula because schools 
serving more high-minority and low-income students offer more remedial and vocational 
courses, on average, than other schools (Darling-Hammond, 2007).  Alternatively, there 
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may be a “crowding out” effect where “increasing school racial diversity increases the 
chances that White students will be in the college preparatory track and decreases the 
chances that Blacks will be in that track” (Lucas & Berends, 2007; Tyson, 2013).  
Academic tracks may become associated with student race, and minority students do not 
always feel comfortable being placed in the top academic track if White students are 
overrepresented in this track (Carter, 2013; Tyson, 2013).  For all of these reasons, some 
scholars argue that tracking is one of the main reasons for inequity in educational 
opportunity and outcomes in the United States (Tyson, 2013).  Academically rigorous 
courses, academic tracks, and teacher quality are all related, and taken together, these 
variables “account for much of the school-related contribution to achievement” (Darling-
Hammond, 2007, p. 322). 
Peer effects.  Research has found that peer effects–defined in several ways–relate 
to student outcomes.  Peer effects may be defined as me n achievement or IQ of a 
student’s peers (Boucher, Bramoulle, Djebbari, & Fortin, 2010; Burke & Sass, 2008; 
Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Lefgren, 2004; Levin, 2001), 
educational or college attainment of a student’s peers (Palardy, 2013; Patacchini, Rainone, 
& Zenou, 2011), or disruptive behaviors of a student’s peers (Figlio, 2005).  Peer effects 
may also be defined in terms of concentrations of minority and low-income students 
(Caldas & Bankston, 1997; Ewijk & Sleegers, 2010; Konstantopoulos & Borman, 2011; 
Mickelson, 2005; Raitano & Vona, 2013).  Peer effects may be determined at the school 
or classroom levels.  
The general consensus is that peers who have higher ac ievement and educational 
attainment and less disruptive behaviors positively impact student achievement and 
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educational attainment, and this is true for students in all grades.  Effect sizes of peer 
effects differ across studies, ranging from very small to moderate, which is not surprising 
given that peer effects are defined differently across studies.  There is also disagreement 
whether peer effects impact students of all abilities equally. 
 Levin (2001), using data of Dutch students in grades two through eight, found that 
peer effects–defined as peer mean IQ–have the largest positive impact on the lowest 
ability students.  He concludes, “Students towards the lower end of the conditional 
achievement distribution are ‘dependent’ learners, relying more heavily on the number of 
similar peers relative to their higher achieving counterparts that learn more 
‘independently’” (p. 241).  Burke and Sass (2008) also found that the lowest ability 
students benefit the most from being grouped with the highest ability students.  However, 
they also found that combining the highest and lowest ability students may damper the 
achievement of the highest ability students; the highest ability students benefit from 
having peers that are of middle ability.  Burke and Sass (2008) recommend combining 
high and middle achieving students in classrooms for the best possible results.  These 
findings are consistent with Raitano and Vona’s (2013) conclusion that, in the U.S., some 
heterogeneity of peer effects has a positive relationship with student achievement.  While 
research is less clear on the most efficient strategy for re-distributing higher achieving 
peers to maximize student outcomes, studies consiste tly find that having higher 
achieving peers is positively correlated to students’ educational outcomes.   
Peer effects in terms of concentrations of minority and low-income students have 
been shown to have a negative impact on student achievement (Caldas & Bankston, 
1997; Ewijk & Sleegers, 2010; Konstantopoulos & Borman, 2011; Mickelson, 2005; 
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Raitano & Vona, 2013).  Compared to middle-class students, low-income students are 
more likely to have worse health, more school-to-school mobility, and less educated 
parents, which translate into more disruptions to student learning, a more limited 
vocabulary, and fewer critical thinking skills (Roths ein, 2013).  For these reasons, even 
when school-based resources are equivalent, low-income students have worse 
achievement than middle-class students, on average (Rothstein, 2013).  Further, in 
schools with large numbers of low-income students, the negative effects of poverty are 
exacerbated, and schools often spend time and resources addressing issues of poverty at 
the expense of providing high quality education (Rothstein, 2013).  To the extent that 
race is related to poverty, the same findings occur.  Harris (2006) explains, “It is not race 
per se that affects learning, but the conditions under which minority students are raised 
and the characteristics of their classmates” (p. 18).   
Coupled with the fact that schools and classes with larger proportions of low-
income and minority students may also have lower quality teachers and less rigorous 
curricula (Kalogrides & Loeb, 2013; Southworth, 2010), racial and socioeconomic peer 
effects may have a “profound” impact on student achievement.  For example, one study 
found that “both the racial/ethnic and social class composition of a student’s school are 
175% times more important than a student’s individual race/ethnicity or social class for 
understanding educational outcomes” (Borman & Dowling, 2010, p. 1202).   
A small but growing body of research has investigated the equity of peer effects 
among classrooms in the same school, and three recent studies analyzed this issue.  The 
first study found that schools sorted students into classes primarily based on student 
ability, which was associated with student race and socioeconomic status and resulted in 
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concentrations of low-achieving, minority, and low-income students grouped in certain 
classrooms (Kalogrides, Loeb, & Beteille, 2013).  Another study found that within-school 
sorting of students across classes resulted in segregated classrooms for minority students 
but that differences in student ability did not fully explain student sorting (Conger, 2005); 
in other words, even after controlling for student achievement, minority students were 
more likely to be grouped with low-achieving and minority peers than their non-minority 
counterparts.  A third study found that within-school sorting of students across classes 
resulted in racially and socioeconomically segregatd classrooms, which resulted in 
negative peer effects for minority and low-income students (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 
2003).  This study also found that within-school racial segregation of classes is most 
problematic in middle and high schools where between 50 and 70% of the student 
population is African American (Clotfelter et al., 2003).  In summary, research suggests 
that peer effects–as defined by peer achievement, race or socioeconomic status–impact 
student achievement and are, in many cases, inequitably distributed across classrooms in 
the same school.   
Per-pupil expenditures.  This section discusses the efficacy of per-pupil 
expenditures (PPEs) and equity of the allocation of PPEs.  One scholar notes that PPEs 
are “typically used as a proxy measure for the whole package of school inputs available 
in a school” (Ladd, 2008, p. 406).  Total PPEs include instructional expenditures as well 
as expenditures not related to instruction–such as facilities, transportation, and food 
services.  Instructional PPEs are those related to the instruction of students, and around 
60% of district budgets are spent on instructional resources including teacher salaries and 
benefits, teaching aides, textbooks, and supplies (Odden & Picus, 2008).  The majority of 
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instructional expenditures are spent on teachers’ salaries and benefits (Odden, 2000).  
Class size, which determines the number of teachers needed, is also a large component of 
instructional expenditures (Odden & Picus, 2008).  
In 1981, in his journal article entitled “Throwing Money at Schools,” Hanushek 
released a synthesis of 130 school finance studies and concluded that money spent on K-
12 education is not associated with improved student outcomes.  Since then, many have 
disputed his finding.  Krueger (2002) pointed out that Hanushek equally weighted each 
finding in each study and therefore did not take into account the studies’ sample sizes or 
power, the grades or subjects sampled, or the methodological strengths and weaknesses 
of each study.  Krueger conducted his own analysis of the studies and concluded that 
when the studies are given equal weight–as opposed t  the findings in the studies–money 
spent on public education is related student performance.  Further, Hedges, Laine, and 
Greenwald (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of the same set of studies, taking into 
account the sample sizes and power of each study, an  re ched the opposite conclusion: 
money matters. 
Ten more recent studies have investigated the associ tion between total and 
instructional PPEs and student achievement (See Tabl  3).2  All but one found at least 
one statistically significant positive effect of PPEs on a student outcome in a specific year 
and/or for a specific grade-level (Archibald, 2006; Deke, 2003; Elliott, 1998; Fortune & 
                                                
2 To conduct a fair synthesis on the research on the direct impact of expenditures on student outcomes, I 
conducted a literature review for the years 1994 to 2012, commencing with articles in the Journal of 
Education Finance and Education Finance and Policy and then cross-referencing the citations.  I also 
searched the databases Education Research Complete and the Web of Science using the search terms “per-
pupil expenditure” (PPE) and “expenditure.”  Studies were included in this literature review if they: a) 
examined the impact of instruction-related or total PPEs on student outcomes, b) employed data aggregated 




O’Neil, 1994; Grubb, 2006; Hogrebe et al., 2008; Nyhan & Alkadry, 1999; Roy, 2011; 
Stiefel, Schwartz, Portas, & Kim, 2003).  The studies, however, did not find associations 
between PPEs and all student outcomes or for students in every grade.  The only study 
that did not observe an effect of PPEs on any student outcome was a study conducted by 
Wenglinsky in 1998; however, Wenglisky did find that instructional PPEs were 
associated with the size of the socioeconomic-related chievement gap and that districts 
with higher per-pupil spending had less of a socioeconomic-related achievement gap than 
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According to all but two of these studies, the effect size of total or instructional 
PPEs in predicting student achievement is small or negligible.  Some researchers have 
noted, however, that effect sizes of PPEs on studen outcomes may be underestimated for 
five potential reasons.  First, some studies examine the association between total PPEs 
and student outcomes, and because total PPEs include expenditures that are not related to 
instruction, they may potentially cloud the relationship between instructional PPEs and 
student outcomes (Fortune & O’Neil, 1994).  Second, weak relationships between money 
and student outcomes may exist due to resource substitution in which a school or district 
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may receive more of one resource and less of another.  For example, in their study of 
New York City schools, Berne and Stiefel (1994) found that high-poverty schools had 
smaller class sizes but employed lower-paid teachers.  Thus, the higher expenditures due 
to small class sizes were offset by the lower expenditures due to lower paid teachers.  
Relatedly, Rubenstein et al. (2007) found that while schools with large numbers of low-
income students had higher overall PPEs and fewer pupils per teacher than other schools, 
they also employed less educated and less well-paid st ff.  Several studies have found 
that schools with large proportions of low-income students have smaller class sizes but 
employ lower quality teachers than other schools (Baker, 2012; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; 
Stiefel et al., 1998).   
Third, not all resources are efficiently allocated.  For example, Ilon and Normore 
(2006) show that investments in teacher quality are likely to produce, at a lower cost, 
greater student achievement gains than decreasing class sizes.  In other words, the effect 
of a small monetary investment in class sizes may not be identified if class size is not a 
cost effective variable to influence student achievement.  Fourth, a certain amount of 
resources may be necessary to observe an effect on student achievement.  Fortune & 
O’Neil (1994) found a threshold effect for fiscal resources and estimated that a $700 
increase in PPEs is necessary to observe an effect on student outcomes.  For example, 
reducing a class size by one student may not result in improved student performance 
because studies suggest that class sizes of between 12 and 15 students are needed to 
produce positive results in student achievement (Krueger, 2002). 
Finally, the use of aggregated data may hinder resea ch rs’ ability to correctly 
determine the effect of fiscal resources on student outcomes.  Traditionally, school 
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finance research has employed district-level data (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Odden & Picus, 
2008), which aggregate expenditures and student achievement to the district level.  
However, the most “critical” activities occur at the school or program level, and data 
aggregation to the district level ignores any variation in resources within or between 
schools (Berne & Stiefel, 1994, p. 405).  At least 80% of district budgets are spent at the 
school level (Odden & Archibald, 2001); thus, the assumption that all students within a 
district get the same resources is “bold” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 58).  Researchers have 
noted that studies that examine associations between expenditures and student 
achievement would be improved if students–not district , schools, or classrooms–were 
the unit of observation and if the effect of fiscal resources was analyzed at the student 
level (Jefferson, 2005; Verstegen & King, 1998).   
Nevertheless, given the small effect sizes of PPEs on tudent outcomes, some 
scholars argue that money does not matter.  However, there is ample evidence that 
statistically significant relationships do exist bew en dollars spent and student outcomes.  
Card and Krueger (1998) note that: 
To some extent, interpreting the literature depends on the strength of one’s 
expectations.  If one starts from the position thatschool resources do not make a 
difference, then one can point to the bulk of the evid nce on the lack of a 
statistically significant connection between school resources and test scores, and a 
handful of studies on economic outcomes, to support that view.  On the other 
hand, if one starts from the view that resources do make a difference, then the 
available evidence on school quality and economic out omes may be interpreted 
as generally supportive. (p. 50) 
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Yet, as Slavin (1999) remarks: 
It is clear (and obvious) that increased dollars do not magically transform 
themselves into greater learning.  But it is just as clear (and just as obvious) that 
money can make a difference if spent on specific programs or other investments 
known to be effective. (p. 522) 
Additional spending can improve student performance if the dollars are invested in 
instructional resources that matter for student outc mes, and without money, schools and 
districts are unable to obtain key resources necessary to promote student learning.  
Given the importance of school funding, equity in PPEs is worth investigating.  
Research has shown that inequities in PPEs can exist at every organizational level–
between states, districts, and schools (Ladd et al., 1999).  For students within the same 
state, the equity in the allocation of student-leve PPEs depends on interdistrict, 
intradistrict, and intraschool equity.  
Interdistrict equity.  Property wealth is the primary cause of interdistrict inequity 
in PPEs because districts with greater property wealth h ve a larger tax base with which 
to raise local money for education (Odden & Picus, 2008).  In the early 1900s, districts 
were primarily responsible for raising funding for education; however, as interdistrict 
inequities in funding became more apparent around 1920, states responded by providing 
additional financial support to districts with lower property wealth (Odden & Picus, 
2008).  However, vast inequities in interdistrict spending have persisted.   
In the 1960s, school finance litigation began to play a large role in defining and 
addressing interdistrict equity (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Most notably, in the case of 
Serrano v. Priest II in 1976, the California Supreme Court found the degre  of 
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interdistrict inequity in PPEs to be in violation of the California Constitution, which held 
that education is a fundamental right and that PPEs may not depend on local property 
wealth (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Since then, lawsuits in a number of other states have 
challenged the equity and adequacy of state school finance systems.  Plaintiffs argued 
that resources were not equitably distributed and/or that adequate funding was not 
provided for all students to achieve a basic education, as defined by the individual state 
constitution.  In approximately half of the cases, the state school finance systems were 
overturned and declared to be unconstitutional according to the individual state 
constitutions (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Even when litigation was not pursued, some states 
responded to the threat of litigation by re-designin  their school finance systems to 
ensure greater interdistrict equity (Odden & Picus, 2008).   
Today, states provide roughly half of the funding for public K-12 education: 
50.7% of district funding is provided by the state, 6.9% by the federal government, and 
42.4% by local municipalities.  Further, in 80% of states, states allocate funding to 
districts according to formulas that ensure a minimum per-pupil spending level for all 
districts and provide additional aid to districts with low property wealth; this funding 
structure is called a foundation plan (Odden & Picus, 2008; Park, 2004; Verstegen, 
2002).3  
State foundation plans have not, however, substantially reduced interdistrict 
inequities in PPEs for three reasons.  First, creating a formula that adequately captures 
district need is difficult.  Foundation plans may not adequately account for differences in 
student need (Slavin, 1999), purchasing power across districts in different geographic 
                                                
3 Other states employ modified versions of foundation plans, and seven states allocate funds based on 
student enrollment (Roza, 2010).   
 
 48
locations (Liu, 2006; Odden & Picus, 2008; Taylor, 2006), rising costs of resources, or 
economies of scale (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Second, the process of creating a state 
foundation plan is inherently political and therefor  may impede equity.  State formulas 
that provide no aid to wealthy districts are often not politically popular, and politicians 
may push for political compromises that provide some level of funding to all districts; in 
addition, politicians may create funding “loopholes” to promote the interests of their 
constituents (Bundt & Leland, 2001; Timar, 1994; Toutkoushian & Michael, 2008; 
Verstegen, 2002).  These practices maintain and exacerb te interdistrict inequities (Bundt 
& Leland, 2001; Toutkoushian & Michael, 2008; Verstgen, 2002).  For example, 
Toutkoushian and Michael (2008) found that loopholes regarding school facilities 
provided no additional resources to districts with the lowest PPEs and provided an 
addition $2,700 to districts with the highest PPEs for districts in Indiana.  Third, some 
poor districts responded to increased state support by decreasing local funding while 
other wealthier districts continued to raise additional revenue, resulting in higher PPEs in 
wealthier districts than in poor districts (Driscoll & Salmon, 2008; Odden & Picus, 2008; 
Verstegen, 2002).  Thus, despite their purposes, state foundation plans do not resolve 
interdistrict inequities in many cases (Odden & Picus, 2008).   
In addition, studies that find that increased state involvement in school finance 
decreased interdistrict inequity come with caveats.  For example, Hussar and Sonnenberg 
(2000) found that nationwide, while interdistrict equity of PPEs improved across districts 
within the same state due to state involvement in school finance, interdistrict disparity in 
instructional PPEs persisted.  Another study employing a national database found that 
while interdistrict inequity in PPEs declined from 1972 to 1992, other resources 
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continued to be inequitably distributed; specifically, schools serving larger percentages of 
poor or minority students were more likely to report l wer quality facilities, less 
experienced teachers, fewer AP course offerings, and fewer Internet connections than 
other schools (Corcoran, Evans, Godwin, Murray, & Schwab, 2003).  
Numerous studies have investigated the equity of interdistrict PPEs and found 
inequities in monetary resources.  Hartman (1999) studied a sample of districts in 
Pennsylvania and grouped them into low, middle, and high spending categories.  The 
average difference in PPEs between the low and middle spending districts was $845, 
between the middle and high spending districts was $2,707, and between the low and 
high spending districts was $3,552.  The high spending istricts had larger tax capacities 
in terms of personal income and property wealth and spent considerably more per-pupil 
than low-spending districts.  Similarly, Rolle and Liu (2007) examined interdistrict equity 
in Florida and found that, in 2003, even with state dollars, the more affluent and high-
spending districts outspent the low-spending districts by more than 50%.  Finally, using a 
national sample of districts, Spatig-Amerikaner (201 ) found that across all districts, an 
increase of 10% in non-White students is associated with a decrease of $75 of spending 
per student.  In some states, the differential amounts are more substantial; in Vermont, for 
example, a 10% increase in non-White students is associated with a decrease of $762 per 
student.  In 12 states, the percentage of non-White students is positively associated with 
PPEs.   
 Slavin (1999) argues, however, that student need should be considered in 
analyzing interdistrict equity because districts with more low-income and minority 
students may have greater student need and higher educational costs.  For example, 
 
 50
Bifulco (2005) found that nationwide, the average African American student’s district 
faces costs 30% higher than the average White student’s district.  He notes that at first 
glance, districts with larger percentages of African American students appear to have 
larger PPEs, but controlling for poverty, PPEs are 15% less than those in districts with 
fewer than 20% African American students.  Similarly, other studies employing national 
data and controlling for the proportion of special education students found that in high-
poverty districts, average district PPEs were 5.4% to 15.3% less than in low-poverty 
districts (Wilson, Lambright, & Smeeding, 2006), and i  high-minority districts, average 
district PPEs were 13% to 25% less than in low-minority districts (Wilson et al., 2006).  
These findings indicate that interdistrict inequities n monetary resources persist.  
Intradistrict equity.  In 1998, the Journal of Education Finance dedicated an 
entire issue to intradistrict equity of PPEs and offered two criticisms of studies that 
investigate interdistrict equity: that studies employing data aggregated to the district level 
mask considerable variation in school-level resources and that district-level financial 
resource data do not necessarily inform available instructional resources (Odden, 
Archibald, Fermanich, & Gross, 2003a).  Schools “are the units primarily responsible for 
producing educational outcomes” (Stiefel et al., 1998, p. 447), yet studies employing 
district-level data do not account for variations i resources across schools.  In fact, 
studies have shown that there is more variation in i tradistrict PPEs than in interdistrict 
PPEs (Owens & Maiden, 1999; Speakman et al., 1997).4   
Intradistrict inequity in PPEs results from a number of factors, including teacher 
preferences and collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).  Much of the variation in 
                                                
4 Owens and Maiden (1999) did not include funding for c mpensatory education in their study; they 
examined all other expenditures.     
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across-school spending stems from differences in teach r salaries, which comprise the 
majority of school budgets (Miller, 2010; Rubenstein, 1998; Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012; 
The Education Trust, 2008).  As previously discussed, experienced teachers tend to leave 
low-performing, high-poverty, and high-minority schools (Boyd et al., 2005; Hanushek et 
al., 2004; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001; Rivkin et al., 2005; Scafidi et al., 
2007).  Because teacher salary is correlated to years of experience, schools with large 
numbers of low-income, minority, and low-performing students employ a 
disproportionate percentage of inexperienced teachers and therefore spend less on teacher 
salaries than other schools.  CBAs often include clauses that give experienced teachers 
preferential treatment in transferring to schools of their choice (Miller, 2010), which may 
exacerbate the inequitable distribution of experienced teachers as well as affect total 
spending differences across schools.   
CBAs may also influence school-level average PPEs by dictating maximum class 
sizes (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2013), which ultimately affect the number of 
teachers at each school and thus average spending per student.  In exceptional cases, an 
additional teacher may be assigned to the school even though the class size is too large by 
one student.  Class size may also be affected by staff-based budgeting policies, which 
determine the number of teachers per grade or school based on benchmarks of student 
enrollment (Roza & Miles, 2002; Roza, 2008).  Thus, between-school differences in 
spending on instruction result from teacher choices, CBAs, and staff allocation policies.   
The degree of fiscal intradistrict inequity has been difficult to determine due to 
the lack of reliable school-level data (Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012).  Until 2009, federal 
legislation did not require districts to track actual teacher salaries–only district averages 
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of teacher salaries–and districts did not typically keep track of resources allocated to each 
school; the Department of Education now requires reporting of school-level expenditure 
data (Heuer & Stullich, 2011).  Further, when districts attempted to report school-level 
resource data, the data were often coded inconsistetly, rendering data analysis difficult 
(Stiefel et al., 1998).  
Despite these limitations, several studies have resarched intradistrict equity in 
PPEs and reported findings regarding the horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equal 
opportunity of PPEs within districts (See Table 4).5  Existing research indicates that 
intradistrict inequity exists.  There are inconsistent findings, mainly because the criteria 
for determining equity and the expenditures included to gauge equity vary across studies.  
However, common findings of this literature include that inequity exists for low-income 
and minority students and that the degree of inequity is more severe for expenditures 
related to classroom instruction.   
Concerning intradistrict horizontal equity, two studies concluded that intradistrict 
horizontal equity of PPEs was satisfied because the coefficient of variation (CV) was less 
than .15 (Klein, 2008; Stiefel et al., 2003).  However, Goertz and Stiefel (1998) argue 
that a CV of .15 is too high for studies of intradistrict equity.  An additional two studies 
found violations of horizontal equity–determined by CVs larger than .15–and the degree 
of inequity varied depending on the school grade lev l type (elementary, middle, or high) 
and type of expenditures examined (total, instructional, including special education, 
excluding special education, including compensatory education, and excluding 
                                                
5 I attempted to conduct a comprehensive literature review for this section.  I commenced with articles in 
the Journal of Education Finance and Education Finance and Policy and then cross-referenced the 
citations.  I also searched the databases Education Research Complete and the Web of Science using the 




compensatory education) (Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Rubenstein, 1998).  Thus, whether 
horizontal intradistrict equity was achieved depended on the author’s criterion for 
achieving horizontal equity and which expenditures w re included in the analysis.   
 Other studies examined intradistrict vertical equity and equal opportunity, and, as 
previously discussed, most studies do not differentiate between the concepts of vertical 
equity and equal opportunity; in evaluating vertical equity, most studies only examine the 
existence and direction of the relationship between PPEs and student characteristics as 
opposed to comparing the magnitude of the relationship to a pre-determined criterion.  
Most of these studies found some evidence of vertical inequity or unequal opportunity in 
PPEs between schools in the same district.  A common finding of these studies is that 
total and instructional PPEs are higher in schools with lower proportions of low-income 
and minority students (Baker, 2012; Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Condron & Roscigno, 2003; 
Heuer & Stullich, 2011; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Klein, 2008; Owens & Maiden, 1999; 
Spatig-Amerikaner, 2012).  The degree of vertical inequity or unequal opportunity may 
be considerable in some cases.  Using national data, Spatig-Amerikaner (2012) found that 
across the U.S., predominantly non-White schools spend $733 less per pupil on average 
than predominantly White schools.  Similarly, Condron and Roscigno (2003), who 
examined the allocation of district dollars raised by a local municipality, found that high-
poverty schools received $800 less per pupil than low-poverty schools.   
A second common finding of these studies is that when t e percentage of low-
income or minority students is positively associated with total PPEs, it is negatively 
associated with instructional PPEs or PPEs that exclude funding for special education 
(Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Owens & Maiden, 1999; Rubenst in, 1998; Stiefel et al., 2003).  
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Therefore, though high-poverty and/or high-minority schools may have higher total PPEs 
than other schools, these schools may still be underfunded compared to other schools in 
terms of expenditures dedicated to classroom instruction because these schools must 
spend a larger portion of their budget on special education services.  This finding is 
consistent with research that shows that schools enrolling large percentages of low-
income and/or minority students almost always have low r school-level averages of 
teacher salaries (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; R. Miller, 2010; Roza & Miles, 2002; Rubenstein 
et al., 2007; Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel et al., 1998; The Education Trust, 2008), even 
though they may have higher averages of total PPEs than schools enrolling few low-
income and minority students.  These studies indicate that intradistrict inequity in 




Table 4: Summaries of Studies of Intradistrict Equity in PPEs 
 





schools in five 
urban districts 
in Texas 
NA6 PPEs in schools with 100% poverty 
are 25% more than in schools with 




Schools in New 
York City, NY 
NA Instructional PPEs are negatively 
associated with number of students 
in poverty, and non-instructional 






NA Students in high-poverty schools 
receive roughly $800 less than 
students in more affluent schools of 










Almost 50% of schools had 
PPEs that were more than 10 
percent above or below their 
district’s average. 
Lower PPEs in more than one third 
of schools serving greater 
percentages of low-income students 
than the district average compared to 
schools with fewer low-income 






in New York 
City, NY 
Elementary schools: CV is .126 
for PPEs for regular program 
and .191 for regular and special 
education programs.  Middle 
schools: CV is .156 for PPEs 
for regular program and .195 
for regular and special 
education programs. 
PPEs are negatively associated with 
percent low-income and minority in 
elementary schools only.  Negative 
relationship between PPEs and 
percent of immigrant students.   
(Klein, 2008) Elementary 
Schools in 
Nashville, TN 
CV is 14.9% for PPEs. PPEs decrease as percent of low-







When remove compensatory 
expenditures, PPEs at some 
schools were more than double 
those at other schools.   
Negative association between PPEs 
(excluding compensatory education) 
and percent African-American and 
low-income students; positive 
association between PPEs and 
percent Hispanic; positive 
association between PPEs and 
percent low-income when 
compensatory funds are included. 
(Rubenstein 
et al., 2007) 
Schools in New 




NA Overall: higher PPEs for special 
education and ELL students.  
Elementary schools: PPEs are 
positively associated with percent 
low-income. 
Middle schools: lower PPEs for 
immigrants; PPEs are negatively 
associated with percent minority and 
low-income. 
  
                                                
6 NA indicates that the study did not investigate th particular aspect of equity.   
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 (1) For school-level PPEs, CV 
is .27 in elementary schools 
and .14 in high schools; (2) 
removing special education 
funds, CV is .22 in elementary 
schools and .13 in high schools; 
and (3) removing special 
education and desegregation 
funds, CV is 12 in elementary 
schools and .13 in high schools.   
Positive relationship between PPEs 
and percent low-income but 
negative relationship between 
“general fund” PPEs and percent 
low-income.  (General fund includes 
state and local money to provide 
general and special education.)   
(Stiefel et al., 
1998) 
Schools in New 
York City and 
Rochester, NY, 
Chicago, IL, & 
Forth Worth, 
TX 
CVs are close to .15 and are 
within horizontal equity range.    
In New York and Rochester, general 
education PPEs are positively 
correlated with percent low-income, 
and effect is stronger in middle 
schools.  In Chicago, negative 
relationship between general 
education PPEs and percent low-
income but positive relationship 
between total PPEs (including 
special education funding) and 










NA On average, students attending 
predominantly non-White schools 
receive $733 less than students 
attending predominantly White 
schools. 
 
Intraschool equity.  While there is ample research on interdistrict equity and a 
growing body of research on intradistrict equity of PPEs, research on intraschool equity 
of PPEs is almost nonexistent.  Three dissertations descriptively analyzed how much 
money was spent on individual students in a large uban high school and did not find 
noteworthy inequities in student-level PPEs (Kimball, 2009; Robillard, 2001; Young, 
2003); however, each of these studies examined studen -level expenditures at only one 
school in California, and each school primarily enrolled low-income and minority 
students.  Since the student populations were not racially, ethnically, or 
socioeconomically diverse, there may not have been ad quate variation in student 
characteristics to identify student characteristics that are associated with PPEs.  
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Another dissertation conducted an equity analysis of student-level expenditures 
(in terms of teacher salaries) at two high schools in the same district with dissimilar 
characteristics (Holmes, 2001).  The author found that although there was little variation 
across the two schools in teacher expenditures per tudent and that there was large 
within-school variation; as a result, horizontal equity was not achieved in either school.  
The author also found tradeoffs in resource allocati n: High-achieving students were 
assigned to the highest paid teachers but had larger class sizes than low-achieving 
students.  Finally, the author found that, out of anumber of student characteristics, prior 
student achievement and placement in academic track were the most explanatory factors 
in differential resource allocation.   
The one published study that calculated student-level PPEs did so for students 
within one large urban high school and found that student-level PPEs ranged from $3,615 
to $16,734 and varied according to grade level and academic track (Picus et al., 2002).  
The authors concluded that there were “considerable” diff rences in PPEs for students in 
the same school (Picus et al., 2002, p. 200).   
Three studies have examined differences in expenditures per course for courses 
within the same school.  Though these studies do not calculate student-specific 
expenditures, they provide evidence that substantial variation in within-school resource 
allocation exists and that inequites and inefficienes of course expenditures may exist.  In 
their case study of six high schools in New York, Brent et al. (1997) found that in terms 
of teacher salary expenditures, the most expensive courses per student across the six 
schools were the foreign language and science courses followed by music and special 
education courses.  Concerning academic track, they found that the remedial core-
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academic courses were more costly per student than regular or advanced core-academic 
courses.  Finally, they also found evidence of an inequitable distribution of experienced 
teachers across courses: Experienced teachers competed to teach the advanced courses, 
and novice teachers taught a disproportionate number of low-track courses and courses 
outside of their areas of certification.  Second, i his study of resource allocation for all 
students attending public schools in Ohio, Chambers (1999) found similar results: 
Foreign language courses were more costly per studen  than regular core-academic 
courses, and that special education courses were among the most costly program 
offerings in terms of expenditures per student.   
Lastly and more recently, Roza (2009) analyzed resource allocation in terms of 
per-pupil costs and found that schools spend more in t rms of teacher salary expenditures 
on advanced courses than on regular or low-track courses due to higher teacher salaries.  
For example, while high schools in her study averagd $1,660 per pupil per advanced 
course, the schools averaged $739 per pupil per regular course and $713 per pupil per 
remedial course.  Advanced placement (AP) courses were more costly per student than 
regular-track courses due to higher teacher salaries ($16,656 more on average than other 
teachers) as well as smaller class sizes (five students less on average than other courses).  
These studies suggest that inequities in resources at the individual student level 
exist.  However, one shortcoming of the studies that ex mine course expenditures per 
student–as opposed to student-specific expenditures–is that they do not link course 
expenditures to certain student characteristics.  For example, they do not inform which 
students are enrolled in the remedial, regular, and advanced track courses.  Further, these 
studies do not account for all of a particular student’s courses, and it is possible that some 
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students take multiple advanced and foreign language courses and that the spending 
differentials compound for certain students.  Thus, these studies do not inform the degree 
of variation or inequity in student-specific expenditures for students within the same 
school.  To date, the only studies that calculated s u ent-specific expenditures include 
three dissertations and one published study by Picus and his colleagues.  However, the 
available evidence suggests that variation and inequiti s in resources may exist for 
students within the same school, and more research is needed to understand the within-
school variation and equity of student-level PPEs. 
What Are the Dynamics of the Within-School Resource Allocation Process? 
This section describes the factors that influence the within-school resource 
allocation process and discusses why schools may spend more to educate some students 
than others.  Within-school resource allocation is pr marily determined by teacher and 
student sorting into classes.  This sorting ultimately affects how instructional resources 
are allocated to individual students within schools.  Teacher and student sorting into 
classes has two components: teacher assignment to courses and students and student 
course-taking behaviors 
School leaders influence teacher assignment (Brent et al., 1997; Koski & Horng, 
2007; Leithwood et al., 2004), though how much discretion school leaders have is 
debated.  Some studies indicate that school leaders r  limited in assigning teachers to 
courses due to teacher seniority clauses in CBAs, which allow senior teachers to select 
the courses that they teach (Brent et al., 1997).  A recent study finds that even if CBAs do 
not restrict school leaders in assigning teachers p se, school cultural norms regarding 
teacher seniority may still present barriers to school leaders in allocating teachers as they 
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see fit (Donaldson, 2013).  However, another study found that effective school leaders are 
not hindered by provisions in CBAs in assigning teachers to courses (Koski & Horng, 
2007).  In addition, when school leaders do have influe ce over teacher assignment, they 
may choose to reward and help retain effective teach rs by assigning them to more 
desirable courses or students (Player, 2010), and teachers generally prefer to teach 
higher-income and more advanced students (Ingersoll, 2004).  As teacher salary 
structures are largely static, this is one way thatschool leaders can influence teacher 
satisfaction and retention.  Thus, teacher assignment ay produce inequities in access to 
effective and experienced teachers for some students.   
 Student course-taking behaviors also affect within-school resource allocation and 
access to high-quality teachers because high track courses are more likely to be taught by 
high-quality teachers than low-track courses.  School p licies, parent and student 
preferences, and teacher expectations may all potentially influence student course-taking 
behaviors.  Further, school policies regarding course taking may preclude some students 
from participating in certain courses.  For example, one study by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) found that the most powerful influence on student course-
taking is prerequisite requirements; teacher recommendations and student grades were the 
second greatest factors influencing student participation in courses, and suprisingly, only 
14% of schools placed students in courses based on student achievement scores (Tyson, 
2013).  An additional study that reviewed the litera u e on student course-taking 
behaviors concuded that school policies leave littl room for students to select courses 
(Tyson, 2013).   
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Other research indicates that parents play large roles in student course-taking 
behaviors.  For example, Oakes and Guiton (1995) found that middle-class parents are 
more likely to push their children to take advantage of “open access” course policies for 
advanced courses, while low-income and minority students often opt out of these 
advanced courses.  Student preferences also influence student participation in courses.  
Brent et al. (1997) note that, in addition to parents, “students themselves play an 
important role in terms of actual utilization of teaching resources,” because, “it is 
students who have ultimate control over the availability of their time, interest, and 
commitment to various educational activities” (p. 225).  In addition, studies show that 
students may select courses attended by students of similar race, and minority students 
may opt out of advanced courses if White students are overrepresented in those courses 
(Tyson, 2013). However, one study found that student and parent preferences did not 
fully account for differential course-taking (Oakes & Guiton, 1995); instead, they found 
that differential course-taking was also related to teacher perceptions regarding “race and 
social class differences in [students’] academic ablities and motivation” and that school 
staff did not encourage low-income and minority students to take advanced courses (p. 
28).   
In summary, there are a number of reasons why studen s within the same school 
may receive different instructional resources.  As Kalogrides, Loeb, and Beteille (2013) 
remarked, “The allocation of teachers to students is likely to result from a complex 
process whereby principals and other school leaders attempt to balance short and long 
term goals while responding to pressures to meet th preferences of teachers, students, 
and parents” (p. 105).  Given the complexity and non-transparency of this process, it is 
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possible that teacher and student sorting into classes results in inequitable resources for 
students within the same school. 
This chapter highlights that there is a lack of knowledge on the equity of the 
allocation of resources within schools and at the sudent level.  There is virtually no 
research on the equity of the allocation of instructional expenditures within schools, and 
few studies investigate the equity of the interplay of the allocation of multiple resources.  
This study seeks to address this gap in the literature by conducting a within-school equity 
analysis of a number of resources and determining if the results of the within-school 




Chapter 3: Data Source, District Context, & Variables 
This chapter describes the data source, district context, and variables used in this 
study.  The first section identifies the data source and provides the sample size.  The 
second section describes the context of the district, in luding demographic characteristics, 
financial considerations, and goals and values.  The final section of this chapter defines 
and explains the variables used in this study.   
Data Source 
Education Resource Strategies (ERS) originally colle ted the data analyzed in this 
study.  ERS is a non-profit organization dedicated to transforming how urban school 
systems organize resources–people, time, technology, and money–so that every school 
succeeds for every student.  This study employs ERS’s data collected from one large 
urban public school district for the 2009-10 academic year.  To preserve confidentiality, 
this study does not identify the name or location of the district.  The raw data files contain 
information on student demographics, achievement, and course enrollment; special 
education services; and staff qualifications, salaries, and courses taught.  The author 
cleaned and merged the raw data files to create a flat file linking individual high school 
students to allocated resources.  The sample contains 41,537 high school students in more 
than 20 schools; sample selection is further discussed in Appendix I.  The following table 
outlines documents that were collected and reviewed to more fully understand the district 






Table 5: Data Documents 
 
Source Type of Document 




District Course guide handbook 
Promotion & retention policies 
Collective bargaining agreement 
Description of staff positions 
State Department of Education Annual report 
List of Title 1 schools 
 
District Context 
 This section describes aspects of the district’s context that are relevant to this 
study.  The first subsection shows that this district serves a racially and ethnically diverse 
student population, whose racial and socioeconomic diversity allows this study to explore 
resource allocation patterns for students with different characteristics, and that the district 
employs an atypically larger proportion of minority teachers than other urban school 
districts.  The second subsection discusses financial considerations, which inform what 
percentage of the district’s total budget this study investigates and funding weights 
provided to certain student groups in the state foundation plan.  The final subsection 
discusses district values and goals in order to determine if the district resource investment 
is consistent with their stated priorities.   
Student and school demographics.  The district is located in a major mid-
Atlantic metropolitan area.  The district is chosen b cause it is a large, urban district with 
a diverse student population.  A sufficient number of schools are needed to analyze 
resource allocation patterns across schools, and a diverse student population is needed to 
analyze whether groups of students receive more or f wer resources.  Districts with 
homogenous student populations may still have practically significant within-school 
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variation in the allocation of resources; however, if all students are similar, student 
characteristics cannot be associated with differences in resource allocation.  This district 
has a diverse student population in terms of both race and socio-economic status, and it is 
historically recognized as a being a middle-class African American community.   
Across the district, 79% of high school students are African American, 12% are 
Latino, and 8% are White or Asian; 40% of students qualify for free and reduced priced 
meals (FARMS); and 3% are English language learners (ELLs).  Examining further the 
relationship between student race and socioeconomic status in this district, 40% of 
African American students qualify for FARMS, 68% of Latino students qualify for 
FARMS, 33% of Asian students qualify for FARMS, and 0% of White students qualify 
for FARMS.  None of these high schools receive federal Title 1 funds, though Title 1 
funds are provided to some elementary and middle schools in the district. 











Special Education 9 6 15 
FARMS 40 22 62 
ELL 3 < 1 18 
Race                             African-American 
Latino 
White or Asian 
Other 
79 42 98 
12 1 49 
8 1 27 
< 1 < 1 < 1 
Gender                                             Male 
                                                   Female 
49 55 46 
51 45 54 
Math Achievement       Below Proficient 
Proficient 
Advanced 
29 19 55 
56 37 60 
15 3 44 
English Achievement  Below Proficient 
Proficient 
Advanced 
32 15 51 
53 41 59 





The high schools in the sample differ in terms of student characteristics.  African 
American students are the majority racial group in almost every school, and White, Asian, 
and Latino students are concentrated in certain schools.  Two schools have substantial 
proportions of White and Asian students (27% and 24%), and four schools have 
substantial proportions of Latino students (49%, 47%, 41%, and 39%).  Schools also 
differ in terms of proportions of low-income students:  In a few schools, fewer than 30% 
of students qualify for FARMS; in approximately half of the schools, between 30 and 
50% of students qualify for FARMS; and in a number of schools, 50% or more students 
qualify for FARMS.  Finally, schools differ in student performance.  In a few schools, 
more than 70% of students have passed the state English and math tests; in a few schools, 
between 60 and 70% of students have passed the state tests; in the majority of schools, 
between 50 and 60% of students have passed the state tests; and in a number of schools, 
less than 50% of students have passed the state tests.7   
School-level values of student race distribution, mean achievement, and average 
socioeconomic status are related in this district.  Schools with the largest proportions of 
Latino students have the largest proportions of low-income students.  The two schools 
with substantial White and Asian populations are among the schools with the lowest 
proportions of low-income students and have the highest average student achievement.  
Characteristics of the high schools are outlined in the following tables.  Table 7 
categorizes the number of schools in the sample by racial composition, socioeconomic 
status, and achievement level.  All schools have relativ ly large enrollments, and the 
                                                
7 These percentages are calculated for 10th– 2th graders only, as student achievement data are mostly 
missing for 9th grade students.   
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median school size is 1,841 students, the minimum school size is 918 students, and the 
maximum school size is 3,106 students.8
                                                
8 Descriptives for each school are provided in Appendix II. 
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X    X     X 
 X    X X    
 X    X  X   
  X X     X  
  X  X    X  
  X  X     X 
  X  X   X   
  X   X  X   
  X   X X    
Tables Notes: 
(a) In the two schools with substantial White/Asian populations, White and Asian students comprise 24%and 27% of the student population.     
(b) In the schools with substantial Latino populations, Latino students comprise 41%, 47%, 39%, and 49% of the student population.   
(c) Low-poverty in this table is defined as less than 30% of students qualify for FARMS; mid-poverty is defined as between 30 and 50% of students qualify for 
FARMS; high-poverty is defined as more than 50% of students qualify for FARMS. 
(d) Low-achieving is defined as less than 50% of 10th–12th grade students have passed the state tests in English and math; low- to mid-achieving is defined as 
between 50 and 60% of students have passed these test ; mid- to high-achieving is defined as between 60 and 70% of students have passed state tests; and high-




  Financial considerations.  The author reviewed the district’s Board of 
Education’s annual report to determine the percentage of all district expenditures that are 
accounted for in this study.  Expenditures dedicated to the instruction of students include 
expenditures for teacher salaries, special education, “other instructional costs,” and 
textbooks and supplies.  Instructional expenditures constitute 54.5% of the district budget 
(see Table 8).  This study accounts for the majority f teacher salary expenditures (34.4% 
of the district budget) but does not account for expenditures allocated to substitute 
teachers, interns, paraprofessionals, librarians, or other instructional aides who are not 
included in course enrollment files.  This study also includes a portion of special 
education expenditures (15% of the district budget) b cause it accounts for expenditures 
allocated to special education “classroom teachers,” whether or not these teachers are 
included in the course enrollment files.  As a result, this study accounts for roughly one-
third of all district expenditures and around 60% of instructional expenditures.9   
  
                                                
9 This calculation is based on descriptive analyses and the reported district-wide average expenditure.  The 
district-wide average PPE for the 2009-10 academic year was $12,000.  The average per-pupil TRE 
calculated by this study is approximately $4,000.  Hence, this study accounts for roughly one-third of all 
district expenditures.   
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Table 8: Percent of Expenditures by Category 
 
Expenditure Category Percent of Total Budget 
% 
Instructional salaries 34.4 
Fixed costs 18.0 
Special education 15.0 
Maintenance and operations 9.5 
Mid-level administration 7.0 
Transportation 5.7 
Other instructional costs 3.4 
Central Administration 3.0 
Textbooks and supplies 1.7 
Health services 0.9 
Student personnel services 0.8 
Food services 0.4 
Community services 0.2 
Capital outlay 0.1 
Total instructional 54.5 
Total 100.1 
Table note: Percentages are off by one-tenth due to rounding.   
  The funding structure of the state in which the district resides is also of 
importance in this study.  In this particular state, the state allocates funding for public 
education according to its foundation plan, which supplements district funding and sets 
funding weights for students in certain categories.  The state then allocates funding to 
districts according to student need and in conjunctio  with other legislation that governs 
school finance.  Specifically, the state allocates additional money for special education, 
ELL, and low-income students.  The state’s foundation plan includes a funding weight of 
1.74 for special education students, 1.99 for ELL students, and 1.97 for low-income 
students (Verstegen, 2011).  The district receives substantial funding from the state.  In 
2009-10, the state funded 51% of all district expenditures; local funding from the district 
funded 35% of expenditures, and the federal governmnt funded 12% of expenditures.  
Although none of the high schools in the district received federal Title 1 funds in the 
2009-10 academic year, the district received Title 1 funds, which were allocated to 
elementary and middle schools with larger proportions f low-income students.   
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 District values and goals.  Finally, district values and goals are potentially 
relevant in understanding how the district invests it  resources.  First, the district is 
committed to equity.  Board policy emphasizes that education is a fundamental right and 
that equitable access to a high quality education sh uld be provided to all students.  The 
Board also states that resources should be targeted to students with the greatest academic 
needs.  Second, the district believes that raising achievement is the result of what happens 
in the classroom, and they are committed to targetin  resources to the classroom.  This 
value is particularly relevant to this study because this study focuses on specific 
instructional resources that can be traced to indivdual classrooms.   
 Finally, this district strives to ensure that all graduating students are college 
and/or career ready.  In the 2009-10 academic year,the graduation rate was just over 80%.  
Only one-fourth of graduating students met course requirements to enroll in the premier 
state university, and 50% of students planned to enr ll i  four-year colleges.  Concerning 
job preparation, only 4.5% of graduating students went directly into the workforce, and of 
these students, only 18.5% obtained employment in a field related to their high school 
training program.  The following table below displays data from student decision surveys 
concerning post-graduation plans.  In response to these student outcomes, the district 
stated that it is currently working to both increas cademic course requirements and re-
design vocational programs to provide students withmore opportunities to enroll in 
courses that are relevant, rigorous, and appropriate for college and career readiness.10    
  
                                                
10 All facts in this paragraph are outlined in the Board annual report.   
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Table 9: Post-Graduation Student Decisions 
 Percent of graduating students 
Planned to attend a four-year college 50% 




 This section defines the variables used in this study.  Independent variables 
include student demographic and achievement characteristics.  Dependent variables 
include teacher resource expenditures (TREs) per pupil, class size teacher experience, 
peer achievement, and number of advanced placement (AP) courses.  
Independent variables.  This study assesses if certain student characteristics are 
related to equity of allocated resources.  Student mographic characteristics include 
special education, English language learner (ELL), and low-income status; grade level; 
race/ethnicity; and gender.  The following table outlines and defines student demographic 
variables.     





Description Type of 
Variable 
 Demographic  
SPED Special education status defined by having an individual education 
plan (IEP) (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
Gender Gender (0=male, 1=female) Dichotomous 
POV Free and reduced priced meals (FARMS) status (0=no, 1=yes) 
 
Dichotomous 
ELL ELL status (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
Grade9 Grade 9  (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
Grade10 Grade 10 (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
Grade11 Grade 11 (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
Grade12 Grade 12 (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
Latino Latino (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
African African American (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
WhiteAsian11 White or Asian (0=no, 1=yes) Dichotomous 
                                                
11 White and Asian student subgroups each account for a small percentage of the larger student population 




This study also employs student achievement variables.  The testing structure of 
the state in which the district is located influencs how student achievement variables are 
derived in this study.  In this particular state, students must take and pass four state 
exams–in algebra, English, government, and biology–in order to graduate from high 
school, and students pass these tests if they scoreat a level deemed to be “proficient” or 
“advanced.”  Students may take these tests multiple tim s, and they do not have to take 
these tests annually.  As a result, raw test scores may have different meanings depending 
on the year in which the students took the test.  For example, one would expect student 
performance on tests to increase with age and/or additional years of education; thus, one 
would expect 12th grade students to score higher than 9th grade students.  Therefore, a 9th 
grade student who scores 500 on the English test during his/her 9th grade year is 
theoretically higher achieving than a 12th grade student who scores a 500 on the English 
test during his/her 12th grade year. 
Due to these complications in determining accurate current student achievement, 
this study employs a more basic measure of student achievement.  First, this study creates 
a binary indicator of whether the student has passed th  state test in an academic subject.  
Then, interaction variables between student binary achievement and grade level are 
derived.  In doing so, this study analyzes resource allocation for students with different 
achievement status only for students within the same grade level.  For example, this study 
compares per-pupil TREs for 12th grade students who have passed state tests to per-pu il 
TREs for 12th grade students who have not passed state tests.  Though coding choice 
allows for a clear comparison of resources for students who have passed state tests with 
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those who have not.  Passing state tests is particul ly important in this district because 
students must pass state tests to graduate from high school.  Student achievement is not 
examined for 9th grade students, as few students take state tests th ir freshman year, and 
student achievement data are generally not available for these students.   The following 
table provides a summary of the student achievement variables derived and employed in 
this study.   





Description Type of 
Variable 
 Achievement  
Gr10PELA Interaction variable indicating whether a 10th grade student has passed 
the state English test (0=no, 1=yes)  
Dichotomous 
Gr10PMath Interaction variable indicating whether a 10th grade student has passed 
the state math test (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
Gr11PELA Interaction variable indicating whether a 11th grade student has passed 
the state English test (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
Gr11PMath Interaction variable indicating whether a 11th grade student has passed 
the state math test (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
Gr12PELA Interaction variable indicating whether a 12th grade student has passed 
the state English test (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
Gr12PMath Interaction variable indicating whether a 12th grade student has passed 
the state math test (0=no, 1=yes) 
Dichotomous 
 
Available achievement data by grade are summarized in the table below.  Note 
that the percentage of students who have passed the test and the mean test scores increase 
with student grade level.  Most students have taken both the English and math tests at 
least once by the end of their 10th grade year.   


















9th 5.5% 2% 375 74.9% 37% 375 
10th 75.7% 47% 399 85.7% 52% 414 
11th 86.6% 60% 405 88.5% 64% 423 




School-level variables are also created based on aggregates of student 
demographic and achievement variables for each school.  School-level demographic and 
achievement variables are outlined and defined in the following table. 







 Demographic  
SCHSPED % of special education students in the school Continuous 
SCHPOV % of students in the school who qualify for FARMS Continuous 
SCHELL % of ELLs in the school Continuous 
SCHLatin % of Latino students in the school Continuous 
SCHAfrican % of African American students in the school Continuous 
SCHWhAs % of White and Asian students in the school Continuous 
SCHSize Total enrollment Continuous 
 Achievement  
SCHELA Average raw score on state English test for all students in a school Continuous 
SCHMath Average raw score on state math test for all students in a school Continuous 
SCHPELA Percent of 10th–12th grade students who have passed the state English test 
in the school 
Continuous 
SCHPMath Percent of 10th–12th grade students who have passed the state math test in
the school 
Continuous 
SCHAchieve Principal component score for school that is  weighted linear 
combination of the previous four school-level achievement variables 
Continuous 
 
Dependent variables.  This study merges numerous district raw data files to 
create one flat file with a student identification number linked to a number of resources, 
including teacher resource expenditures per pupil, resources in students’ English and 
math classes, and number of AP courses taken.  The following subsections define 
resource variables and discuss key assumptions in determining these variables. 
Teacher resource expenditures per pupil.  This study defines teacher resource 
expenditures (TREs) as the amount spent per pupil on teacher salaries.  In this district, 
TREs account for roughly one-third of all district expenditures and 60% of instructional 
expenditures.  The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (2013a) defines 
instructional expenditures as follows:  
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Instruction expenditures are for services and materials directly related to 
classroom instruction and the interaction between tachers and students.  Teacher 
salaries and benefits, textbooks, classroom supplies and extra curricular activities 
are included in Instruction. (p. 1) 
According to NCES’s definition, there are other instructional expenditures that this study 
does not account for, such as textbooks, classroom supplies, teacher benefits,12 and 
extracurricular activities relating to instruction.  This study also does not account for 
money spent on instructional or teacher aides who instruct students but who do not 
appear in course enrollment files.  In this study, per-pupil TREs reflect how teacher 
salaries are ultimately allocated to students.   
 How teacher salaries are allocated to students was determined by a number of 
factors, including class sizes, teacher course loads, student course-taking behaviors, and 
length and duration of courses.  Per-pupil TREs were calculated by the following method: 
First, each teacher’s salary was evenly divided among the teacher’s courses, accounting 
for the duration and term length of the course.  For example, full-year courses were 
allocated a larger proportion of a teacher’s salary than courses that met for only one 
quarter or semester.  In addition, teachers who taught a few number of courses were 
identified and course expenditures were adjusted.13  This analysis resulted in course 
expenditures.  Then, course expenditures were divided by class size, yielding course 
expenditures per student.  Finally, for each student, the course expenditures per students 
were aggregated for each student to reflect the per-pupil TRE for each student in the 
                                                
12 In this district, teacher salary expenditures excluding benefits are strongly correlated with teacher salary 
expenditures including benefits (r = .975).  For this reason, this study examines teacher salary expenditures 
only.    
13 See Appendix I for more detail.   
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district.  The following figure depicts the allocation of teacher salaries to individual 
students. 




 Per-pupil TREs partially depend on the number of courses that each student takes.  
However, when examining descriptive statistics, it does not appear that number of 
courses taken dramatically varies across students with different characteristics.  Twelfth 
grade students take fewer courses than younger students, on average, and there is more 
variation in number of courses taken for 12th grade students.  When examining 
differences in number of courses taken for 12th grade students who have passed the state 
standardized tests, there is no difference in number of courses taken for 12th grade 
students who have different achievement status in math.  Twelfth grade students who 
have passed the state English test take 0.2 courses more than 12th grade students who 
have not passed the state English test on average.  Thus, although student course loads 
are one component of per-pupil TREs, large discrepancies in per-pupil TREs for students 
of different characteristics are not likely to the result of different numbers of courses 
Teacher’s 
Salary 
Course A Course B Course C 
Accounting for time  
& duration of course &  








Taking into account 
class sizes 




Table 14: Number of Courses Taken By Students According to Student Characteristics 
 
 Mean Number of 
Courses Taken 
Standard Deviation 
Special Education                              Yes 





FARMS                                              Yes 





ELL                                                    Yes 





Race                             African-American 
Latino 







Gender                                             Male 





Grade                                                  9th 
                                                       10th 
                                                       11th 









Math Achievement               Passed Test 





English Achievement           Passed Test 






 Per-pupil TREs are calculated for instruction in all courses and for instruction in 
core-academic courses only.  Total per-pupil TREs include teacher salary expenditures 
associated with all instruction–academic, elective, or vocational–but do not include 
expenditures relating to physical education, team sport , and personal fitness courses or 
courses in which a student is placed in an internship outside of the school.  Core-
academic TREs per pupil include traditional college-pr paratory courses and academic 
courses in the English, math, science, history, reading, and foreign language departments.  
The following table outlines per-pupil TRE variables and relevant variables in calculating 




Table 15: Per-pupil TRE Variables and Related Course and Teacher Variables  
 
Variable Name Description Variable Type 
STUDENT-LEVEL VARIABLES 
TRE Teacher resource expenditure per pupil, outliers r moved14 Continuous 
TRE_CA Teacher resource expenditure per pupil, core-academic subjects 
only and outliers removed 
Continuous 
COURSE-LEVEL VARIABLES  
Class_Size Class size of course Continuous 
Course_Exp Course expenditure Continuous 
Course_Exp_PP Course expenditure per pupil Continuous 
TEACHER-LEVEL VARIABLES  
Teacher_Salary Teacher salary Continuous 
 
 In addition, regardless of whether special education, ELL, and reading classroom 
teachers were included in course enrollment files, these teacher salaries were allocated to 
students who benefit from their instruction.  More detailed information about how these 
TREs per pupil were estimated as well as a discussion on how irregularities in the data 
were handled is provided in Appendix I.  Appendix I also summarizes decision rules 
regarding missing data imputation and procedures for handling outliers.  
  Teacher salary data were not straightforward, and the financial file contained line 
item expenditures allocated to individual teachers fo  various purposes.  In determining 
teacher salary, this study included all expenditures that are directly related to instruction 
and aggregated regular, leave, and performance pay and other stipends granted for 
teaching purposes.  This study did not include teacher expenditures that are indirectly 
related to instruction, occur outside of the regular school year, or involve activities not 
related to instruction, such as professional development, summer school, and athletic 
coaching.  Using these decision rules, the average high school teacher salary was $66,944.  
In this district, teacher salaries are determined by a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA), which ties base salary to teacher years of experience, certification level, and 
                                                
14 See Appendix I for a discussion of treatment of outliers. 
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education.  The Pearson correlation coefficient betwe n teachers’ salaries and years in the 
district is r = .476 (p < .001).  Hence, teachers’ years of teaching in the district explained 
22.6% of variation in teacher salaries.  During the 2009–10 academic year, teachers’ 
salaries were not tied to measures of effectiveness.  The following table provides 
descriptive information for teacher salaries.   






Standard Deviation 25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
Teacher Salary $66,944 $66,485 $17,692 $53,581 $82,873 
 
Class sizes, teacher experience, peer achievement, and number of AP courses.  
Based on course enrollment data, this study also derives specific resource variables that 
reflect observable differences in classroom resources.  The following table provides an 










NETF New English teacher flag indicating whether the student’s English teacher is 
new to the school, or has taught for less than three years in the school; if the 
student is enrolled in more than one English class, the average years of 
experience of the English teachers is first calculated and then the student is 
tagged as having a new English teacher if the average is less than three years 
in the school (0=no, 1=yes)15 
Dichotomous 
NMTF New math teacher flag indicating whether the student’s math teacher is new 
to the school, or has taught for less than three years in the school; the student 
is enrolled in more than one math class, the average years of experience of 
the math teachers is first calculated and then the student is tagged as having a 
new math teacher if the average is less than three years in the school (0=no, 
1=yes)16 
Dichotomous 
ELACS The class size of the student’s English class; if the student is enrolled in more 
than one English class, the class sizes are averaged 
Continuous 
MathCS The class size of the student’s math class; if the student is enrolled in more 
than one math class, the class sizes are averaged 
Continuous 
PeerEPer Peer achievement in English class defined by the percent of peers in English 
class who have passed the state English test; if the student is enrolled in more 
than one English class, peer achievement of the classes are averaged 
Continuous 
PeerMPer Peer achievement in math class defined by the percent of peers in math class 
who have passed the state math test; if the student is rolled in more than 
one math class, peer achievement of the classes are ave aged 
Continuous 
AP Number of AP courses a student is enrolled in for the academic year Count 
 
This study focuses on resources in students’ English and math classes because 
these classes are essential for student success on state high school graduation exams as 
well as on national standardized tests often used for college admissions for students who 
wish to pursue post-secondary education.  Second, resea ch on the efficacy of resources 
such as class size and teacher experience has typicall  analyzed student outcomes in 
English and math, and therefore, it is unknown if class sizes and teacher experience are 
related to student outcomes in all academic subjects.  Third, averages of class sizes and 
teacher experience may not be as informative as actual lass sizes; for example, if a 
student is enrolled in a math class with a large number of students and an English course 
                                                
15 Forty-two percent of students are enrolled in more than one course in the English department.  
16 Thirty-five percent of students are enrolled in more than one course in the math department. 
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with a small number of students, the student’s averag  class size does not reflect this 
variability.  Thus, by focusing on available resources in students’ English and math 
classes, this study provides a more nuanced analysis of resource allocation.  These 
resource variables are derived as follows:   
Class size.  This study defines class size as the actual classsize of a student’s 
English or math class.  In some cases, students are enrolled in more than one English or 
math class.  In these cases, class sizes are averaged across all English or math courses per 
student.17   
Teacher experience.18  In this study, experienced teachers–in either English or 
math class–are defined to be teachers who have been teaching in the school for at least 
three years; total years of teaching experience are not available.  It appears that, in this 
district, teachers who are new to their schools are also new to the district: Years in the 
district are highly correlated with years in the school (r = .969, p < .001, and see Table 
18).  It also appears that teachers who are new to the schools generally have lower 
salaries and hence likely have fewer total years of teaching experience than other teachers.  
However, some teachers with less than three years experi nce in the school have high 
teacher salaries, indicating these teachers are not new eachers.  In summary, in most 
cases, teachers who are new to the school are also new to the profession, but there are 
some exceptions. 
  
                                                
17 One result of this decision is that class sizes vary at the student level and are not constant at the 
classroom level.  In addition, even though class sizes are averaged, TREs per course category per student 
are not.  In other words, if a student is enrolled in two English courses, expenditures per student for both 
courses are allocated to the student and are reflected in the TRE for that student.   
18 This study recognizes that teacher certification and dvanced degrees for high school math teachers has 
also been shown to impact student outcomes.  Teacher exp rience has a similar impact on student outcomes 
as teacher certification and advanced degrees, and te cher experience, like teacher certification and 
advanced degrees, partially drives teacher salaries.   
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Standard Deviation 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Teacher Years in District 8.5 5.9 8.5 2.9 10.9 
Teacher Years in School 8.4 5.8 8.2 2.9 10.7 
 
Based on the number of years the teacher has been teaching in the school, the 
author creates a dummy variable that flags teachers with less than three years of 
experience in the school.  Research indicates that teachers are much more effective after 
their first few years of teaching (Rice, 2010), and to be consistent with the literature, this 
study employs this dummy variable as opposed to total years of experience teaching in 
the school. 
In some cases, students are enrolled in more than one English or math class.  For a 
student who is enrolled in more than one English class, the average years of teaching 
experience in the school of the student’s English teachers is first calculated and then the 
student is tagged as having a new English teacher if this average is less than three years 
of teaching experience in the school.  The same appro ch applies to identifying teacher 
experience for students who are enrolled in more than one math class.  For example, if a 
student benefits from the instruction of an experienced math teacher and also has a novice 
math teacher, the student is still taught by at least one experienced math teacher.  
Therefore, if a student is enrolled in more than one math course, the student is considered 
to be taught by a novice math teacher if the student oes not have at least one 
experienced teacher.   
Peer achievement.  This study defines peer achievement in English as t e 
percentage of a student’s peers in English class who have passed the state standardized 
test in English.  Similarly, peer achievement in math is the percentage of a student’s peers 
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in math class who have passed the state standardized test in math.  These percentages 
exclude the particular student’s achievement, and if the student is enrolled in more than 
one English or math course, peer achievement is averaged across courses for each 
academic subject.19 
Number of AP courses.  Finally, to gauge access to academically rigorous courses, 
this study also examines the number of AP courses taken by 11th and 12th grade students.  
This study calculates the number of AP courses taken by each 11th and 12th grade student 
during the 2009-10 academic year.  The number of AP courses is only calculated for 11th 
and 12th grade students because few younger students are enrolled in AP courses.  
This district has an “open door” policy for AP courses meaning that any student 
may enroll in any AP course, though students with prior high achievement are especially 
encouraged to participate in AP courses.20  All schools offer AP courses in the following 
subjects: biology, calculus, English language, English literature, human geography, U.S. 
government, psychology, statistics, and world history, and individual schools may choose 
to offer additional AP courses.  The most frequently offered AP courses are in English 
and psychology, and the AP courses offered the least frequently are in sciences and math.  
Student enrollment in AP courses reflects both school informal practices that influence 
teacher and student sorting into courses as well as student choices.   
School-level resource variables.  School-level aggregates of resource variables 
are also derived from student-level variables (See Table 19).  In some cases, school-level 
aggregates only include students in certain grades.  For example, the school-level 
aggregate of number of AP courses taken by students is calculated only for 11th and 12th 
                                                
19 Averaging peer achievement when there is more than one class is a method employed by a recent study 
analyzing the distribution of peer achievement (Kalogrides & Loeb, 2013).   
20 Information provided in the Board’s annual report.   
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grade students as few 9th and 10th grade students enroll in AP courses.  In addition, due to 
the large amount of missing achievement data for 9th grade students, school-level 
aggregates of peer achievement are calculated for 10th through 12th grade students only.  
School-level aggregates of resource variables by school are provided in Appendix II. 







SCHTRE Average per-pupil TRE Continuous 
SCHTRE_CA Average core-academic TRE per pupil Continuous 
SCHELACS Average English class size in school Continuous 
SCHMathCS Average math class size in school Continuous 
SCHNETF Proportion of students in school with inexprienced English teacher  Continuous 
SCHNMTF Proportion of students in school with inexprienced math teacher Continuous 
SCHAP Average number of AP courses taken by 11th and 12th grade students in 
school 
Continuous 
SCHPeerEPer Average percent of peers in English class who have passed state English 
test for 10th–12th graders in school 
Continuous 
SCHPeerMPer Average percent of peers in math class who have passed state math test 




Chapter 4: Methods  
This chapter discusses the methods employed in this study.  Most notably, it 
outlines the analytic approach used to conduct a within-school equity analysis of resource 
allocation; the following sections also discuss the methods employed to address the other 
research questions.  Table 20, below, provides an overview of the models utilized in this 
study.  The chapter concludes by providing information on the software used in this study.   
Table 20: Methods Utilized To Address Research Questions 
 




How does the within-school 
variation in teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 





TRE Teacher resource expenditure per pupil 
TRE_CA Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditure per pupil 
Are teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
equitably distributed within 
schools? 
MLM & Simple 
linear regression 
(SLR) 
TRE Teacher resource expenditure per pupil 
TRE_CA Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditure per pupil 
Do within-school allocation 
patterns of teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil vary 
across schools? 
MLM TRE Teacher resource expenditure per pupil 
TRE_CA Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditure per pupil 
Are specific resources 
equitably allocated within 
schools, and do multiple 
resource advantages or 





TRE Teacher resource expenditure per pupil 
TRE_CA Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditure per pupil 
MLR ELACS Class size in English 
MathCS Class size in math 
Logistic 
regression 
NETF New English teacher flag 
NMTF New math teacher flag 
Poisson 
regression 
AP Number of AP courses 
MLR PeerPELA Percent of peers in English class who 
have passed state English test 
PeerPMath Percent of peers in math class who have 
passed state math test 
 
 The first three research questions concern the equity of the allocation of teacher 
resource expenditures (TREs) per pupil.  This study employs multilevel modeling (MLM) 
and simple linear regression (SLR) to evaluate the equity of the allocation of TREs per 
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pupil.  The last research question concerns the equity of the allocation of resources in 
students’ English and math classes and the number of AP courses taken by students.  To 
address the last research question, this study employs regression analysis for each school 
to gain a more nuanced understanding of the equity of the allocation of a number of 
resources within schools.   
Within-School Variation in Per-Pupil TREs 
 Before any equity analysis of per-pupil TREs is conducted, this study tests if there 
is indeed considerable within-school variation in per- upil TREs compared to the 
variation between schools.  To address the first research question, “How does the within-
school variation in teacher resource expenditures pr pupil compare to the variation 
between schools?” this study employs multilevel modeling (MLM) because it determines 
if differences in per-pupil TREs are primarily the result of differences in spending 
between or within schools.  To do so, MLMs compare the proportion of the variation in 
per-pupil TREs that occurs within schools to the proportion that occurs between schools.  
This analysis is necessary for this study because if within-school differences in per-pupil 
TREs exist and yet are small compared to between-school variation in per-pupil TREs, 
then policies should instead focus on equalizing resources between schools instead of 
addressing resource equity within schools.   
 MLM is the most appropriate method to analyze data wi h multiple levels (Bickel, 
2007; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 21  In this study, students are 
                                                
21 Ignoring the multilevel structure of the data also potentially results in biased results (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003).  In particular, the multiple linear regression (MLR) assumption that the residuals of 
individual students are independent from each other is violated in data with multiple levels (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003).  Because all students within t e same school experience the same environment, 
observations of students in a particular school mayshare values on unobserved variables (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002).  The result is that residuals of students within one particular school may be correlated, 
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“nested” within schools and two levels are present: students at level 1 and schools at level 
2.  Student characteristics are referred to as level-1 ariables and school characteristics as 
level-2 variables.   
 To parse the variation to the student and school levels, this study estimates the 
following multilevel model (MLM): the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
random effects, also known as the fully unconditional model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
This model is represented by the following: 
Equation 1: Null MLM of Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Y  β  r 
β  γ  u 
Where: 
Y: per-pupil TRE for the ith student in school j 
β: school-level mean TRE per pupil for school j 
r: residual for the ith student in school j 
γ: grand mean, average of all school means 
u: random school effect, or residual for school j.22   
This model also provides an estimate for the grand mean, which is the average of all 
school-level mean TREs.  More importantly, this model provides information on what 
proportion of the variance in per-pupil TREs occurs within schools compared to between 
schools (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), or the 
proportion of variance in per-pupil TREs that occurs between schools, can be calculated 
from the estimates of this model.  The ICC is calcul ted as follows: 
                                                                                                                                      
violating the MLR assumption of independence (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  This violation causes 
standard errors of the regression coefficients that are too small and increased Type I error rates (Cohen et 
al., 2003).  In other words, independent variables may be found to be statistically significant predictors of 
the dependent variable when in fact, they are not. MLM accounts for nested data structures and provides 
better estimates of standard errors (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
 
22 Model assumptions are further discussed in Appendix IV.   
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Equation 2: Formula for ICC 
 
ICC  ττ  σ 
Where: 
τ: the variance in Y attributable to between-school differences, Varu   τ 
σ: the variance in Y attributable to within-school differences, Varr   σ. 
 
If the within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is statistically and practically significant 
compared to the between-school variation, indicated by a small ICC, an investigation of 
within-school fiscal resource equity is warranted.   
Equity Analysis of Per-Pupil TREs 
To address the second research question, “Are teacher resource expenditures per 
pupil equitably distributed within schools?” this study develops an analytic approach for 
evaluating the equity of per-pupil TREs.  This analysis has multiple parts corresponding 
to Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) framework for evaluating equity in education: horizontal 
equity, vertical equity, and equal opportunity.  
Horizontal equity.  Horizontal equity is the equal treatment of equals, which 
implies that all students with equal needs receive the same amount of resources (Baker & 
Green, 2008).  However, Odden and Picus (2008) point out that not “all children are alike” 
(p. 66).  Children differ in grade level, prior performance, disability, low-income 
background, and limited English ability, and identifying subgroups of “like” students is 
difficult.  For this reason, Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) argue that it would be very 
difficult to conduct a horizontal equity analysis for each subgroup of “like” students 
because there would be a large number of student subgro ps.  They remark that an 
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important limitation of traditional horizontal equity analyses is that they “do not generally 
account for the effects of multiple dimensions of student and district need” (p. 398).   
To resolve this issue, Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) provide one approach for 
analyzing horizontal equity that utilizes MLR to control for multiple factors of student 
need.  Their idea is that once certain student needs are controlled for, then students are 
alike, and horizontal equity may be evaluated.  Thefirst step of their approach is to 
regress PPEs on legitimate categories of student need to obtain the residuals, or the 
differences between actual PPEs and expected PPEs given student needs.  They argue 
that the residuals represent the differences in dollars for “like” students.  Then, horizontal 
equity is determined based on the variation of the residuals instead of the actual PPEs.  
Conceptually, analyzing the variation of the residuals is similar to analyzing the variation 
of PPEs, but using the residuals instead of the actual PPEs controls for some reasons why 
per-pupil TREs differ across students.   
The second step of their approach is to calculate the s andard error of the estimate, 
which “represent[s] the average amount of variability” in PPEs across “like” students (p. 
407).  Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) posit that horizontal equity is achieved when the 
standard error of the estimate is 0; in other words, horizontal equity is violated if there is 
any variability in PPEs after controlling for student needs.  One flaw to their approach, 
however, is that it does not allow for any variability in spending on “like” students before 
horizontal equity is violated, yet traditional horizontal equity analyses typically allow for 
some variation before horizontal equity is violated (Odden & Picus, 2008).  To be 
consistent with traditional horizontal equity analyses, this study diverges from 
Toutkoushian and Michael’s (2007) approach at this step and instead allows for some 
 
 91
variation in PPEs before horizontal equity is violated.  The following paragraphs outline 
this study’s analytic approach for evaluating horizntal equity.   
According to the literature, students who differ on the following variables are not 
alike: special education, ELL, and low-income status and grade level (Odden & Picus, 
2008).  Further, the state in which this district is located allocates additional funding for 
special education, ELL, and low-income students (Verstegen, 2011); hence, these 
students are unlike other students who do not need additional resources.  In addition, 
grade level is also a common variable for defining “like” student subgroups because 
districts may target resources to students in certain gr des (Odden & Picus, 2008).  Thus, 
this study identifies “like” students as students who are in the same grade and who are 
similar in terms of special education, ELL, and low-income status.   
 This study first obtains the residuals of PPEs using Toutkoushian and Michael's 
(2007) MLR approach, controlling for special education, ELL, and low-income status and 
grade level, and then calculates the coefficient of variation (CV) using the residuals from 
the MLR analysis.  The CV is a common statistic used to evaluate horizontal equity of 
PPEs (Odden & Picus, 2008), and it is typically calculated by dividing the standard 
deviation of PPEs by the mean PPE.  The study employs the CV to evaluate the degree of 
variation because the CV is a good overall measure of variation because it takes into 
account all values in the data, and it is easily understood and interpretable.  The study 
calculates the CV by dividing the standard deviation of the residuals by the average per-
pupil amount.  Therefore, in this study, the CV represents the degree of variation in PPEs 
after controlling for special education, ELL, and low-income status and grade level.  
Then, to determine if horizontal equity is achieved, this study compares the CV with a 
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pre-determined criterion.  Therefore, unlike Toutkoushian and Michael’s (2007) approach, 
this analysis allows for some variation in PPEs before horizontal equity is violated.  
 To determine if horizontal equity is achieved, typically, the CV of PPEs is 
compared to a pre-determined criterion.  A common criterion for achieving horizontal 
equity of PPEs in studies of interdistrict equity is a CV of less than 0.10, though several 
scholars argue that this criterion is too large for studies of intradistrict spending (Goertz 
& Stiefel, 1998; Odden & Picus, 2008).  However, due to limited research on within-
school horizontal equity of PPEs, there is no commonly accepted criterion for 
determining within-school horizontal equity.  This study proposes the following 
approach:  As per-pupil TREs are largely determined by teacher salaries, and there is 
variation of teacher salaries within schools, this study first calculates the CV of teacher 
salaries, and this value serves as the criterion for determining horizontal equity of PPEs 
within schools.  The logic is that if per-pupil TREs do not vary more than teacher salaries 
within schools, horizontal equity is achieved.  Alternatively, if the CV of the residuals is 
greater than the CV of teacher salaries, horizontal equity is violated.  
MLM is appropriate for this analysis because it may be used to determine the 
average degree of within-school variation in PPEs after controlling for special education, 
ELL, and low-income status and grade level.  The following MLM model controls for 
these variables, and residuals from this model are employed to determine horizontal 
equity.  Conceptually, the level-1 residuals of this model represent the differences in 
spending for students within the same school, controlling for student needs.   
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The following equation outlines the MLM for this analysis.  Variables are 
uncentered, and a fixed slope model is employed.23  Random effects are added to the 
MLM in subsequent analyses.   
Equation 3: MLM for Horizontal Equity of Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Level-1 
Y  β  βSPED  βELL  βPOV  βGRADE10  β$GRADE11 
β%GRADE12  r  
Level-2 
β  γ  u 
                                                                           β'  γ'         ( ) *1, 2, … , 6. 
Where: 
Y: per-pupil TRE for the ith student in school j 
β: school-level average TRE for school j 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes)  
γ: “average” per-pupil cost for 9th grade students who are not special education, ELL,or low-income 
γ: "average" slope for SPED students 
γ: "average" slope for ELL students  
γ: "average" slope for low-income students  
γ: "average" slope for Grade10 students 
γ$: "average" slope for Grade11 students 
γ%: "average" slope for Grade12 students 
r: residual for the ith student in school j 
u: random school effect, or residual for school j.24  
                                                
23 Grand-mean centering the level-1 variables to control for differences across schools in student 
populations does not change the residualized ICC.  I do not center the variables in this model for ease of 
interpretation.   
24 I use “average” because these estimates are not true averages but rather weighted averages.  Model 
assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV. 
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From this model, this study can also calculate a conditional ICC, which now represents 
the proportion of variation in per-pupil TREs that occurs between schools, controlling for 
differences in spending on special education, ELL, and low-income students and students 
in different grade levels.  This study calculates the CV of per-pupil TREs by dividing the 
standard deviation of the level-1 residuals (r) by the average per-pupil TRE (γ in the 
null model).  This CV indicates the degree of within-school variation in per-pupil TREs, 
relative to the average per-pupil TRE and controlling for differences in student needs.  
The CV is calculated by: 






σ: variation of the conditional level-1 residuals 
γ: grand mean, average of all school means, obtained from the null model in equation 1. 
 To determine the criterion for achieving horizontal equity, this study employs a 
MLM to calculate the CV of teacher salaries, or the degree of within-school variation in 
teacher salaries.  Clearly, per-pupil TREs depend on teacher salaries, and teacher salaries 
vary within schools.  Put simply, if per-pupil TREs vary only to the same degree as 
teacher salaries within schools, then horizontal equity is achieved.  The MLM and 





Equation 5: MLM for Determining Criterion for Horizontal Equity of Per-Pupil TREs  
 
Y  β  r 
β  γ  u 
Where: 
Y: teacher salary for ith student in school j 
β: school-level average teacher salary school j 
r: residual for the ith teacher in school j 
γ: grand mean, average of all school means of teacher salaries 
u: random school effect, or residual for school j.  







σ2 : within-school variation of teacher salaries 
γ 2: grand mean of teacher salaries 
The results from the previous MLM and equation produce a CV of .26 for within-school 
variation in teacher salaries.  Thus, horizontal equity of per-pupil TREs is achieved if the 
CV of per-pupil TREs is less than .26.   
 Vertical equity.  Vertical equity is the unequal treatment of unequals, and vertical 
equity is achieved when students with greater educational needs receive sufficiently more 
resources.  As discussed in Chapter 2, state funding weights for categorical student needs 
serve as one benchmark for achieving vertical equity for students with greater needs.  The 
district in this study resides in a state that employs a foundation plan to provide state aid 
to districts based on proportions of special education, ELL, and low-income students.  
Specifically, the state employs a weight of 1.74 for special education students, 1.97 for 
low-income students, and 1.99 for ELL students (Verstegen, 2011).  To determine if 
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vertical equity is achieved, this study compares th actual funding weights for special 
education, ELL, and low-income students to the funding weights outlined in the state 
foundation plan for each student subgroup.  Vertical equity is analyzed for one student 
characteristic at a time because states generally assign weights without consideration of 
student membership in more than one category.  By defining vertical equity in terms of 
the weights used in the state foundation plan, this study ascertains if the district meets 
state goals in terms of categorical funding for students.  In summary, in this study, 
vertical equity is achieved for a student subgroup if the actual funding weight is not less 
than the funding weight specified in the state foundation plan.   
 To assess vertical equity for special education, ELL, and low-income students, this 
study employs simple linear regression (SLR) models to determine the additional amount 
of money spent on special education, ELL, and low-income students relative to non-
special education, non-ELL, and non-low-income students in the district.  This study does 
not use MLMs for the vertical equity analysis because MLMs parse spending differences 
to within- and between-school components, and both wit in- and between-school 
components contribute to how much money is spent to educate these students.  This 
study’s analytic approach is most consistent with the intention of the state foundation 
plan, which implies that the district should spend a certain percentage more on 
categorical subgroups of students.  Therefore, this approach does not produce within-
school spending differences for students with categorical needs; however, it does provide 
an estimate of how much the district spends on these students using student-level teacher 
expenditure data.  The SLR model for determining the vertical equity of special education 
students is written as follows: 
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Equation 7: SLR Model for Vertical Equity of Per-Pupil TREs for Special Education 
Students 
 
Y  β  βSPED  r 
Where: 
Y: per-pupil TRE for the ith student in the district 
β: average per-pupil TRE for all non-special education students in the district 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
3: additional expenditure amount for SPED students 
r: residual for the ith student in the district. 25 
The slope coefficient, β, represents the incremental difference in dollars for pecial 
education students relative to non-special education students in the district.  Similar SLR 
models are analyzed for low-income and ELL students.   
This study determines vertical equity in terms of funding weights, as opposed to 
regression coefficients, because the state foundation plan also determines categorical 
funding in terms of weights.  Actual funding weights for each student category–special 
education, ELL, and low-income–are derived from the SLR models.  Then, the 
magnitude and direction of the weights are compared to the mandated state weights for 
each student category.  The actual funding weight for special education students is 
calculated by: 




 β  ββ  
Where: 
β: average per-pupil TRE for non-special education students 
3: additional dollar amount for SPED students 
                                                
25 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV. 
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The same method applies to analyzing vertical equity for ELL and low-income students. 
Vertical equity for special education students is achieved if Weight4567 8 1.74, vertical 
equity for ELL students is achieved if Weight699 8 1.99, and vertical equity for low-
income students is achieved if Weight5:; 8 1.97.  
It must be noted that the state mandated weights for these student categories apply 
to all expenditures, not just TREs, and this study does not account for other instructional 
non-instructional expenses for special education, ELL, and low-income students.  Thus, 
one could argue that the criteria for achieving vertical equity should be adjusted 
downwards since the district may spend additional dollars to educate various students.  
However, the per-pupil TREs derived by this study also do not include school-level 
expenditures that affect all students equally, and inclusion of these school-level 
expenditures would decrease actual funding weights.26  Therefore, by including all 
expenditures in calculations of per-pupil TRE, the vertical equity weights may be greater 
than or less than the vertical equity weights derived by this study.  However, as 
instruction is the most important function of schools, differential spending on instruction 
for special education, ELL, and low-income students should be reflected in actual 
funding weights of per-pupil TREs.   
 Equal opportunity.  Equal opportunity is achieved if student characteristics that 
are illegitimate in predicting per-pupil TREs are not associated with TREs.  One would 
not expect, for example, students with similar educational needs but of different races to 
receive different resources.   Equal opportunity is traditionally analyzed using Pearson 
                                                
26 Assuming the weight of special education students is 1.74, adding school-level expenditures x to both 
special education and non-special education students may be modeled by the equation: y = (1.74 + x)/(1 + 
x).  As x increases, the y, or the vertical equity weight for special education students, decreases. 
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correlation coefficients.  This study instead employs MLM to ascertain if there are linear 
relationships between student characteristics and per-pupil TREs while controlling for 
categorical student needs and grade level.  Conceptually, both analytic approaches are 
similar.   
Student race, gender, and achievement should not be relat d to per-pupil TREs, 
controlling for student needs (Odden & Picus, 2008).  To address equal opportunity for 
students of different races, genders, and achievement levels, this study employs MLM to 
test whether student race, gender, and achievement pr dict allocations of per-pupil TREs, 
controlling for reasons why per-pupil TREs may legitimately vary within schools.  The 
MLM to assess equal opportunity is defined by the following equation.  Variables are 
uncentered, and this model includes fixed slopes only.27  Random effects are included in 
the next section. 
  
                                                
27 I later group-mean center the level-1 variables in the following MLM, but I do not center the variables 
for this model for ease of interpretation because I wish to know how much more is being spent on each 
student subgroup.   
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Equation 9: MLM for Equal Opportunity of Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Level-1 
Y  β  βSPED  βELL  βPOV  βGRADE10  β$GRADE11 
β%GRADE12 




β  γ  u 
β'  γ'         ( ) *1, 2, … , 15. 
Where: 
Y: per-pupil TRE for the ith student in school j  
β: school-level average TRE for school j 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) 
LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes) 
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes) 
GR10PELA: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state English test 
GR10PMath: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state math test 
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test 
GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test 
GENDERNO: gender (0=male, 1=female) 
γ: “average” school-level TRE for 9th grade male African American students who are not special 
education, ELL, or low-income and older students who have not passed state tests in English or math 
γ: "average" slope for SPED students  
γ: "average" slope for ELL students  
γ: "average"  slope for low-income students  
γ: "average"  slope for 10th grade students relative to 9th grade students 
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γ$: "average"  slope for 11th grade students relative to 9th grade students 
γ%: "average"  slope for 12th grade students relative to 9th grade students 
γ<: "average"  slope for Latino students relative to African American students  
γ?: "average"  slope for White/Asian students relative to African American students  
γB: "average"  slope for 10th grade students who passed English test  
γCD: "average"  slope for 10th grade students who passed math test  
γCD: "average"  slope for 11th grade students who passed English test  
γCD: "average"  slope for 11th grade students who passed math test  
γCD: "average" slope for 12th grade students who passed English test  
γCD: "average"  slope for 12th grade students who passed math test 
γC$D: “average” slope for female students 
r: residual for the ith student in school j 
u: random school effect, or residual for school j.28  
Equal opportunity is achieved if student race, achievement, or gender are not predictive 
of TREs, which occurs when β< through β$ are not statistically different than 0.   
Variation in Within-School Allocation Patterns of Per-Pupil TREs  
 This section discusses the method for analyzing the third research question: “Do 
within-school allocation patterns of teacher resource expenditures per pupil vary across 
schools?”  This research question goes one step further than the previous analysis and 
examines whether within-school monetary resource alloc tion patterns differ for schools 
with dissimilar student populations.  This study employs MLM to identify the best-fitting 
model to explain within- and between-school differenc s in monetary resource allocation.  
This multilevel analysis is beneficial because it provides statistically rigorous findings of 
school-level characteristics that are associated with ithin-school resource allocation 
patterns.  However, this analysis is also somewhat limited due to the small number of 
level-2 units, or schools; the model potentially suffers from a lack of power.  Power is the 
                                                
28 I use “average” because these estimates are not true averages; they are rather weighted averages of 
regression slopes in each school.  Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV. 
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ability to identify an effect if the effect exists, and it is dependent on the number of level-
2 units, among other things.  In other words, while a MLM provides a sophisticated 
statistical analysis of within- and between-school patterns in the allocation of monetary 
resources, it may not identify all variables that are related to differences in within-school 
resource allocation patterns.   
This study employs Snijders and Bosker's (2012) model building approach,  
which suggests that researchers build up from the lev l-1 model with fixed effects and 
simultaneously pursue the best-fitting and most parsimonious model.  Random effects 
are added to the model if there is descriptive evidence that regression slopes vary across 
schools, but only random effects–or slope variances or covariances–that are statistically 
significant and that statistically significantly improve model fit should remain in the 
model.  A Chi-Square test of the difference of model deviances is conducted to ensure 
that the addition of each random effect statistically significantly improves model fit with 
p < .01.  Next, cross-level effects are added to the model to explain the random effects.  
A cross-level effect is an interaction variable between a level-2 and a level-1 variable.  
Cross-level effects can inform why regression slopes of level-1 independent variables 
vary across schools (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  Only cross-level effects that are useful 
in accounting for variation in regression slopes of level-1 independent variables across 
schools should remain in the model.  Further, to avoid misleading findings, it is 
necessary to include level-2 variables that are used in cross-level effects as fixed effects 
in the model, even if the level-2 variables themselves are not statistically significant in 
predicting the outcome variable (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).   
This model building approach results in inclusion of several random effects and 
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one cross-level effect in modeling between-school differences in within-school monetary 
resource allocation patterns.  For both models for expenditures per student and core 
expenditures per student, seven regression slopes fr level-1 independent variables are 
allowed to randomly vary across schools, and the random effects are allowed to covary.  
For the most part, cross-level effects are not useful in reducing regression slope variance 
with one exception: a cross-level effect between the proportion of ELL students in the 
school and a student’s ELL status statistically significantly reduces the random slope 
variance of ELL status on expenditures per student and core expenditures per student.  
Implications are discussed in Chapter 5, which addresses this study’s findings.   
The final MLM for understanding between-school differences in within-school 
resource allocation of per-pupil TREs is outlined on the following page.  The final MLM 




Equation 10: MLM for Understanding Between-School Differences in Within-School 
Allocation Patterns of Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Level-1 
Y  β  βSPED  βELL  βPOV  βGRADE10  β$GRADE11 
β%GRADE12 




β  γ  γSCHELLu 
β  γu 
β  γ  γSCHELLu 
β  γ 
β  γ 
β$  γ$u$ 
β%  γ%u% 
β<  γ< 
β?  γ? 
βB  γB 
βCD  γCD 
βCD  γCDuCD 
βCD  γCD 
βCD  γCDuCD 
βCD  γCDuCD 
βC$D  γC$D 
 
Where: 
Y: per-pupil TRE for the ith student in school j  
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
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ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes) GMC 
GR10PELA: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state English test GMC 
GR10PMath: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state math test GMC 
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test GMC 
GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test GMC 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test GMC 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test GMC 
GENDER: gender (0=male, 1=female) GMC 
SCHELL: proportion of students who are ELLs in school j GRMC 
γ: grand mean, average of all school means 
γ: "average" school slope for SPED students  
γ: "average" school slope for ELL students 
γ: "average" school slope for low-income students 
γ: "average" school slope for 10th grade students relative to 9th grade students  
γ$: "average" school slope for 11th grade students relative to 9th grade students  
γ%: "average" school slope for 12th grade students relative to 9th grade students  
γ<: "average" school slope for Latino students relative to African American students  
γ?: "average" school slope for White/Asian students relative to African American students  
γB: "average" school slope for 10th grade students who passed English test 
γCD: "average" school slope for 10th grade students who passed math test   
γCD: "average" school slope for 11th grade students who passed English test  
γCD: "average" school slope for 11th grade students who passed math test  
γCD: "average" school slope for 12th grade students who passed English test  
γCD: "average" school slope for 12th grade students who passed math test  
γC$D: “average” school slope for female students 
γ: slope coefficient for SCHELL relative to proportion of ELL students in district 
γ: increment to γ for schools with more ELL students than district average 
r: residual for the ith student in school j 
u: random school effect for the intercept, or residual for school j 
u: random school effect for the slope of SPED for school j 
u: random school effect for the slope of ELL for school j 
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u$: random school effect for the slope of Grade11 for school j 
u%: random school effect for the slope of Grade12 for school j 
uCD: random school effect for the slope of Gr11PELA for school j 
uCD: random school effect for the slope of Gr12PELA for school j 
uCD: random school effect for the slope of Gr12PMath for school j.29 
Centering refers to the process of subtracting a constant from all values of a 
predictor variable and is commonly used in MLM to facilitate interpretation (Enders & 
Tofighi, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 2012).  Two methods of centering are employed for 
this MLM: Level-1 predictor variables are group mean centered (GMC) and level-2 
predictor variables are grand mean centered (GRMC).  In this study, group mean 
centering refers to subtracting the school average on a particular variable from the 
student’s value on the variable, and grand mean centering refers to subtracting the district 
average from the student’s value on the variable.  Group mean centering for level-1 
variables is the most appropriate centering choice wh n examining the relationship 
between level-1 predictor variables and the dependent variable, and grand mean centering 
for level-2 variables is the best choice when examining the relationship between level-2 
predictor variables and/or cross-level effects and the dependent variable (Enders & 
Tofighi, 2007).  It should be noted that centering affects the interpretation of the 
regression slopes.  
  
                                                
29 I use “average” because these estimates are not true averages but rather weighted averages.  Model 
assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.  
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Equity of Within-School Allocation Patterns of Specific Resources 
 This section describes the method for analyzing the fourth and final research 
question, “Are specific resources equitably allocated within schools, and do multiple 
resource advantages or disadvantages exist for some students?”  To better understand 
the combination of resources that individual students within a school receive, this study 
now conducts several MLR analyses for each school.  Previous MLM analyses inform 
average within-school resource allocation patterns across schools in the district; however, 
they may not identify all resource allocation patterns within schools.  For example, if a 
school spends more on teacher salaries but less due to larger class sizes, the MLM of per-
pupil TREs does not reflect this resource substitution.  Further, previous MLMs do not 
inform the equity of the allocation of multiple resources within a particular school.  For 
example, previous analyses do not reveal if White students have larger per-pupil TREs 
and have higher peer achievement in a given school.  T gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the equity of the allocation of resources within schools, this study 
simultaneously analyzes the equity of the allocation of a number of resources for each 
individual school.  This analysis also yields an understanding of how the equity of the 
allocation of one resource relates to the allocation of another.   
 To determine if within-school resource allocation patterns of class sizes, teacher 
experience, peer achievement, and number of AP courses are equitable, this study 
combines Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) concepts of vertical equity and equal opportunity.  
For equal opportunity to be achieved, student characte istics that are illegitimate in 
predicting TREs should also not be associated with other allocated resources.  As 
previously discussed, student characteristics that s ould not be associated with TREs are 
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student race, achievement, and gender.  However, on w uld expect student achievement 
to be related to peer achievement and number of AP courses taken because high-
achieving students may take more advanced courses and have more high-achieving peers 
than low-achieving students; thus, this study does not consider associations among 
student achievement, peer achievement, and number of AP courses taken to be violations 
of equal opportunity.  In addition, students who have greater educational needs according 
to the state–special education, ELL, and low-income students–should also not receive 
inferior resources compared to other students; however, in the spirit of vertical equity, 
resource allocation patterns are still equitable if these students receive superior resources 
than other students.30  Thus, the allocation of resources within schools is equitable if 
student race, gender, and achievement are not associ ted with allocated resources and if 
special education, ELL, and low-income students do not receive inferior resources than 
other students.   
 Overall resources include per-pupil TREs and number of AP courses taken by 
students in the 2009-10 academic year.  Resources in students’ English and math classes 
include class sizes, teacher experience, and peer achievement.  By re-analyzing the 
allocation of per-pupil TREs within each school, this study attempts to understand how 
multiple resource advantages or disadvantages may exist for students within the same 
school.  The following sections outline MLR models used to determine the equity of each 
allocated resource within each school.   
                                                
30 Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) framework for analyzing equity is not typically used for analyzing the equity 
of non-expenditure resources.  While it may be understood that certain students–such as special education 
and ELL students–cost more to educate, there is no co sensus on how this money should be spent.  Should 
these students have smaller class sizes or teachers with higher salaries or both?  Therefore, I blend Berne 
and Stiefel’s (1984) concepts of educational opportunity and vertical equity to address this research 
question.   
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 Per-Pupil TREs.  The MLR model employed to understand the equity of the 
allocation of per-pupil TREs in each school is written as follows: 
Equation 11: MLR Model for Analyzing the Allocation of Per-Pupil TREs Within Each 
School 
Y  β  β4567SPED  β5:;POV  β699ELL  βPQR76SGRADEK 
β9RTMU:LATINO  βVWMT6R4MRUWHITEASIAN  βGr10PELAβGr10PMath 
βGr11PELAβGr11PMath  β$Gr12PELA  β%Gr12PMath  r  
Where:  
Y: per‐pupil TRE for ith student 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) 
LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes)  
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes)  
GR10PELA: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state English test  
GR10PMath: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state math test 
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test 
GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test 
β: intercept, or average base spending per-pupil 
β4567: average differential dollar amount allocated to special education students 
β5:;: average differential dollar amount allocated to low-income students 
β699: average differential dollar amount allocated to English language learners 
βPQR76S: average differential dollar amount allocated to students in grade k 
β9RTMU:: average differential dollar amount for Latino students 
βVWMT6R4MRU: average differential dollar amount for White or Asian students 
β\: (m≠0) average differential dollar amount for students in grade k (k≠9) who passed state test 
r: residual for the ith student.31 
  
                                                
31 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.   
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Class sizes.  Next, this study analyzes student characteristics that are associated 
with differences in class sizes in students’ English and math courses.  The class size of a 
student’s English or math class is regressed on studen  characteristics to assess if certain 
subgroups of students have smaller or larger class size  than other students.  If a student 
is enrolled in more than one course in the English or math department, the average class 
size per academic subject is used.  The MLR model for understanding the equity of the 
distribution of English class sizes within schools is expressed as follows:  
Equation 12: MLR Model for English Class Size 
 
Y  β  β4567SPED  β5:;POV  β699ELL  βPQR76SGRADEK 
β9RTMU:LATINO  βVWMT6R4MRUWHITEASIAN  β]6^R96FEMALE 
βGr10PELAβGr10PMath  βGr11PELAβGr11PMath  β$Gr12PELA 
β6Gr12PMathiri  
Where:  
Y: class size in English for ith student 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) 
LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes)  
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes)  
FEMALEM: dummy code for female students (0=no, 1=yes)  
GR10PELA: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state English test  
GR10PMath: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state math test 
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test 
GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test 
β: intercept of class size in English 
β4567: average English class size difference for SPED students 
β5:;:  average English class size difference for low-income students 
β699:   average English class size difference for ELLs 
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βPQR76S:   average English class size difference for kth grade students 
β9RTMU::  average English class size difference for Latino students 
βVWMT6R4MRU:   average English class size difference for White or Asian students 
β]6^R96:   average English class size difference for female students 
β\:  (m≠0) average English class size difference for students in grade k (k≠9) who passed state test 
r: residual for the ith student.32 
The MLR model to estimate the within-school variation n math class sizes is the same as 
above except that Ǹ represents the ith student’s class size in math and the slope 
coefficients represent the incremental math class size differences.   
 Teacher experience.  The study also determines whether student characteristics are 
associated with having a new English or math teacher.  The dependent variable in these 
models is dichotomous, and a logistic link function s eeded to estimate the models.  The 
binary logistic model predicting having a new teacher in English (0=no, 1=yes) is written 
as follows:  
Equation 13: Binary Logistic Regression Model for New English Teacher 
 
ln b π1 d πe
 β  β4567SPED  β5:;POV  β699ELL  βPQR76SGRADEK  β9RTMU:LATINO
 βVWMT6R4MRUWHITEASIAN  β]6^R96FEMALE  βGr10PELAβGr10PMath
 βGr11PELA  βGr11PMath  β$Gr12PELA  β%Gr12PMath 
Y~ Bern(πD 
Where:  
Y: NETF, student has new English teacher (0=no, 1=yes) 
π: odds of having new teacher in English 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADEK: set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) 
                                                
32 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.   
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LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes)  
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes)  
FEMALEM: dummy code for female students (0=no, 1=yes)  
GR10PELA: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state English test  
GR10PMath: dummy code for 10th grade student who passed state math test 
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test 
GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test 
β: intercept  
β4567: average log odd difference for SPED students 
β5:;:  average log odd difference for low-income students 
β699:  average log odd difference for ELLs 
βPQR76S: average log odd difference for kth grade students 
β9RTMU::  average log odd difference for Latino students 
βVWMT6R4MRU: average log odd difference for White or Asian students 
β]6^R96: average log odd difference for female students 
β\: (m≠0) average log odd difference for students in grades k (k≠9) who have passed the state test 
Y~ Bern(πD: Y follow Bernoulli distribution.33 
The model for understanding the within-school distribution of new math teachers is 
similar to the above model, except Y represents NMTF, or whether the student has a new 
math teacher (0=no, 1=yes).    
Peer achievement.  This study also examines which student characteristics are 
associated with peer achievement in students’ English and math classes.  The peer effect 
in English class is defined as the percentage of a student’s peers who have passed the 
state standardized test in English.  This percentag excludes the student’s achievement, 
and if the student is enrolled in more than one English course, peer achievement is 
averaged.  The structure of the state testing program makes it difficult to compare student 
achievement across grades validly; hence, this analysis is conducted for students in each 
                                                
33 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.  
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grade separately.  In addition, given that most 9th grade students and many 10th grade 
students have not yet taken the state tests, this analysis is conducted for students in the 
11th and 12th grades and separately for students in each grade.  To further control for prior 
student achievement because prior achievement is related to tracking and peer 
achievement, student grade point average (GPA) is added to the model (Kalogrides & 
Loeb, 2013).  The MLR model for assessing the within-school distribution of peer 
achievement, or social capital, in English class for 11th grade students is written as:  
Equation 14: MLR Model for Peer Achievement in English Class for 11th Grade Students 
Y  β  β4567SPED  β5:;POV  β699ELL  β9RTMU:LATINO 
βVWMT6R4MRUWHITEASIAN  βPELAβPMath  βP5RGPA  r  
Where:  
Y: percentage of peers in English class who have passed state English test for ith student 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
LATINO: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes) 
WHITEASIAN: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes) 
PELA: dummy code for passed state English test  
PMath: dummy code for passed state math test 
GPA: grade point average 
β: intercept of peer effect 
β4567: average difference for SPED students 
β5:;:  average difference for low-income students 
β699: average difference for ELLs 
β9RTMU::  average difference for Latino students 
βVWMT6R4MRU:  average difference for White or Asian students 
β: average difference for students in who have passed the state test in English 
β: average difference for students in who have passed the state test in math 
βP5R: average slope coefficient of GPA on peer effect 
r: residual for the ith student.34 
                                                
34 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.   
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Peer achievement in English class for 12th grade students is estimated in a similar manner.  
Peer achievement in math class is also estimated for 11th and 12th grade students 
separately.  In the latter models, the Y represents the percentage of the student’s peers 
who have passed the state math test.  
Number of AP courses.  Finally, the study examines the relationships betwe n 
student characteristics and number of AP courses tak n for students in each school.  The 
number of AP courses taken by students in the 2009-1  academic year is regressed on 
student characteristics to identify student characteristics that are associated with AP 
course-taking behaviors.  Given that most AP courses ar  taken by 11th or 12th grade 
students, this analysis is only conducted for 11th and 12th grade students.  The dependent 
variable, number of AP courses, is a count variable.  Thus, Poisson regression is the most 
appropriate method for this analysis.  The regression model is expressed as follows:  
Equation 15: Poisson Regression Model for Number of AP Courses 
 
lnkul  β  β4567SPED  β5:;POV  β699ELL  βPQR76GRADE11 
β9RTMU:LATINO  βVWMT6R4MRUWHITEASIAN  β]6^R96FEMALE  βGr11PELA 
βGr11PMath  βGr12PELA  βGr12PMath  
Y~ Poisson(uD 
Where:  
Y: Number of AP courses enrolled in during the year 
u: expected number of AP courses 
SPED: student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
POV: student qualifies for FARMS (0=no, 1=yes) 
ELL: student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
GRADE11: dummy code for students in grade 11, (0=no, 1=yes) 
LATINOM: dummy code for Latino students (0=no, 1=yes)  
WHITEASIANM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes)  
FEMALEM: dummy code for White or Asian students (0=no, 1=yes)  
GR11PELA: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state English test 
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GR11PMath: dummy code for 11th grade student who passed state math test 
GR12PELA: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state English test 
GR12PMath: dummy code for 12th grade student who passed state math test 
β: intercept  
β4567: average log difference for SPED students 
β5:;: average log difference for low-income students 
β699: average log difference for ELLs 
βPQR76: average log difference for 11th grade students 
β9RTMU:: average log difference for Latino students 
βVWMT6R4MRU: average log difference for White or Asian students 
β]6^R96: average log difference for female students 
β\: (m≠0) average incremental log difference for students in grades 11 and 12 who have passed the state test  
Y~ Poisson(πD: Y follow Poisson distribution.35 
Software 
This study employs two software programs, Mplus 7 and HLM 6.06, to estimate 
the foregoing models.  This study also employs SPSS Version 20 to clean and merge 
data, conduct descriptive analyses, check model assumptions, and calculate component 
scores of school-level achievement.  This study employs HLM to estimate all MLMs 
because HLM offers restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which produces 
unbiased estimates of variance and covariance components when there are few level-2 
units.  Due to the small number of level-2 units, HLM may understate standard errors, 
particularly standard errors of level-2 variance comp nents (McNeish & Stapleton, 
2013).  Hence, p-values of fixed effects close to .05 should be interpreted with caution 
and p-values of level-2 variance components with exreme caution.   
This study employs Mplus software to analyze all multiple linear, binary logistic, 
and Poisson regression models.  Mplus is useful because it estimates standard errors that 
are robust to violations of normality, meaning that it corrects the standard errors in the 
                                                
35 Model assumptions are discussed in Appendix IV.  
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scenario that the residuals deviate from perfect normality.  Mplus is also advantageous 
because it employs full information maximum likelihood (a method that uses all 
available data to estimate model parameters) and accounts for missing data in the 
independent variables (Enders, 2001).  For cases whre t e value of the dependent 
variable is missing, however, Mplus reverts to listwise deletion, and these cases are 
removed from the analysis.  Finally, Mplus is flexible when conducting regression 
analysis with non-continuous dependent variables; with relative ease, one can account 
for dichotomous and count dependent variables.  Owing to these advantages, the 






Chapter 5:  Findings 
This chapter discusses the findings for the study and after providing descriptive 
statistics, is organized according to the four research questions.  First, this chapter 
compares the degree of variation in per-pupil TREs within schools to the variation 
between schools and finds that within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is substantially 
greater than between-school variation, even when controlling for certain reasons why per-
pupil TREs might reasonably be expected to vary within schools.  Second, this chapter 
provides the results of the equity analysis of the allocation of per-pupil TREs.  This study 
finds that inequities in the allocation of per-pupil TREs exist within schools; in particular, 
horizontal equity is not achieved for all students, vertical equity is not achieved for low-
income students, and it is debatable whether vertical equity is achieved for ELL students.  
Equal opportunity is also violated because schools spend more money on instruction for 
students who have passed state tests than on students who have not passed state tests.  
Third, this chapter explores the variation in within-school monetary resource allocation 
patterns across schools and finds that within-school m netary resource allocation patterns 
do in fact vary across schools, and few school-level characteristics are related to 
differences in within-school monetary resource allocation patterns.  Finally, this chapter 
summarizes the within-school resource allocation patterns of a number of resources and 
determines the equity of the allocation of these reources.  Results from the regression 
analyses conducted for each school indicate that schools may spend dramatically 
different amounts on students within the same school and that multiple resource 
advantages or disadvantages may exist for certain students.  Before these findings are 




First, this section provides descriptive information concerning the resource 
variables derived and used in this study.  Then, to be ter understand investment in various 
courses and curricular programs, this section examines course expenditures by course 
category.  Finally, this section explores between-school differences in resources.   
Descriptives of derived resource variables.  The table below provides summary 
information of dependent variables.   
Table 21: Means, Standard Deviations, and Percent Missing Values for Dependent 
Resource Variables 
 






Per-pupil TRE TRE $3,904 $2,769 2.0 
Core-academic TRE per pupil TRE_CA $2,876 $2,434 1.9 
English class size ELACS 32.7 8.48 0.7 
Math class size MathCS 33.7 8.56 6.6 
New English teacher flag NETF 0.31 0.46 11.8 
New math teacher flag NMTF 0.31 0.46 12.8 
Percent of peers in English who have passed 
English test for 10th–12th graders only 
PeerEPer 58% 49% 0.0 
Percent of peers in math who have passed 
math test for 10th–12th graders only 
PeerMPer 61% 48% 0.0 
Number of AP courses for 11th and 12th 
graders only 
AP 0.36 0.73 0.5 
 
The district spends, on average, $3,904 per student on teacher salaries for all 
instruction and $2,876 per student on teachers salaries for core-academic instruction.  
Per-pupil TREs, as defined by this study, account for roughly one third of the total 
spending per pupil in this district.36  Per-pupil TREs are very strongly correlated to core-
academic TREs per pupil (r=.925, p < .001).  The strong correlation is due to the fact that 
salary expenditures spent on core-academic instruction onstitutes the majority (73%) of 
total salary expenditures.  
                                                
36 The Board’s annual report indicates that total PPEs including all transportation, facility, and food service 
expenditures amount to approximately $12,000 per student.   
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Average class sizes in English and math are approximately 33 and 34, 
respectively.  Approximately 31% of students have a new teacher in either English or 
math class.37  On average, 58% of 10th through 12th grade students’ peers in English class 
have passed the state English test, and 61% of their pe rs in math class have passed the 
state math test.  Note that there is considerable variation in all of the dependent variables, 
implied by the magnitude of the standard deviations relative to the magnitude of the mean 
values of these variables.   
Course expenditures by academic subject.  The following table indicates how 
much money the district spends on various academic, ele tive, and vocational courses.  
The most expensive courses, in terms of course expenditures per student, are special 
education, remedial, and ESOL courses.  The district pends more on advanced core-
academic courses than on regular track core-academic courses.  Finally, the district 
spends the least on fine arts, health, and other elective courses.  
  
                                                
37 The cases where the dependent variable is missing are not included in the analysis as the software resorts 
to listwise deletion when the value of the dependent variable is missing.  Missing data on the dependent 
variables are not of large concern, except for the substantial percentage of missing data on the new teacher 
flag variables.  The missing data on these variables ar  primarily due to miscoding of staff identification 
numbers: approximately 5% of teachers cannot be link d to teacher characteristics, and years of teaching 
experience in the school are not known for these teach rs.  This miscoding appears to randomly occur 
across schools and across teachers who teach a variety of academic subjects and grade levels.  The data 
suggest that the teachers with miscoded staff identification numbers do not systematically differ from other 
teachers.  In addition, not all students are enrolled in a math course in a given year, and dependent variables 
relating to math class are unavailable for these students. 
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Table 22: Average Course Characteristics By Category S ted by Average Course 
Expenditure Per Student 
 











Students in Course 
in the District  
 
Special Education 2,156 9 72,955 941 
 
Core Academic Remedial All 1,419 13 67,164 3,547 
Math Remedial 1,504 13 65,786 1,211 
Social Studies Remedial 1,501 14 67,296 1,246 
English Remedial 1,477 13 68,108 2,478 
Science Remedial 1,141 16 65,636 2,005 
 
Job Skills 1,219 21 76,589 2,385 
 
Reading 849 19 69,757 1,976 
 
ESOL All 727 23 72,703 1,841 
English ESOL 858 19 72,910 1,413 
Science ESOL 484 34 72,950 495 
Social Studies ESOL 469 29 72,695 877 
Math ESOL 369 34 71,707 1,140 
 
AP Courses 652 25 69,710 5,311 
 
Core Academic Advanced All 584 27 68,237 9,580 
Math Advanced 1,088 22 74,521 1,223 
Science Advanced 684 23 65,547 1,631 
Social Studies Advanced 496 29 65,547 6,121 
English Advanced 448 30 68,707 4,390 
 
Life & Leadership Skills 577 34 57,585 593 
 
AVERAGE OF ALL 
COURSES & TEACHERS 
511 29.6 66,944 NA 
     
Foreign Language All 488 33 66,255 23,753 
Foreign Language Advanced 645 25 71,369 3,158 
Foreign Language Regular 457 34 65,262 20,858 
 
Other Elective  
(Journalism, Newspaper, Etc.) 
470 29 58,388 1,804 
 
Vocational All 407 28 66,188 32,021 
Military Science 825 22 69,137 6,872 
Technical / Certification 425 12 66,170 904 
Media 388 34 66,200 1,552 
Technology 366 35 60,896 8,053 
Family & Consumer Sciences 309 36 62,500 14,313 
Business 300 33 69,663 14,537 















Students in Course 
in the District 
 
Core Academic Regular All 404 33 66,511 40,082 
Science 515 31 69,828 34,288 
Math 478 31 71,483 35,964 
English 345 32 60,373 34,831 
Social Studies 334 37 63,843 31,249 
 
College Skills 354 28 63,186 3,557 
     
Fine Arts 353 32 62,060 26,096 
Music 393 29 67,687 7,883 
Drama 344 37 60,137 2,427 
Art 342 35 60,140 18,449 
Dance 301 30 56,669 2,127 
 
SAT Prep 324 26 69,288 3,376 
 
Health 201 31 65,546 14,234 
Table Note: Values are organized by descending average course expenditure per student for each general 
course category. 
 
As the table above indicates, the district spends the most in terms of course 
expenditures per student on special education and remedial courses, largely due to small 
class sizes, and special education students account for 61% of the students enrolled in 
remedial courses.38  Courses for non-native English speakers (ESOL courses) have the 
second highest course expenditures per student; however, while the district spends much 
more on ESOL courses in English–due to small class sizes–the district actually spends 
less on ESOL math classes–due to large class sizes.  
More money is directed to advanced core courses than regular track core courses 
in math, science, and English, but the differential in math is the most striking: The district 
spends more than double the amount per course per student on advanced math courses 
than on regular track math courses.  The higher cost of advanced courses in math is due 
                                                
38 Reading is also considered to be a remedial course.   
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to smaller class sizes and, to a lesser extent, teachers with higher salaries.  Finally, the 
district spends more on advanced foreign language courses per student and other elective 
courses than on regular track core academic or vocational courses.39  
Between-school differences in resources.  Though the primary purpose of this 
study is to investigate the equity of within-school resource allocation, it is important to 
know whether between-school inequities in resources exist.  Across the district, inequities 
in resource allocation at the student level may be exacerbated if inequities exist in the 
allocation of resources both within and between schools.  For example, if experienced 
teachers are inequitably distributed between and within schools, some students may have 
few chances to be taught by an experienced teacher.  
The following table provides Pearson correlation coefficients of school-level 
characteristics and school-level average resources.  The table shows that the schools 
serving the largest percentages of low-income students spend more on average per 
student than other schools, and that schools with hig er achievement and larger 
proportions of White and Asian students spend less p r student than other schools.  
However, when controlling for proportions of special education and ELL students, the 
correlations between TREs and school characteristics are not statistically significant (p 
< .10) in either case.  In summary, schools with larger proportions of low-income, low-
achieving, or African American students do not have l rger TREs after controlling for 
differences in student need.  This is a common finding in school finance literature (Berne 
& Stiefel, 1994; Owens & Maiden, 1999; Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel et al., 2003). 
                                                
39 Military vocational courses are the exception.   
 
 123
The following table also indicates that there are school-level differences in other 
resources.  To summarize, schools with substantial Latino populations have larger-than-
average math class sizes.  Schools with larger proporti ns of high-achieving and White 
and Asian students have the highest concentrations of experienced teachers and the 
highest AP enrollment.  Finally, peer achievement is heavily determined by between-
school differences in student achievement.  This study later explores how these between-
school differences in resources affect the distribuion of resources at the student level.  
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Aggregated to the 
School Level 
 School Characteristics 

























SCHTRE .32 .09 .33 .04 .09 -.32 -.52* -.50* -.35 
Average core-
academic TRE per 
pupil 
SCHTRE_CA .33 .28 .39’ .23 -.10 -.23 -.49* -.45* -.27 
Average English 
class size 
SCHELACS -.35’ .04 -.13 .28 -.30 .14 .33 .35 .55** 
Average math class 
size 
SCHMathCS -.11 .22 .22 .42* -.35 -.05 .09 .11 .49* 
% of students with 
new English teachers 
SCHNETF .30 .10 .24 -.07 .20 -.33 -.44* -.39 -.23 
% of students with 
new math teachers 
SCHNMTF -.06 -.22 -.05 -.25 .39’ -.43* -.16 -.19 -.10 
Average number of 
AP courses per 11th 
and 12th grade 
student 
SCHAP -.42* .09 -.21 .12 -.33 .57** .39 .34 .18 
Average peer 
achievement in 
English for 10th–12th 
graders 
SCHPeerEPer -.73*** -.25 -.76*** -.21 -.09 .69*** .99*** .87*** .52* 
Average peer 
achievement in math 
for 10th–12th graders 
SCHPeerMPer -.70*** -.03 -.56** -.00 -.29 .74*** .93*** .99*** .57** 
Table Notes: 
(a)  ‘ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 
(b) Given that there are only 20+ schools in this correlational analysis, statistical significance is difficult to achieve. 
(c) School size is correlated to student achievement b cause the highest performing schools are also the largest ones.  
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Within-School Variation in Per-Pupil TREs 
 To address the first research question, “How does the within-school variation in 
teacher resource expenditures per pupil compare to the variation between schools?” this 
study employs multilevel modeling (MLM) to obtain the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC), which determines how much variation in per-pupil TREs is the result of within- or 
between-school differences in spending.   
Table 24: Null Model Results 
 Null Model for TRE 
 
Null Model for TRE_CA 









Intercept $4,044 220 .000 $2,959 161 .000 
Random Effects Variance P-value Variance Variance 
Varr   σ 6769289 --- 5410474 5410474 
Varu   τ 1060993 .000 573549 573549 
ICC .135 .095 
 
The table above shows that the ICC for per-pupil TREs is .135, meaning that only 
13.5% of the variation in per-pupil TREs is due to between-school differences in 
spending and that the remaining 86.5% of the variation in per-pupil TREs occurs within 
schools.  Hence, the vast majority of variation in per-pupil TREs occurs within schools.  
When examining the ICC for core-academic TREs per pupil, the ICC is .095, meaning 
that 90.5% of the variation in core-academic TREs per pupil occurs within schools.  
The following figures provide graphical displays of the variation in per-pupil 
TREs within and between schools.  Between-school variation in per-pupil TREs is 
evident; however, relative to the within-school variation, between-school variation in per-




Figure 3: Between- and Within-School Variation in Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Figure 4: Between- and Within-School Variation in Core-Academic TREs Per Pupil 
 
The large within-school variation in per-pupil TREs re ults from the fact that 
there is little variation in teacher salaries between schools.  The following figure displays 
the variation in teacher salaries.  From the figure, one may observe that although there are 
slight differences in the distributions of teacher salaries between schools, there is much 
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more variation in teacher salaries within schools.40  Thus, because the majority of 
variation in teacher salaries occurs within schools, the majority of per-pupil TREs occurs 
within schools.  
Figure 5: Variation in Teacher Salaries 
 
 
In addition, in this district, there is considerable variation in class sizes, which 
results in large differences in per-pupil TREs for students within the same school.  For 
students within the same school, per-pupil TREs vary because course expenditures vary, 
and course expenditures vary primarily due to differences in class sizes; teacher salary 
and number of courses both have a smaller effect on ourse expenditures per student.  
The district’s class size policy is liberal in that minimum class size is left to the discretion 
                                                
40 In fact, when calculating the coefficient of variation (CV) of teacher salaries between schools, the CV is 
0.03, which falls below the commonly accepted criterion of 0.10 for between-school differences.  Thus, 




of the principal.41  Some courses–such as advanced foreign language and music courses–
are expensive to offer due to very small class sizes.  Because there is so much variability 
in class sizes across courses, there is large variation in course expenditures per student 
and ultimately in per-pupil TREs for students within the same school.  In summary, there 
is much more variation in per-pupil TREs within schools than between schools.  The next 
section discusses whether the within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is equitable.   
Equity Analysis of Per-Pupil TREs 
To answer the second research question, “Are teacher resource expenditures per 
pupil equitably distributed within schools?” this study evaluates the horizontal equity, 
vertical equity, and equal opportunity of per-pupil TREs within schools (i.e., at the 
student level) and finds that the following equity s andards are violated: horizontal equity 
for all students, vertical equity for low-income students, and equal opportunity for 
students with different achievement. 
Horizontal equity.  This study calculated the degree of within-school variation in 
per-pupil TREs for “like” students and determined that horizontal equity is achieved in 
this district if the degree to which per-pupil TREs vary within schools (controlling for 
special education, ELL, and low-income status and gra e level) is less than the degree to 
which teacher salaries vary within schools.  Horizontal equity is violated because the CV 
of per-pupil TREs is .46, which is substantially greater than the within-school variation in 
teacher salaries (indicated by a CV of .26).  For core-academic TREs per pupil, the CV 
is .57, which is also substantially greater than the proposed horizontal equity benchmark.  
Thus, horizontal equity for both all and core-academic TREs per pupil is violated for 
                                                
41 This is outlined by Board policy.   
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“like” students, and there is considerable variation in spending on “like” students within 
schools.  
Equation 16: Calculation of the CV of Per-Pupil TREs 
 
CV  σγ 
1,883
4,044  .465 
Table 25: Horizontal Equity MLM Results for Per-Pupil TREs and Core-Academic TREs 
Per Pupil 
 Per-Pupil TREs 
 
Core-Academic TREs Per Pupil 









Intercept $3,304 222 .000 $2,657 159 .000 
Special Education Status $6,268 34 .000 $5,399 30 .000 
ELL Status $2,800 46 .000 $2,971 41 .000 
Low-Income Status -$20 19 .294 -$25 17 .147 
Grade10 -$51 24 .038 -$261 22 .000 
Grade11 $381 26 .000 -$176 23 .000 
Grade12 $99 26 .000 -$791 23 .000 
Random Effects Variance P-value Variance P-value 
Varr   σ 3548218 --- 2848966 --- 
Varu   τ 1078277 .000 554993 .000 
ICC 23% 16% 
 
A CV of .46 indicates that within schools and for two-thirds of students, TREs for 
“like” students may vary up to $1,500 ($3,304 x .465) per student.  Per-pupil TREs may 
vary even more for the remaining one third of students.  Given that the average salary 
expenditure per non-special education, non-ELL, and non-low-income pupil is $3,304, 
$1,500 is a large discrepancy in per-pupil TREs.  For core-academic instruction, there are 
even larger disparities in per-pupil TREs for students within the same school.  
These models–and the inclusion of special education, ELL, and low-income status 
and grade level dummy variables–reduce the amount of level-1 residual variance 
obtained from the previous null model by 47%.  Thus, differences in special education, 
ELL, and low-income status and grade level account for a large proportion of the within-
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school variation in per-pupil TREs.  However, the ICCs of these models indicate that 
even when controlling for differences in student need and grade level, the variation in 
per-pupil TREs within schools is still considerably larger than the variation between 
schools.  The conditional ICCs obtained from these models indicate that 77% of the 
variation in per-pupil TREs and 84% of the variation n core-academic TREs per pupil 
result from within-school differences in spending, controlling for special education, ELL, 
and low-income status and grade level.  In other words, the ICCs show that the large 
within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is not simply the result of differences in 
student need or grade level.  In summary, horizontal equity is not achieved for “like” 
students in this district because there is statistically and practically significant variation in 
TREs for “like” students within the same school.   
Vertical equity.  Vertical equity is achieved for special education students, is not 
achieved for low-income students, and is arguably achieved for ELL students.  The actual 
funding weight for special education students in ths district is 2.81, which exceeds the 
state mandated weight of 1.74.  In other words, the district spends, on average, 181% 
more on teacher salaries for special education studen s than for non-special education 
students, though according to the state foundation pla , the district only needs to spend 
74% more on special education students.  For core-academic TREs per pupil, the actual 
funding weight is 3.10, which also exceeds the categorical funding weight for special 




Table 26: Vertical Equity SLR Model Results for Special Education Students 
 
 Per-Pupil TREs 
 










Intercept $3,393 11 .000 $2,438 10 .000 
Special Education Status $6,149 39 .000 $5,251 35 .000 
R Squared 37.6% 35.6% 
 
Vertical equity is not met for all TREs for ELL students, but it is met for core-
academic TREs for ELL students.  The state mandated weight for ELL students is 1.99, 
and the actual funding weight for all TREs for ELL students is 1.61.  In other words, the 
district spends, on average, 61% more on salaries for ELL students than for non-ELL 
students, and according to the state foundation pla, the district should spend 99% more 
on ELL students.  Thus, the district spends 38 percentage points less on teacher salaries 
for ELL students than the amount mandated by the stat  foundation plan.  However, the 
actual funding weight for teacher salaries in core-academic subjects for ELL students is 
1.99.  Thus, in terms of core-academic TREs per pupil, the district spends sufficiently 
more on instruction for ELL students relative to non-ELL students, according to the state 
foundation plan.  Because the district spends at least 1.99 times more on core-academic 
TREs for ELL students than on non-ELL students, district funding is not in violation of 
state policy.   
Table 27: Vertical Equity SLR Model Results for ELL Students 
 
 Per-Pupil TREs 
 










Intercept $3,795 13 .000 $2,749 12 .000 
ELL Status $2,349 64 .000 $2,737 55 .000 




Vertical equity is not met for low-income students in this district.  The district 
spends only 13% more on teacher salaries for low-income students compared to other 
students, and there is a large gap between the actual funding weight and the state 
mandated weight for low-income students.  The state funding weight for low-income 
students is 1.97, suggesting that 97% more should be spent on low-income students than 
on non-low-income students.  Therefore, the district spends 84% less on teacher salaries 
for low-income students than the amount mandated by the state foundation plan.  The 
district spends 17% more on teacher salaries in core-academic subjects for low-income 
students, relative to non-low-income students, but the actual funding weight of 1.17 for 
core-academic TREs per pupil is again substantially lower than the state funding weight 
of 1.97 for low-income students.   
Table 28: Vertical Equity SLR Model Results for Low-Income Students 
 
 Per-Pupil TREs 
 










Intercept $3,700 18 .000 $2,673 15 .000 
ELL Status $478 27 .000 $474 24 .000 
R Squared 7% 9% 
 
The previous simple linear regression models for low-income students also do not 
account for the fact that low-income students are overrepresented in special education 
and ELL groups (see Table 29).  When special education nd ELL status are added to the 
model, the district spends only 2% more on teacher salaries and 4% more on teacher 
salaries in core-academic subjects for low-income students relative to non-low-income 
students.  In summary, the district is far from providing low-income students with 
sufficiently more resources as suggested by the stat foundation plan.   
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Table 29: Special Education and ELL Status by Low-Income Status 
 




Low-Income 12% 8% 
Not Low-Income  8% 2% 
 
Equal opportunity.  Equal opportunity is not violated for students of dif erent 
race/ethnicity and gender, holding student achievement constant, but equal opportunity is 
violated for students with different achievement levels.  Equal opportunity is violated for 
students of different race/ethnicity when achievement is not held constant.  
Table 30: Equal Opportunity MLM Results 
 
 Expenditures Per Student 
 
Core Expenditures Per Student 









Intercept $3,298 223 .000 $2,650 160 .000 
SPED $6,327 35 .000 $5,423 31 .000 
ELL $2,858 48 .000 $2,991 43 .000 
POV -$14 29 .483 -$20 17 .246 
Grade10 -$82 32 .012 -$196 29 .000 
Grade11 $319 40 .000 -$168 36 .000 
Grade12 -$213 44 .000 -$1,081 40 .000 
Latino  -$26 31 .397 -$7 28 .785 
White/Asian $1 37 .972 $55 33 .097 
Gr10PELA $142 44 .002 $47 39 .236 
Gr10PMath -$71 44 .107 -$167 39 .000 
Gr11PELA $162 48 .000 $71 43 .100 
Gr11PMath -$60 49 .222 -$81 44 .066 
Gr12PELA $216 48 .000 $221 43 .000 
Gr12PMath $236 48 .000 $197 43 .000 
Gender $3 18 .840 $0 16 .975 
Random Effects Variance P-value Variance P-value 
Varr   σ 3540663 --- 2841948 --- 
Varu   τ 1088200 .000 558222 .000 
ICC 23.5% 16% 
Model Fit: Deviance & 
Number of Estimated 
Parameters for Variance-
Covariance Model 






For per-pupil TREs, schools spend more on 10th, 11th, and 12th grade students who 
have passed the state English test compared to students who have not passed the state 
English test.  Schools also spend more on 12th grade students who have passed the state 
math test compared to students who have not passed the state math test.42  Thus, equal 
opportunity is violated for student achievement, though the monetary differences are 
small.  Schools spend roughly 4% more on 10th grade students, 5% more on 11th grade 
students, and 6.5% more on 12th grade students who have passed the state English test 
compared to students who have not.  Schools also spend roughly 7% more on 12th grade 
students who have passed the state math test compared to those who have not.  Taken 
together, schools spend 13.7% more on 12th grade students who have passed both English 
and math state tests compared to 12th grade students who have not passed either state test.  
Recall that larger proportions of students in higher grades have passed the state 
tests than students in lower grades; specifically, round 50% of 10th grade, 60% of 11th 
grade, and 70% of 12th grade students have passed state tests.  Therefore, for 10th grade 
students, this study tests if there are differences in spending on the lowest achieving 50% 
of students compared to higher achieving students.  For 11th grade students, this study 
tests if there are differences in spending on the lowest achieving 40% of students 
compared to higher achieving students.  Finally, for 12th grade students, this study tests if 
there are differences in spending on the lowest achieving 30% of students compared to 
higher achieving students.  The effect sizes are the largest for 12th grade students, 
indicating that schools spend the least on the 30% lowest achieving group of students 
relative to higher achieving students, holding all else equal. 
                                                
42 Other regression slopes are not statistically significant at p < .05 and therefore, are not considere to be 
statistically different than 0.   
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For core-academic TREs per pupil, equal opportunity is violated for 10th grade 
students who have passed the state math test and for 12th grade students who have passed 
either the English or math state test.  For 12th grade students, schools spend 8% more on 
students who have passed the state English test, 7% more on students who have passed 
the state math test, and almost 16% more on students who have passed both the state 
English and math tests.  Interestingly, schools spend l ss on 10th grade students who have 
passed the state math test than on 10th grade students who have not passed the state math 
test.   
Although equal opportunity for student race is not vi lated (controlling for 
student achievement), student race is related to studen  achievement.  Larger proportions 
of White and Asian students have passed both the English and math state tests compared 
to African American or Latino students.  Higher proortions of African Americans have 
passed state tests compared to Latino students.  Hence, qual opportunity is violated for 
student race/ethnicity when achievement is not heldconstant.  
Table 31: Student Achievement by Race  
 
Race Percent Passed English Test 
 
Percent Passed Math Test 
White/Asian 55% 73% 
African American  41% 53% 
Latino 30% 49% 
 
Finally, adding student race, gender, and achievement to these models does not 
reduce the level-1 residual variance substantially, relative to the previous horizontal 
equity model.  The level-1 residual variance is reduced by only 0.2% with the addition of 
these variables.  Thus, while student achievement is predictive of allocated per-pupil 
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TREs, student achievement, race, and gender are not as powerful in explaining resource 
differences as special education, ELL, and low-income status and grade level.   
Variation in Within-School Allocation Patterns of Per-Pupil TREs 
 This section provides findings for the third research question, “Do within-school 
allocation patterns of teacher resource expenditures p r pupil vary across schools?”  
This study finds substantial variation in within-school monetary resource allocation 
patterns between schools.  For the models for both per-pupil TREs and core-academic 
TREs per pupil, seven regression slopes of level-1 independent variables are allowed to 
vary across schools because their inclusion statistically significantly improves model fit, 
but only one cross-level effect is statistically and practically significant in reducing the 
variation of regression slopes.  It could be the case that the small sample size of high 
schools makes it difficult to identify patterns of within-school resource allocation 
between schools.  Alternatively, schools in the same district may have very different 




Table 32: Equal Opportunity MLM Results with Random and Cross-Level Effects for 
Per-Pupil TREs 
 Model with Random 
Effects 
Model with Random & Cross-
Level Effects 











Intercept $4,045 220 .000 $4,045 221 .000 
SPED (GMC) $6,841 875 .000 $6,841 875 .000 
ELL (GMC) $1,498 395 .001 $1,155 274 .001 
POV (GMC) $2 16 .881 $2 16 .907 
Grade10 (GMC) -$82 26 .003 -$82 26 .002 
Grade11 (GMC) $265 55 .000 $266 56 .000 
Grade12 (GMC) -$194 98 .062 -$196 98 .060 
Latino (GMC) $13 26 .605 $14 26 .592 
White/Asian (GMC) $86 31 .005 $86 30 .006 
Gr10PELA (GMC) $72 36 .045 $72 36 .046 
Gr10PMath (GMC) -$5 36 .887 -$4 36 .894 
Gr11PELA (GMC) $197 81 .025 $196 81 .026 
Gr11Pmath (GMC) $35 40 .389 $34 40 .396 
Gr12PELA (GMC) $254 75 .003 $259 76 .003 
Gr12Pmath (GMC) $247 67 .002 $342 68 .002 
Gender (GMC) -$1 15 .946 -$1 15 .932 
SCHELL (GRMC)    $1,077 2553 .677 
SCHELL (GRMC) x ELL (GMC)    $25,990 4362 .000 
Random Effects Variance P-
value 
Variance P-value 
Varr   σ 2381293 --- 2380944 --- 
Varu   τ 1064255 .000 1076880 .000 
Var (γD =  
Variance of the slopes of SPED  
16847878 .000 16849692 .000 
Var (γD =  
Variance of the slopes of ELL  
2764338 .000 1047770 .000 
Var (γ$D = Variance of the slopes of 
Grade11 
43305 .000 43680 .000 
Var (γ%D = Variance of the slopes of 
Grade12 
182495 .000 181867 .000 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr11PELA 
108549 .000 109883 .000 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr12PELA 
89871 .000 91399 .000 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr12Pmath 
63314 .000 65366 .000 
ICC 30% 31% 
Model Fit: Deviance & Number of 
Estimated Parameters for Variance-
Covariance Model 
713577, 37 713524, 37 
Table Note: The random effects are allowed to covary in this model, and covariances are not included in 





Table 33: Equal Opportunity MLM Results with Random and Cross-Level Effects for 
Core-Academic TREs Per Pupil 
 Model with Random 
Effects 
Model with Random & Cross-
Level Effects 











Intercept 2,960 161 .000 2,960 157 .000 
SPED (GMC) 5,902 797 .000 5,902 797 .000 
ELL (GMC) 1,358 398 .003 1,126 262 .000 
POV (GMC) -1 14 .914 -2 14 .876 
Grade10 (GMC) -212 23 .000 -212 23 .000 
Grade11 (GMC) -227 60 .001 -226 60 .001 
Grade12 (GMC) -1,043 67 .000 -1,044 67 .000 
Latino (GMC) 37 23 .106 37 23 .105 
White/Asian (GMC) 121 27 .000 122 27 .000 
Gr10PELA (GMC) 15 32 .632 15 32 .625 
Gr10PMath (GMC) -103 32 .002 -104 32 .002 
Gr11PELA (GMC) 94 68 .180 94 36 .184 
Gr11PMath (GMC) -4 36 .898 -5 68 .888 
Gr12PELA (GMC) 227 50 .000 230 53 .000 
Gr12PMath (GMC) 184 50 .002 183 51 .002 
Gender (GMC) 2 13 .885 1 13 .895 
SCHELL (GRMC)    4,855 2,284 .046 
SCHELL (GRMC) x ELL (GMC)    30,609 3,993 .000 
Random Effects Variance P-
value 
Variance P-value 
Varr   σ 1902512 --- 1902162 --- 
Varu   τ 576164 .000 547297 .000 
Var (γD =  
Variance of the slopes of SPED  
13962666 .000 13960190 .000 
Var (γD =  
Variance of the slopes of ELL  
2919252 .000 1033486 .000 
Var (γ$D = Variance of the slopes of 
Grade11 
59292 .000 60314 .000 
Var (γ%D = Variance of the slopes of 
Grade12 
74818 .000 75843 .000 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr11PELA 
72599 .000 73308 .000 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr12PELA 
25921 .000 33032 .004 
Var (γCDD = Variance of the slopes of 
Gr12PMath 
27011 .000 28109 .004 
ICC 23% 22% 
Model Fit: Deviance & Number of 
Estimated Parameters for Variance-
Covariance Model 
704948, 37 704891, 37 
Table Note: The random effects are allowed to covary in this model, and covariances are not included in 






Differential amounts spent on teacher salaries for pecial education students vary 
substantially across schools indicated by the large variability in the regression slopes for 
special education status between schools, and no available school-level (level-2) 
variables account for why schools spend such different amounts on special education 
students.  Differential amounts spent on teacher sala ies for special education students 
(relative to non-special education students) range from $1,233 more per student to 
$15,957 more per student across schools.  However, descriptive analyses indicate that 
regression slopes for special education students may vary across schools because 13 
schools employ additional special education “classroom teachers” who do not teach 
specific courses.  Thus, these teachers’ salaries are allocated to special education students 
on top of the money spent in providing courses to special education students, and as a 
result, these schools spend more on special education students relative to non-special 
education students compared to other schools.   
Second, differential amounts spent on teacher salaries for ELL students also vary 
across schools, and differential amounts spent on teacher salaries for ELL students 
(relative to non-ELL students) range from $474 more per student to $5,148 more per 
student.  However, the variability in the regression slopes for ELL students for per-pupil 
TREs is reduced by 62% (64% for core-academic TREs per pupil) by the addition of the 
cross-level effect, the proportion of ELL students i  the school multiplied by individual 
student ELL status.  This finding indicates that schools with more ELL students spend 
more on ELL students than other schools.  This finding is consistent with descriptive 
analyses that indicate that schools with larger propo tions of ELL students have 
additional ELL “classroom teachers” who do not teach specific courses.  Hence, the 
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TREs per ELL student relative to non-ELL students are higher in schools that employ 
additional staff for ELL students.   
Third, schools vary in how much more they spend on students who have passed 
state tests relative to students who have not passed state tests.  Finally, schools vary in 
how much they spend on students in different grades.  Available cross-level effects do 
not explain variability in these regression slopes.   
Another noteworthy finding of these models is that when regression slopes are 
allowed to vary across schools, student race predicts both per-pupil TREs and core-
academic TREs per pupil, albeit the estimated regression slopes are small.  The district 
spends more on teacher salaries for White and Asian students than for African American 
students.  The district spends approximately 1% more on teacher salaries for White and 
Asian students and 4% more on teacher salaries in core-academic subjects for White and 
Asian students compared to African American students.43  Therefore, when regression 
slopes are allowed to vary between schools, equal opportunity for students of different 
race is violated.   
Compared to the previous MLM with fixed effects only, this more flexible model 
reduces the level-1 residual variance for per-pupil TREs by almost 33%.  Because the 
level-1 residual variance decreases, the ICC increases, and the resulting ICC for the final 
model for per-pupil TREs is 31%.  Thus, despite the inclusion of a number of student and 
school variables in the MLM, the within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is still far 
greater than the between-school variation.  In addition, the latter more flexible model 
with random effects has statistically significantly improved model fit compared to the 
                                                
43 Technically, the differential dollar amount may be more or less, depending on the proportion of White or 
Asian students in the school.  Because the variables ar  group-mean centered, the interpretation is not 
straightforward.   
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equal opportunity model with fixed effects only.  Conducting a likelihood ratio test of 
model deviances produces o=15793, with 35 degrees of freedom and a p-value of l ss 
than 0.001.  As the final models have the best model fit, the estimates for the final models 
are the most precise.  In summary, schools within the same district vary in how they 
allocate their resources, yet there is still much variation in the within-school allocation of 
per-pupil TREs that is not explained by available student or school characteristics. 
Equity of Within-School Allocation Patterns of Specific Resources 
 Finally, to address the fourth and final research question, “Are other resources 
equitably allocated within schools, and do multiple resource advantages or 
disadvantages exist for some students?” this study examines the equity of a number of 
resources resulting from within-school allocation processes. Relationships between 
resources and student characteristics are analyzed in each high school, and common 
findings for each student subgroup are provided.  Identifying common findings of within-
school resource allocation is a subjective process; therefore, this study outlines decision 
rules for identifying common findings.  A finding is considered to be common in the 
district if both of the following criteria are met: (a) There is a statistically significant 
difference in the distribution of the resource in approximately 20% schools; and (b) The 
direction (positive or negative) of the slope coefficients for a student characteristic is the 
same in greater than 70% of the schools with statistically significant differences.  In other 
words, this study identifies a within-school resource allocation pattern when a finding is 
reoccurring in a number of schools.   
 Taken together, student characteristics explain about 54% of the variation in per-
pupil TREs, core-academic TREs per pupil, and peer achievement, and student 
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characteristics are more strongly correlated with resources in students’ English classes 
than in students’ math classes; student characteristics explain 31% of the variation in 
English class size–on average–compared to 21% of the variation in math class size, and 
they explain 37% of the variation in having a new English teacher compared to 22% of 
the variation in having a new math teacher.  While some student characteristics–such as 
special education status–should theoretically be associated with allocated resources, other 
student characteristics–such as race and achievement–should not be associated with 
allocated resources.  This study finds that inequities n student-level resources exist.   
 This chapter now provides common within-school resource allocation patterns for 
each student subgroup including special education, ELL low-income, Latino, White or 
Asian, and high-achieving students.44  This chapter also discusses how inequities in 
allocated resources may be exacerbated for some stud nts who are members of more than 
one student subgroup.   
 Special education students.  This section summarizes findings regarding 
common within-school resource allocation patterns for special education students.  The 
first table below provides common within-school resource allocation patterns, and the 
second table displays effect sizes for resource variables regressed on special education 
status.  Results by school are provided in Appendix III.   
  
                                                
44 This study does not find any meaningful within-school resource allocation patterns for students of 
different genders.  
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Table 34: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for Special Education 
Students 
 
Common Within-School Resource 
Allocation Pattern 
Percent of Schools with This 
Pattern 
Higher per-pupil TREs 100% 
Smaller English class sizes 95% 
Smaller math class sizes 100% 
Greater odds of having new math 
teacher 
59% 
Fewer AP courses 59% 
Lower peer achievement in both English 
and math classes 
100% 
 
Table 35: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on Special Education Status 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope Coefficients Median Slope Coefficient 
Teacher resource expenditures per pupil $1,233 to $15,957 $6,737 
Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
$849 to $14,780 $5,199 
English class size -16 to +1.5 -11 
Math class size -16 to -3 -10 
Odds of having new English teacher < .1 to 12 1.0 
Odds of having new math teacher 0.3 to 917 1.9 
Log odds of number of AP courses -2.7 to -0.4 -1.8 
Peer effect in English class for 11th 
graders 
-37% to -13% -23.5% 
Peer effect in English class for 12th 
graders 
-37% to -7% -25.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 11th graders -42% to -9% -24.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 12th graders -43% to -7% -28% 
Table Note: Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized 
in this table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not i cluded in 
this table.   
 
Special education status is the most informative variable in the MLR models 
predicting per-pupil TREs.  In every school, special education students have higher per-
pupil TREs–for all instruction and for core-academic instruction–than non-special 
education students.  Per-pupil TREs are related to class size, and in almost every school, 
special education students have smaller class sizes in English and math compared to other 
students.   
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This study finds one surprising inequity in the allocation of resources for special 
education students: Special education students are mo likely to have a new math 
teacher than other students in 59% of schools, sometimes considerably so.  In addition, 
special education students take fewer AP courses than other students, and special 
education students’ peers are lower achieving than ose of other students; both of the 
latter findings result from special education student placement in remedial courses.    
ELL students.  This section summarizes findings regarding common within-
school resource allocation patterns for ELL students.  The first table below provides 
common within-school resource allocation patterns, a d the second table displays effect 
sizes for resource variables regressed on ELL status.  Results by school are provided in 
Appendix III.   
Table 36: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for ELL Students 
 
Common Within-School Resource Allocation Pattern Percent of Schools with This Pattern 
Higher per-pupil TREs 100% 
Smaller English class sizes 100% 
Larger math class sizes 50% 
Lower odds of having new English teacher 50% 





Table 37: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on ELL Status 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope Coefficients Median Slope Coefficient 
Teacher resource expenditures per 
pupil 
$474 to $5,148 $1,650 
Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
$635 to $5,310 $1,750 
English class size -10 to -1 -5.5 
Math class size -12 to +3 1.4 
Odds of having new English teacher < .1 to 1.6 0.2 
Odds of having new math teacher 0.3 to 6.2 2.3 
Log odds of number of AP courses -1.0 to +0.4 -0.3 
Peer effect in English class for 11th 
graders 
-32% to -13% -27% 
Peer effect in English class for 12th 
graders 
-31% to -15% -22.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 11th 
graders 
-24% to -4% -18.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 12th 
graders 
-24% to -10% -15.5% 
Table Notes:  
(a) Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized n this 
table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not included in this 
table.   
 (b) 12 schools are eliminated from this analysis due to lack of ELL student populations.   
 
After special education status, ELL status is the second most significant variable 
in predicting per-pupil TREs.  Schools spend more on teacher salaries for ELL students 
partially because they offer smaller class sizes in English to ELL students, and this 
pattern is true in all schools.  In English class, ELL students are also less likely to have a 
new English teacher in approximately 50% of schools.  However, in another 50% of 
schools, ELL students have larger math class sizes, but only slightly so, with one to two 
more students in the class on average.  Despite having larger math class sizes, schools 
spend more on TREs for ELL students than non-ELL students due to substantially 
smaller English class sizes, which drive up per-pupil TREs for ELL students.  As with 
special education students, ELL students’ peers have lower achievement than those of 
non-ELL students; this finding can be explained by grouping of ELL students in ESOL 
courses.   
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Low-income students.  This section summarizes findings regarding common 
within-school resource allocation patterns for low-income students.  The first table below 
provides common within-school resource allocation patterns, and the second table 
displays effect sizes for resource variables regressed on low-income status.  Results by 
school are provided in Appendix III.   
Table 38: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for Low-Income 
Students 
 
Common Within-School Resource Allocation Pattern Percent of Schools with This Pattern 
Larger English class sizes 23% 
Greater odds of having new English teacher 23% 
Fewer AP courses 18% 
Lower peer achievement in both English and math classes 27% 
 
Table 39: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on Low-Income Status 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope Coefficients Median Slope Coefficient 
Teacher resource expenditures per pupil -$199 to +$215 $119 
Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
-$169 to +$178 $90 
English class size -1 to +1 0.5 
Math class size -1 to -0.4 -0.8 
Odds of having new English teacher 1.4 to 10.8 1.25 
Odds of having new math teacher 0.8 0.8 
Log odds of number of AP courses -0.5 to -0.4 -0.45 
Peer effect in English class for 11th 
graders 
-3.4% to -2.3% -3.1% 
Peer effect in English class for 12th 
graders 
-4.0% to -2.0% -3.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 11th graders -3.2% to -2.6% -2.9% 
Peer effect in math class for 12th graders -4.6% to -2.3% -3.5% 
Table Note: Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized 
in this table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not i cluded in 
this table.   
 
Low-income students are exposed to lower amounts of quality resources than 
non-low-income students, particularly in low- and mid-poverty schools.  In a minority of 
schools (18%), low-income students take about half an AP class less than middle-class 
students, controlling for student achievement.  In high-poverty schools, however, there is 
no difference in number of AP courses taken for low-income students relative to non-
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low-income students.  A similar finding is that in 27% of schools, low-income students 
have lower achieving peers in their English and math classes than other students, but 
there are no peer achievement differences for low-income students in high-poverty 
schools.  In other words, peer sorting according to student socioeconomic status occurs in 
low- and mid-poverty schools and does not occur in high-poverty schools.  Differences in 
peer achievement for low-income students are small; nonetheless, they are statistically 
significant and indicate that in some low- and mid-poverty schools, low-income students 
are tracked with lower achieving peers, given students’ abilities.  Low-income students 
are also more likely to have new English teachers in 23% of schools, and in another 23% 
of schools, low-income students have larger English class sizes than middle-class 
students.   
In some schools, multiple inequities in resources for low-income students exist.  
In three schools, for example, low-income students are more likely than other students to 
have new English teachers and have peers with lower achievement.  In two schools, low-
income students take fewer AP courses and also have lower achieving peers than middle-
class students.  Finally, in another two schools, lw-income students are 
disproportionately taught by new teachers and have larg r class sizes than middle-class 
students in the same school.  These findings indicate that within schools, multiple 
resource inequities may exist for low-income students.  These findings also provide 
evidence that resource allocation is related to teach r and student tracking where low-
income students may be disproportionately representd i  the lowest academic tracks, 
and the least experienced teachers may disproportionately teach the lowest track courses. 
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Latino students.  This section summarizes findings regarding common within-
school resource allocation patterns for Latino students.  The first table below provides 
common within-school resource allocation patterns, a d the second table displays effect 
sizes for resource variables regressed on Latino status.  Results by school are provided in 
Appendix III. 
Table 40: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for Latino Students 
Compared to African American Students 
 
Common Within-School Resource Allocation Pattern Percent of Schools with This Pattern 
Smaller English class sizes 18% 
Larger math class sizes 32% 
Lower odds of having new English teacher 18% 
 
Table 41: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on Latino Status 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope Coefficients Median Slope Coefficient 
Teacher resource expenditures per pupil -$302 to +$1,296 $240 
Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
-$381 to +$530 $261 
English class size -3 to -0.2 -2 
Math class size -0.8 to +2.7 1 
Odds of having new English teacher 0.3 to 0.8 0.5 
Odds of having new math teacher 0.5 to 2.0 1.3 
Log odds of number of AP courses -0.8 to +1.2 0.65 
Peer effect in English class for 11th 
graders 
-5% to +7.6% 6% 
Peer effect in English class for 12th 
graders 
-11% to +21% 0% 
Peer effect in math class for 11th graders -5.4% to +9% 0.5% 
Peer effect in math class for 12th graders -10% to +24% -2.8% 
Table Notes:  
(a) Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized n this 
table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not included in this 
table.   
(b) The slope coefficient of $1,296 is likely confounded with money spent on ELL students in the school.  
This slope coefficient should be interpreted with caution.   
 
 Resource allocation patterns are mostly mixed for Latino students.  Statistically 
significant differences in resources do exist for Latino students compared to African 
American students, but the direction of the findings are mixed.  However, there are a few 
common findings.  In 18% of schools, Latino students have slightly smaller English class 
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sizes and are less likely to have new English teachrs compared to African American 
students.  In 32% of schools, Latino students have slightly larger math class sizes than 
African American students.  These findings are consistent with the findings for ELL 
students, which is not surprising given that 70% of ELL students in this district are of 
Latino descent.   
White and Asian students.  This section summarizes findings regarding common 
within-school resource allocation patterns for White and Asian students.  The first table 
below provides common within-school resource allocati n patterns, and the second table 
displays effect sizes for resource variables regressed on White or Asian status.  Results 
by school are provided in Appendix III. 
Table 42: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for White and Asian 
Students Compared to African American Students 
 
Common Within-School Resource Allocation Pattern Percent of Schools with This Pattern 
Higher per-pupil TREs 24% 
Higher core-academic TREs per pupil 19% 
Smaller math class sizes 28% 
More AP courses 57% 
Higher peer achievement in English class 24% 





Table 43: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on White and Asian Status 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope Coefficients Median Slope Coefficient 
Teacher resource expenditures per pupil $176 to $591 $458 
Core-academic teacher resource 
expenditures per pupil 
-$384 to +$933 $218 
English class size -1.3 to +2.6 -0.3 
Math class size -4 to -1.3 -2.1 
Odds of having new English teacher 0.5 to 0.7 0.6 
Odds of having new math teacher 0.5 to 1.6 1.6 
Log odds of number of AP courses 0.3 to 1.0 0.8 
Peer effect in English class for 11th graders 4.5% to 7.1% 6.4% 
Peer effect in English class for 12th graders 3.4% 6% 
Peer effect in math class for 11th graders -8.4% to +6.9% 6% 
Peer effect in math class for 12th graders 1.8% 11% 
Table Notes:  
(a) Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized n this 
table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not included in this 
table.   
 (b) One school is eliminated from this analysis due to a lack of a White and Asian student population.   
 
 There is some evidence that resource advantages exist for White and Asian students.  
The most notable finding is that in 57% of schools, White and Asian students take more 
AP courses than African American students, controlling for achievement on state tests.  
Peer sorting also appears to be at least somewhat related to student race: In roughly 20-
25% of schools, White and Asian students’ peers in English and math classes have higher 
student achievement than African American students’ peers, controlling for student 
achievement.  However, the effect sizes of differential peer achievement are small. 
 Twenty-four percent of schools spend more on teachr salaries for White and Asian 
students, relative to African American students, and 19% of schools spend more on 
teacher salaries in core-academic subjects for White and Asian students.  The dollar 
differentials range from small to large, ranging from $176 to $591 more per student for 
all salaries and $140 to $933 more per student for salaries in core-academic subjects only.  
Only one school spends less on teacher salaries for White and Asian students, but this 
school has a very small (less than 1%) White and Asian tudent population; therefore, 
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common patterns indicate that a portion of schools spend more on teacher salaries for 
White and Asian students than for African American students.  It appears that the schools 
spend more on White and Asian students at least in part because White and Asian 
students have smaller classes than African American students.  In 19% of schools, White 
and Asian students have smaller English class sizesthan African American students, and 
in 28% of schools, White and Asian students have smaller math class sizes.   
 Multiple resource advantages for White and Asian students may exist in some 
schools, and teacher and student tracking likely explain these resource advantages.  In 
seven schools (33%), White and Asian students have cl sses with peers of higher 
achievement and take more AP courses than African American students.  Additional 
findings also suggest that teacher and student tracking are related to class sizes: In eight 
schools (38%), White and Asian students take more AP courses and have smaller class 
sizes than African American students, and in another thr e schools (14%), White and 
Asian students are less likely to have new teachers and have smaller class sizes compared 
to African American students.  These findings indicate that White and Asian students 
may have several resource advantages compared to African American students within the 
same school.   
Further, in the only two schools with substantial White and Asian student 
populations (24% and 27%), multiple resource advantages exist for White and Asian 
students.  In one of the two schools, White and Asian tudents have smaller English class 
sizes, take more AP courses, have higher achieving peers, and larger per-pupil TREs 
than African American students.  In the second school, White and Asian students have 
smaller English class sizes, are less likely to have new English teachers, and take more 
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AP courses than African American students.  Thus, in chools with racial diversity and 
substantial White and Asian populations, White and Asian students have multiple 
resource advantages relative to minority students.  
Students with different levels of achievement.  This section summarizes 
findings regarding common within-school allocation patterns for students who have 
passed state standardized tests in English and/or math relative to students who have not 
passed state tests.  The first table below provides common within-school resource 
allocation patterns, and the second table displays effect sizes for resource variables 
regressed on student achievement and grade level interaction dummy variables.  Results 
by school are provided in Appendix III. 
Table 44: Common Within-School Resource Allocation Patterns for Students Who Have 
Passed State Tests Relative to Students Who Have Not Passed State Tests 
 
Common Within-School 
Resource Allocation Pattern 
Percent of Schools 
with This Pattern for 
10th Grade Students 
Percent of Schools 
with This Pattern for 
11th Grade Students 
Percent of Schools 
with This Pattern for 
12th Grade Students 
Higher per-pupil TREs --- 36% 64% 
Lower per-pupil TREs 32% --- --- 
Larger English class sizes 
 
36% --- --- 
Larger math class sizes 
 
27% 45% --- 
Smaller math class sizes 
 
--- --- 23-32% 
Lower odds of having new 
English teacher 
45% 32% 27% 
Lower odds of having new 
math teacher 
32% --- 18-36% 
Table Notes:  
(a) Percentile ranges are provided when findings differ for students who have passed the state English test 
than for students who have passed the state math test. 
(b) Cells are left blank when there is no reoccurring finding according to the inclusion criteria for common 





Table 45: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on Passed State English Test Dummy Variable by Grade Level 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope 
Coefficients for 10th 
Grade Students,  
Median 
Range of Slope 
Coefficients for 11th 
Grade Students, 
Median 
Range of Slope 
Coefficients for 12th 
Grade Students, 
Median 
Teacher resource expenditures 
per pupil 
-$452 to +$730,  
$203 
$288 to $1,239, 
$785 
$385 to $1,106, 
$539 
Core-academic teacher 
resource expenditures per 
pupil 
-$310 to +$408, 
$70 
-$413 to +$675, 
$320 
$311 to $753, 
$422 
English class size -3.4 to +4, 
1.75 
-1.7 to +1.9, 
0.2 
-3 to +3.8, 
0.8 
Math class size +1.4 to +3.3,  
1.9 
-2.8 to +3.2,  
1.4 
-4.9 to -1.6, 
-2.3 
Odds of having new English 
teacher 
0.1 to 3.6, 
0.6 
0.3 to 1.9, 
0.4 
0.1 to 8, 
0.45 
Odds of having new math 
teacher 
0.1 to 2.3, 
0.5 
0.4 to 5.2, 
0.6 
0.3 to 2.1, 
0.6 
Log odds of number of AP 
courses 
NA 0.5 to 2.1, 
1.2 
0.4 to 2.3, 
1 
Peer effect in English class NA 3.5% to 12%, 
6.9% 
2.3% to 8.2%, 
4% 
Table Note: Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized 
in this table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not i cluded in 
this table.   
 
Table 46: Range and Median of Slope Coefficients for Individual Resources Regressed 
on Passed State Math Test Dummy Variable by Grade Lev l 
 
Dependent Variables Range of Slope 
Coefficients for 10th 
Grade Students, 
Median 
Range of Slope 
Coefficients for 11th 
Grade Students, 
Median 
Range of Slope 




expenditures per pupil 
-$323 to +$405, 
-$248 
-$444 to +$800, 
$320 
$272 to $635, 
$549 
Core-academic teacher 
resource expenditures per 
pupil 
-$411 to -$211, 
-$309 
-$317 to +$859, 
$6 
$272 to $686, 
$401 
English class size -2.9 to +3, 
1.6 
-2 to +2.2, 
-0.5 
-1.8 to +4, 
1.25 
Math class size +1.1 to +2.6, 
1.4 
-1.7 to +5, 
2 
-3.5 to +2.1, 
-2 
Odds of having new English 
teacher 
0.2 to 5, 
1.9 
0.1 to 0.6, 
0.3 
0.4 to 8, 
0.5 
Odds of having new math 
teacher 
0.3 to 0.6, 
0.5 
0.4 to 2.3, 
0.7 
0.1 to 5.7, 
0.3 
Log odds of number of AP 
courses 
NA 0.3 to 1.7, 
1.1 
0.5 to 2.1, 
0.9 
Peer effect in math class NA 3% to 18%, 
6.9% 




Table Note: Only results resulting from statistically significant slope coefficients at p < .10 are summarized 
in this table.  In other words, slope coefficients that are not statistically different than 0 are not i cluded in 
this table.   
 
Similar to the findings from the estimated MLMs, schools spend more on teacher 
salaries for students who have passed the state tests than on those who have not.  Sixty-
four percent of schools spend more money on 12th grade students who have passed state 
tests–either in English or in math–than they do on low-achieving 12th grade students, or 
students who have not passed state tests.  Schools spend more on 12th grade students who 
have passed state tests relative to low-achieving 12th grade students due to a combination 
of smaller class sizes and higher-paid teachers. 
Of the 14 schools that spend more on 12th grade students who have passed state 
tests in either English or math, half of these schools spend more on students who have 
passed state tests in both English and math.  Additional money spent on 12th grade 
students who have passed state tests in both English and math ranges from $839 to 
$1,741 per student for all teacher salaries and from $640 to $1,244 per student for teacher 
salaries in core-academic subjects.  Given that the average regression intercept is around 
$3,200 for all per-pupil TREs and $2,600 for core-academic TREs per pupil, these 
additional amounts spent on 12th grade students who have passed the state tests are quite 
large.  
Results are similar for 11th grade students who have passed the state English test, 
but the effect sizes are not as large for 12th grade students.  Thirty-two percent of schools 
spend more on teacher salaries for 11th grade students who have passed the state English 
test, and only two schools spend less on 11th grade students who have passed the state 
English test.  Greater spending on 11th grade students who have passed the state English 
test mostly coincides with these students being assigned to more experienced teachers.    
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However, there is no common pattern of schools spending more or less money on 
11th grade students who have passed the state math test or on 10th grade students who 
have passed the state English test, controlling for achievement in the other subject.  For 
these students, there are patterns of larger class size and fewer newer teachers.  Thus, the 
lower expenditures per student due to larger class sizes is balanced with the higher 
expenditures per student due to higher teacher salaries, nd the result is that schools do 
not spend substantially different amounts on these students relative to lower achieving 
students.   
Finally, 32% of schools spend less money on 10th grade students who have passed 
the state math test compared to others.  Tenth grade stu ents who have passed the state 
math test are less likely to be taught by a new math teacher but also have larger class 
sizes in both math and English classes.  Thus, the low r expenditures per student 
resulting from larger class sizes outweigh the greater expenditures per student resulting 
from more experienced and higher-paid teachers.   
In summary, there are three common resource patterns in this district for spending 
on students of different achievement levels.  The first pattern is increased spending for 
students who have passed state tests relative to lower achieving students due to a 
combination of smaller class sizes and more experienced teachers.  Second, higher 
expenditures due to more experienced teachers may be balanced with lower expenditures 
due to larger class sizes, and when this occurs, schools do not spend appreciably different 
amounts of money on teacher salaries for students of different achievement levels.  Third, 
students who have passed state tests may have more experienced teachers but also 
substantially larger class sizes or larger class sizes in multiple courses, resulting in 
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schools spending less on these high-achieving studen s.  In any case, students who have 
passed state tests are more likely to be taught by experienced teachers than lower 
achieving students, and this is true across all grades.  
This study finds more occurrences and the largest effect sizes of resource 
inequities for 12th grade students compared to younger students.  As previously discussed, 
70% of 12th grade students have passed state tests.  Thus, comparing allocated resources 
for 12th grade students who have passed state tests with resourc s allocated to 12th grade 
students who have not passed state tests informs disparit es in resource allocation for the 
lowest achieving 30% of 12th grade students compared to higher achieving studens.  
When comparing resource allocation for the lowest achieving 30% of students with 
higher achieving students, low-achieving students are allocated lower per-pupil TREs, 
larger class sizes in English and math, and more new English and math teachers.  Thus, 
the lowest achieving students may have multiple resource disadvantages compared to 
higher achieving students.   
Compounded effects for students.  This section briefly explains how resource 
inequities may be even larger than previously described due to student membership in 
multiple categories and/or student attendance at different schools.  Differences in per-
pupil TREs caused by student membership in multiple student categories can be large.  
For example, one school spends 44% more on White and Asian 12th grade students who 
have passed the state math test than on African American 12th grade students who have 
not passed the state math test.  In another school, 40% more is spent on middle-class 12th 
grade students who have passed the state English test t an on low-income 12th grade 
students who have not passed the state English test.  While these are some of the most 
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extreme cases of inequitable spending within schools, it is worthwhile to note that within-
school inequity in resources may be considerable in some cases, resulting in dramatic 
differences in how much schools spend on teacher salaries for various students.   
In addition, both between- and within-school inequities in resources may produce 
even greater resource inequity at the student level.  For example, between-school 
inequities in teacher experience may result in greate  inequities in access to experienced 
teachers for low-achieving students than previously found.  In one school, for example, 
0% of 12th grade students who passed the state English test are taught by new English 
teachers, and 9% of low-achieving 12th grade students in the same school are taught by 
new English teachers.  In another school, 26% of 12th grade students who passed the state 
English test are taught by new English teachers, and 55% of low-achieving 12th grade 
students in the same school are taught by new English teachers.  Combining between- 
and within-school inequities in teacher experience yields extremely different levels of 
access to experienced teachers for two subgroups of students across two schools: 55% of 
12th grade students who have not passed state tests in School A have new English 
teachers compared to none of 12th grade students in School B who have passed state tests.  
The difference in these percentages, which indicate acc ss to experienced teachers 
resulting from both between- and within-school inequities in resources, is striking.   
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Chapter 6:  Discussion 
By calculating individualized per-pupil teacher resource expenditures (TREs) for 
each high school student in a large public school district, this study sought to create a 
sufficiently granular dataset with which to analyze both the variation in and the equity of 
the allocation of these TREs among individual students.  This analysis reveals that there 
is, in fact, considerable variation in the allocation of per-pupil TREs within schools; 
moreover, these variations are not consistent with differences in student need.  These 
results are particularly striking given the district’s stated goals of ensuring equitable 
access to education and allocating additional resources to the students with the greatest 
needs.  Given these findings, the further study of student-level TREs and the equity of 
their allocation seems ripe for future research and potentially useful for state, district, and 
school leaders as well.  To this end, this chapter discusses the implications, directions for 
future research, and limitations of this dissertation. 
Key Findings 
 Key findings of this dissertation include that thewithin-school variation in per-
pupil TREs is much larger than the variation between schools.  For students within the 
same school, inequities in per-pupil TREs and specific resources exist, and some students 
have multiple resource advantages compared to others udents.  Finally, the results of the 
study indicate that district and school leaders maybe unaware of within-school resource 
allocation patterns.   
There is greater variation in per-pupil TREs within schools than between 
schools.  The within-school variation in per-pupil TREs dwarfs the variation between 
schools.  This holds true for per-pupil TREs for all instruction and for core-academic 
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instruction.  While there is some variation (13.5%) in per-pupil TREs between schools, 
86.5% of the variation in per-pupil TREs stems from within-school differences in 
spending.  Per-pupil TREs are defined by allocating teacher salaries to individual 
students, and while there are slight differences in teacher salaries between schools, there 
is far more variation in teacher salaries within schools.  Likewise, there is much more 
variation in per-pupil TREs within schools than betw en schools.  Another factor that 
contributes to the large variation in per-pupil TREs within schools is the large variability 
in class sizes across courses.  Class sizes are the most influential component of course 
expenditures per student, and class sizes vary dramatically across courses.   
While it is not yet fully understood how much variation in per-pupil TREs should 
be tolerated and or expected given various constraits, this study extends school finance 
research by finding that there is more variation in per-pupil TREs within schools than 
between schools.  School finance researchers traditionally studied interstate and 
interdistrict equity of fiscal resources until some researchers pointed out that there is 
considerable variation in teacher salaries between schools in the same district (Spatig-
Amerikaner, 2012; Speakman et al., 1997), which led to studies of intradistrict 
differences in teacher salaries and/or per-pupil expenditures (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; 
Condron & Roscigno, 2003; Heuer & Stullich, 2011; Klein, 2008; Owens & Maiden, 
1999; Rubenstein, 1998).  Some districts conscientiously tried to reduce teacher salary 
differences across schools (Odden et al., 2003; see al o Hobson v. Hansen), the result 
being that intradistrict equity was improved in some cases.  In this subject district, teacher 
salaries are equitably allocated between schools, and because there are not dramatic 
differences in teacher salaries between schools, the majority of the variation in teacher 
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salaries (and per-pupil TREs) occurs within schools.  This study extends school finance 
research by contributing that there may be more diff rences in fiscal resources at the 
student level than at the school level, particularly when fiscal resources are equitably 
allocated between schools, and highlighting the need for a better understanding of the 
equity and allocation of fiscal resources at the student level. 
Inequities in per-pupil TREs exist.  As might be expected in a sample with 
considerable variation in per-pupil TREs for students within the same school, there are 
also inequities in the allocation of per-pupil TREs within schools and at the student level.  
To analyze the equity of per-pupil TREs within schools, this study started with Berne & 
Stiefel’s framework for evaluating equity, which consists of three principles: horizontal 
equity, vertical equity, and equal opportunity.  To determine horizontal equity and equal 
opportunity within schools, this study developed an analytic approach to account for 
multiple dimensions of student need by utilizing stati tically rigorous analyses while 
hewing as close as possible to the spirit of Berne & Stiefel’s framework.  To assess 
vertical equity, this study calculated how much more money is spent on special education, 
English language learner (ELL), and low-income students relative to other students and 
compared actual funding weights to those outlined in the state foundation plan for each 
category of students. 
Based on this analysis, inequities in per-pupil TREs within schools exist, and 
students in the same school do not necessarily receive equitable monetary resources.  
This study finds that horizontal equity is not achieved within schools, as there is 
considerable variation in per-pupil TREs for “like” students– “like” students are students 
who are similar in terms of special education, ELL, and low-income status and grade 
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level.  This finding is perhaps even more striking given the context of the analysis.  This 
study generally bases its horizontal equity analysis on Toutkoushian and Michael’s 
(2007) modification of Berne & Stiefel’s (1984) framework for evaluating equity, which 
among other things holds that horizontal equity is violated if there is any variation in 
PPEs after controlling for certain variables.  However, this study allows for some 
variation in per-pupil TREs to be more consistent with traditional horizontal equity 
analyses.  Specifically, this study allows the variation in per-pupil TREs to be as large as 
the variation in teacher salaries within schools before horizontal equity is violated.  Yet, 
nevertheless, horizontal equity was not achieved for students in the same school.  Thus, 
despite controlling for differences in student need, variation in per-pupil TREs within 
schools is still quite large.   
Equal opportunity for students with different achievement levels is violated 
because the majority of schools in this district spend more money on teacher salaries for 
students who have passed state tests compared to students who have not passed state tests.  
On average, schools spend 13.7% more on 12th grade students who have passed state 
English and math tests compared to low-achieving 12th grade students.  Around 70% of 
12th grade students have passed state tests, so one implication of this finding is that 
schools spend the least on the lowest achieving 30% of students compared to higher 
achieving students, all else being equal.  For core-academic TREs per pupil, schools 
spend 16% more on 12th grade students who have passed both English and math state 
tests compared to low-achieving 12th grade students.  Schools do not spend more on high-
achieving students than low-achieving students due to differences in student course loads 
because high- and low-achieving students are enrolld in the same number of course 
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credits.  In addition, equal opportunity is violated for student race because a few schools 
spend slightly more on White and Asian students than on African American students, 
holding all else equal, albeit the monetary differentials are small.   
For horizontal equity and equal opportunity, this study finds that inequities in per-
pupil TREs exist.  However, student-level inequities in fiscal resources may not directly 
result from problematic district and school policies.  Teacher and student sorting into 
courses ultimately affects how resources are allocated to individual students and results 
from a myriad of choices and constraints.  Specifically, students (and parents) select 
which courses to take, teachers may have preferences i  which courses that they teach, 
and school leaders may influence teacher assignment to various courses.  Additionally, 
formal and informal school policies and constraints–such as scheduling constraints or 
prerequisite courses–may restrain students’ decisions t  enroll in various courses.  
Research is mixed in the role of student choice versus contextual constraints in students’ 
decisions to participate in various courses (Brent et al., 1997; Oakes & Guiton, 1995; 
Tyson, 2013), and this study does not shed light on the role of student choice in the 
within-school allocation process.  However, this study highlights that choices and 
constraints in the within-school resource allocation process result in inequities in per-
pupil TREs.   
Lastly, this study examines vertical equity for special education, ELL, and low-
income students and determines whether state categorical funding for these student 
subgroups is ultimately allocated to these students.  This study finds mixed results.  
Vertical equity is achieved for special education students; the district spends 181% more 
per pupil on teacher salaries and 310% more per pupil on teacher salaries in core-
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academic subjects for special education students relativ  to non-special education 
students.  As for ELL students, the district spends 61% more on teacher salaries and 99% 
more on teacher salaries in core-academic subjects for ELL students than for non-ELL 
students.  The state provides 99% more funding for ELL students in its contributions to 
districts.  Thus, it is debatable whether vertical equity is achieved for ELL students 
because for all TREs, vertical equity is not achieved, but for core-academic TREs, 
vertical equity is achieved.  Nevertheless, this study concludes that vertical equity is 
achieved for ELL students.   
Vertical equity is not achieved for low-income students because the district 
spends only 13% more per low-income student relative to non-low-income students on all 
teacher salaries and only 17% more per pupil on teacher salaries in core-academic 
subjects.  The funding weight in this state for low-income students is 1.97, implying that 
low-income students should receive 97% more resources than middle-class students.  
Thus, there is a substantial gap between the money sp nt on teacher salaries for low-
income students and the categorical funding weights ou lined in the state foundation plan.  
Further, the district spends only 2% more on teacher salaries and 4% more on teacher 
salaries in core-academic subjects for low-income students when controlling for special 
education and ELL status.  Thus, the district does not achieve vertical equity for low-
income students.   
This vertical equity analysis highlights that state funding for low-income students 
does not ultimately reach individual low-income students, at least in terms of teacher 
salaries.  To the contrary, state funding for special education and ELL students is 
ultimately allocated to special education and ELL students, and the district spends even 
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more per special education student than required by the state.  The district spends 
substantially more on teacher salaries for special ducation and ELL students because 
special education and ELL students are often grouped together for instruction, and they 
have small class sizes, particularly in English classes.  These smaller class sizes drive up 
costs for special education and ELL students.  It is less clear how state categorical 
funding for low-income student populations would be reflected in teacher salary 
differences for low-income students.   
One might theoretically argue that state categorical funding benchmarks for low-
income students should be compared against total PPEs, as opposed to per-pupil TREs, in 
a vertical equity analysis.  Whether low-income students need more instructional 
resources to achieve the same educational outcomes as non-low-income students is 
perhaps debatable; however, there is some evidence that this is the case.  For example, 
researchers find the low-income students may benefit from reduced class sizes (Krueger, 
2002).  One could argue that if the district receives categorical aid for 40% of its students 
who qualify for free and reduced-priced meals, the district should consider how to invest 
these resources in ways that improve student outcomes for low-income students, which 
would likely involve investing more per-pupil TREs for low-income students.  
One might also argue that any failure to achieve vertical equity for low-income 
students is merely the result of all students, regardless of income level, being taught by 
the same teachers and attending the same classes as their non-low-income counterparts; 
however, this argument is not valid in this district.  In this district, low-income (as well as 
minority) students are less likely to be enrolled in advanced courses and are more likely 
to have peers with lower achievement than their middle-class (and White) counterparts.  
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Though the district certainly does not spend lesson teacher salaries for low-income 
students compared to other students, the district does not appear to be strategically 
directing additional dollars to the instruction of l w-income students in terms of teacher 
salaries and class sizes.  State funding for low-income populations could ultimately 
benefit low-income students if districts created monetary incentives to recruit and retain 
high-quality teachers in high-poverty schools.   
Inequities in specific student-level resources exist.  This study also analyzes the 
equity of the allocation of specific resources within each school to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the equity of within-school resource allocation.  Though the 
district spends much more on teacher salaries for special education and ELL students 
than general education students, special education students are more likely to be assigned 
to a new math teacher in 59% of schools.  In addition, ELL students have larger-than-
average math class sizes in 50% of schools; in fact, though the district spends much more 
on courses for non-native English speakers (ESOL courses) than regular track academic 
courses on average, the district spends $109 less per student on math courses for ELL 
students than regular track math courses due to larger-than-average class sizes.  This 
finding highlights the fact that although an analysis of monetary resource allocation is 
informative, it may not capture all resource inequities in a given school.   
This study also finds other resource inequities for low-achieving, low-income, and 
African American students beyond fiscal resources, and resource inequities may exist for 
these students across a number of resources simultaneously.  This is particularly true for 
the lowest achieving students in the district.  When comparing the lowest achieving 30% 
of 12th grade students with higher achieving 12th grade students, the lowest achieving 
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students have almost every resource disadvantage compared to higher achieving students: 
larger math class sizes, more new teachers, less exposure to advanced curricula, and 
lower achieving peers.  Even when schools do not spend more on high-achieving students 
than low-achieving students, schools consistently assign a disproportionate number of 
low-achieving students to the least experienced teach rs.   
When multiple resource inequities are present, the result is a potentially large 
difference in how much is spent on individual students within the same school.  One of 
the most drastic examples of inequitable spending in per-pupil TREs occurs in a school 
that spends 44% more on 12th grade White and Asian high-achieving students thanon 
12th grade African American low-achieving students, contr lling for special education, 
ELL, and low-income status.  This differential is quite large, particularly for teacher 
resource expenditures.   
School context relates to the equity of within-school resource allocation.  For 
example, the relationship between advanced course-taking and student socioeconomic 
status and race appears to be more prevalent in school  with more racial and 
socioeconomic diversity: In low- and mid-poverty schools, low-income students take 
fewer advanced placement (AP) courses and have peers with lower achievement than 
non-low-income students.  In the majority (57%) of schools, White and Asian students 
take more AP courses than African American students, controlling for student 
achievement. Thus, low-income and minority students may be “crowded out” of AP and 
other advanced courses in schools with larger proportions of middle class and White 
students (Tyson, 2013).  In addition, interestingly, there are greater inequities in resource 
allocation for African American students in the two schools with the largest White and 
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Asian populations.  Across these two schools, White and Asian students have higher per-
pupil TREs, smaller class sizes, higher achieving peers, and fewer new teachers and take 
more AP courses compared to African American students.  Again, it is unclear from this 
study the role that student choice plays in course-taking in this district.  However, if 
students are voluntarily sorting themselves based on race, which causes inequitable 
allocated resources, district and school leaders should identify resource inequities and 
then find potential solutions for addressing them.   
Within-school resource investment may not align with district goals.  These 
findings indicate that district leaders may be unaware of within-school resource 
allocation patterns.  Per its school board policy, the district is committed to providing 
equitable access to a high quality education for all students by allocating greater 
resources to students with the greatest needs, yet the district does not spend more on low-
income students and spends less on low-achieving studen s than on middle-class or 
higher achieving students.  Further, across the district, more money is directed to 
advanced core courses than regular track core courses in three out of the four core 
academic subjects, and the advanced math courses are twice as costly as the regular math 
courses.  Another goal of the district is to prepar its students for college or careers, but 
the district spends more on foreign language courses and other elective courses than on 
regular track academic or vocational courses that prepare the majority of students for 
college or careers.  Given its stated goals, the district may need to better align its 
monetary resources with its priorities.  This may require re-examining the cost 
effectiveness of offering advanced foreign language or other non-core courses that are 
expensive due to very small class sizes, increasing student participation in courses that 
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prepare them for college or the workforce, and financi lly investing in courses that are 
likely to affect student outcomes.   
As previously discussed, it is unclear from this study to what extent choices and 
constraints affect how resources are allocated within schools.  To be sure, districts have 
some responsibility to allocate their resources equitably and to provide equitable access 
to a high-quality education to all students.  It may be the case, for example, that the 
district is providing equitable access to rigorous courses but that student course-taking 
choices result in stratified educational opportunities.  It could also be the case that fewer 
students enroll in advanced courses, resulting in smaller class sizes (and higher costs) for 
advanced courses.  Clearly, student and parent preferences play a role in how resources 
are allocated within a school.  But the fact that student choice exists does not absolve 
districts and schools from the responsibility of ensuring that all students receive equitable 
resources.  We know from other research that minority and low-income students may 
“opt out” of advanced courses if there are few minority and low-income students in those 
courses (Carter, 2013).  However, district and school leaders can potentially address this 
issue by creating school cultures in which all students are encouraged to perform at their 
highest levels as well as academic supports for students who are not accustomed to 
participating in advanced courses (Hawley & Wolf, 201 ). 
It could also be the case that few teachers in the sc ool are qualified to teach the 
advanced courses resulting in the most experienced teachers teaching the most advanced 
courses.  To this point, districts and schools should be continually working to develop 
human capital so that all teachers are effective and there are an adequate number of 
effective teachers to distribute across a variety of courses.  Further, as districts and 
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schools move away from the static teacher salary and experiment with teacher 
performance pay, district and school leaders should create policies that incentivize 
experienced teachers to teach courses at all levels.  School leaders may also exert 
influence on which courses students take and how teachers are assigned to courses (Koski 
& Horng, 2007; Leithwood et al., 2004).  
 In summary, the district may be meeting its goal t provide equitable access to a 
high-quality education for all students.  This study points out, however, that providing 
equitable access may not be sufficient in providing a high-quality education for all 
students.  Understanding the results of the within-school resource allocation process is 
potentially the first step for any district interest d in addressing resource equity. 
Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This study has implications for both the educational research community as well 
as education leaders at the state, district, and school levels.  Suggestions for future 
research are also described.   
Research community.  Given the paucity of research on student-level 
expenditure data, there are few examples of–and certainly no consensus regarding–a 
framework for how to calculate individualized TREs.  Student-specific PPE figures (“per-
pupil TREs”) for this study were derived by taking i dividual teacher salaries and 
allocating them among students taught by that teacher, accounting for, among other 
things, the number of classes taught by the teacher, the length of each class, and the 
number of students in each class.  This approach is reasonably comprehensive because it 
essentially accounts for the majority of instructional expenditures of every minute of a 
specific student’s regular school day.  Nevertheless, future studies may well adjust or 
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refine it, and in any event, the calculation of student-level PPEs is itself a topic that 
merits further research and discussion.   
As with the derivation of per-pupil TREs, more research and discussion on the 
logistics of conducting an equity analysis within schools is also warranted.  This study is 
the first to outline an approach for analyzing the equity of per-pupil TREs for students 
within the same school.  Specifically, in calculating the degree of variation in spending 
on “like” students, this study controls for reasons why per-pupil TREs should vary within 
schools.  One would expect, for example, that schools spend more on teacher salaries for 
special education and ELL students.  Further, this study compares the degree of variation 
in spending on “like” students within schools to the variation in teacher salaries within 
schools.  Thus, this study shows that the degree of variation in per-pupil TREs within 
schools is much greater than the degree of variation in teacher salaries within schools.  
Future research may refine this approach for evaluating within-school horizontal equity. 
This study is also the first to compare the variation in per-pupil TREs within 
schools to the variation between schools.  The fact that there is much more variation in 
per-pupil TREs within schools than between schools, t gether with potential contrasts in 
resource investment and district values and goals, r ises the possibility that other districts 
may face similar issues.  Thus, research in other districts is warranted to determine if 
within-school variation in per-pupil TREs is practically significant in other contexts and 
results in resource inequities.   
In addition, this study evaluates the equity of a number of resources within 
schools, but there are many more instructional resources that one could investigate.  For 
example, future researchers could examine the equity of the distribution of effective 
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teachers–identified by value-added measurements or teacher evaluation scores–in 
conjunction with other resources (Bastian, Henry, & Thompson, 2013).  Future research 
could also examine the relationship between equitable resource allocation processes and 
student outcomes.  Can schools, for example, improve student achievement by aligning 
resources with students who have the greatest academic n eds?  Research that examines 
how schools can improve student achievement by aligning resources with student needs 
is particularly relevant because if more equitable resource allocation patterns result in 
improved student achievement, then schools may potentially improve student 
achievement using the resources that they already possess.  
Finally, this study explains about half of the variation in per-pupil TREs with 
student characteristic variables, but much variance is l ft unexplained, and there is room 
for further investigation of the reasons why per-pupil TREs vary within schools.  
Potential influences on per-pupil TREs, such as school leadership and student, parent, 
and teacher choices as well as scheduling and othercourse-related constraints, are not 
examined in this study and may better explain resource allocation patterns.  Research on 
how choices and constraints influence the within-school resource allocation process in 
different school contexts would be particularly insightful because researchers could then 
inform how to create policy solutions that rectify stratification of educational 
opportunities for students within the same school.   
State leaders.  This study informs state leaders and policymakers whether state 
funding for categorical student subgroups is ultimaely allocated to individual students.  
The study finds that for one large urban district, state funding for special education and 
ELL students does reach individual high school students, but this study also finds that 
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state funding intended for low-income student populations is not being spent on low-
income students in terms of TREs.  Further, this study questions how state funding for 
low-income student populations should be allocated to low-income students.  State 
leaders and policymakers should consider how to hold districts accountable for the 
allocation of state funding to categorical student subgroups.   
District leaders.  Until district leaders examine within-school resource allocation 
patterns, they may not be aware of how their policies and practices translate into actual 
resources for individual students or if resources ar  equitably distributed across students.  
Further, within-school resource allocation patterns may also be misaligned with district 
values and goals, and researching how resources are ultimately allocated to students is 
potentially the first step in re-aligning resources to meet district goals.  For this reason, 
along with the recent push by the federal government’s Race to the Top Fund to 
“improve the collection and use of data” (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, p. 3), 
district leaders should collect resource data and analyze within-school resource allocation 
patterns and should consider implementing student ma agement data systems that make 
such data collection and within-school analyses of resources less burdensome.   
To this end, within-school analyses of resources would be facilitated if data were 
collected in a more systematic manner.  Specifically, districts could work to develop 
student-level data files that contain all student characteristics including demographic 
information, academic success in the district, disciplinary actions, and achievement on 
standardized tests.  Course-level files that contain teacher demographic and quality 
information would also be incredibly useful.  Distrc  should routinely produce financial 
summary information that provides teacher salary expenditure information as well as 
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breakdowns of other financial expenditures allocated for various courses or programs.  In 
summary, more integrated data systems are necessary to better understand the resources 
that individual students within a school receive and to ensure that the allocation of 
resources at the student level is consistent with district goals. 
  School leaders.  School leaders are perhaps most able to address inequities in 
resource allocation within schools because they influe ce how resources are allocated 
through teacher assignments, class sizes, and student course-taking.  Even if inequities in 
resources exist across districts and schools–and in many cases they do–school leaders can 
work to ensure that students with greater needs receiv  additional resources within their 
own schools.  School leaders should be aware of how teacher and student sorting into 
classes creates resource advantages and disadvantages for various student subgroups.  
  School leaders–along with district leaders–may also need to examine policies 
relating to course taking to determine if all students have the opportunity to enroll in 
academically rigorous courses (Hawley & Wolf, 2012).  Even if all students have equal 
access to academically rigorous courses, school leaders should consider how students 
select advanced courses and if all students with hig test scores are equally encouraged to 
enroll in advanced and AP courses.  Even though this district has an “open-door” AP 
course-taking policy, in which any student may take ny AP course and access to AP 
courses is not restricted by prerequisite and teacher permission requirements, a 
disproportionate number of White and Asian and middle-class students are enrolled in 
these courses in some schools.  School leaders can dis ggregate student data by race and 
socioeconomic status to ensure that high-achieving mi ority and low-income students are 
equally likely to be enrolled in advanced courses as White, Asian, and middle-class 
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students, and if they are not, identify other ways of encouraging high-achieving minority 
or low-income students to enroll in these courses.  Addressing this issue is particularly 
important in schools with lower proportions of minority and low-income students, as 
such students are often “crowded out” of AP courses in schools with more middle class 
and White student populations (Tyson, 2013).  It may be necessary to engage parents of 
low-income or minority families to ensure that they are knowledgeable about the 
academic offerings of the school or address low expectations of the academic capabilities 
of their children, which can contribute to differential academic track placements (Oakes 
& Guiton, 1995).  Finally, school leaders can work to build academic support structures 
for students who are not accustomed to taking advanced courses (Hawley & Wolf, 2012).    
School leaders may also wish to reconsider teacher assignment practices.  In this 
district, high-achieving students are more likely to be taught by experienced teachers, and 
low-income students are more likely to be taught by inexperienced teachers; this is a 
common finding in the literature (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Player, 2010).  In 
fact, research indicates that, given static teacher salary structures, school leaders may 
reward and help retain more effective teachers by assigning them to higher achieving 
students (Clotfelter et al., 2005; Player, 2010).  But not only is this process inequitable, it 
may also be inefficient as student performance may be most enhanced when the most 
effective teachers teach the most academically struggling students (Clotfelter et al., 2005).  
School leaders can work to ensure the equitable distribution of experienced and effective 
teachers across advanced, regular track, and remedial courses and may have to create new 
staff policies or incentivize effective teachers to share in the teaching of low-achieving 
students (Bastian et al., 2013).  Further, school leaders can identify teachers who are 
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particularly effective in raising student achievement and assign these teachers to the 
students with the greatest academic needs.  Finally, school and district leaders should 
consider how teacher and student sorting into classes creates small class sizes for some 
courses, resulting in high course expenditures per student.  School and district leaders 
should flag courses with fewer students (and high course expenditures per student) and 
decide if investment in these courses contributes to school and district goals.  More work 
needs to be done to support school and district leaders in addressing within-school 
inequities in resources and to identify the barriers that leaders continue to face.   
Limitations 
Technical limitations of this study are discussed in the Appendices; several non-
technical limitations are discussed here as well.  First, findings identified in this study 
may not be generalizable to all districts, particularly districts with very different 
demographic and socioeconomic attributes. However, given the degree of within-school 
variability in per-pupil TREs found in this study, it is possible–if not likely–that within-
school variation in per-pupil TREs is considerable and that inequities in student-level 
resources occur in other districts.   
Additionally, this study does not account for all instructional expenditures.  By 
strategically choosing to investigate only instructional expenditures directly affecting 
classroom instruction, this study ignores much of spending within schools.  For example, 
this study does not account for school-level resources, such as school administration, 
professional development, technology, textbooks and supplies, librarians, guidance 
counselors, and staff who primarily work with teachers, though these resources may be 
indirectly related to student achievement.  Allocating school-level expenditures to 
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individual students is likely to decrease the propotion of within-school variation in PPEs 
and increase the proportion of between-school variation in PPEs, compared to the 
proportions identified in this study.  Further, this study does not account for school staff 
who are not classroom teachers but who may otherwis provide instruction to students or 
contribute to classroom management; examples of such chool staff include instructional 
aides, student teachers, and instructional coaches.  
 The nature of the student achievement data is another limitation in this study.  
High school students must take and pass four standardized tests before graduating from 
high school, and while students may take these tests multiple times throughout their high 
school careers, many do not take each test annually.  Thus, raw test scores are 
confounded with the grade level in which students take the tests.  This study attempts to 
account for this dilemma by creating dummy achievement variables indicating whether or 
not a student has passed a state standardized test and by comparing student achievement 
only for students within the same grade.  However, dummy variables of student 
achievement are not as informative as raw test score .  It is likely that student 
achievement is not fully controlled for in this study.  
Finally, teacher quality data are not available for this study, and this study does 
not examine the distribution of effective teachers.  This study infers teacher quality 
through teacher years of experience and salary, which may not accurately reflect teacher 
effectiveness.  Relatedly, this study does not account for a number of observable and 
unobservable student, teacher, parent, and school leader characteristics and choices that 




Creating schools where all students–regardless of background, race, or 
socioeconomic status–have equitable educational resou ces is a daunting task without a 
simple solution.  Narrowing the racial and socioeconomic achievement gap in student 
achievement will require more than merely providing students with equitable resources 
(Rothstein, 2013; Welner & Carter, 2013), but a more equitable allocation of resources 
can only help.  This study is one of the first in the literature to attempt to link multiple 
resources to individual students for all high school students, and it does so for all high 
school students in a large urban public school district.   
Analysis of the data reveals that per-pupil TREs vary considerably within schools 
and much more than across schools in the district.  There is also variation in how 
individual schools allocate their resources, and within-school allocation patterns of per-
pupil TREs vary across schools.  The study finds that inequities in student-level resources 
do exist, even in a district that is committed to equity of resources for all students.  
Specifically, this study finds inequities in the allocation of per-pupil TREs, class sizes, 
teacher experience, peer achievement, and number of AP courses.  These findings 
highlight the need for future research on within-school resource allocation because 
understanding and evaluating the equity of resource allocation within schools may be 





 Four appendices are included in this study.  The first appendix describes key 
decisions and assumptions in estimating teacher resou ce expenditures (TREs) per pupil.  
The second appendix provides demographic and resource information for each school.  
The third appendix contains the regression analysis re ults for each school.  The final 
appendix discusses model fit and assumptions for all f the models estimated in the study.   
Appendix I: Key Assumptions and Decisions in Estimating Per-Pupil TREs 
 This appendix describes the key decisions and assumptions made in estimating 
per-pupil TREs.  This appendix describes how the sample was obtained, per-pupil TREs 
were calculated, outliers were identified, and missing data were handled.     
Sample selection.  This study employs a sample of high school students for 
several reasons.  First, high school students take a number of courses and are taught by 
multiple teachers; thus, there is variation in allocated resources within schools.  Second, 
tracking may be more common in high schools, and tracking relates to resource equity.  
Finally, the data are the most reliable for high scool students in the district.  Elementary 
school data are problematic because they do not indicate the amount of time each student 
spends with each teacher.  In other words, I could not distinguish if students were with 
the teacher for most of the day or for only one hour.  Assuming that elementary school 
teachers spend equal time with all students is likely incorrect and would potentially 
confound the findings.  Middle school data are mostly reliable, but a few students are 
linked to multiple courses in all academic subjects.  Hence, it is impossible to accurately 
estimate per-pupil TREs for roughly 5% of middle school students.  Data for high school 
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students posed the least complications, and I have confidence that the data adequately 
reflect the resources allocated to individual high sc ool students.  
The sample of students was created using the following rubric: All students from 
all traditional high schools were initially include in the analysis.  Then, special 
education students who spent more than 60% of their day outside of regular instruction 
were removed from the sample because these students may have atypical educational 
experiences and expenditures; the students who were removed constitute 0.3% of all high 
school students.  Approximately three and a half percent of high school students attended 
more than one school in the academic year.  These stud nts were included in the analysis 
more than once if reliable estimated per-pupil TREs exi ted for students at each school.  
The resulting sample contains 41,537 high school students.   
Table 47: Number of Students in Sample by Grade Level  
 
Grade 
Number of Students by 
Grade Level 
Relative Percent (%) of 
Students by Grade Level 
 
Grade 9 12,583 30.3 
Grade 10 10,963 26.4 
Grade 11 8,997 21.7 
Grade 12 8,982 21.6 








I reviewed the state Department of Education handbook f r the 2009–2010 
academic year to ensure that these data are reliable and contain all students and schools.  
The state Department of Education handbook indicates that, for the 2009-2010 academic 
year, there were around 20 high schools and 60,000 students in grades 7–12,45 and the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) repo ts that in the 2010–2011 academic 
                                                
45 Total number of students in grades 9–12 is not available.  
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year, there were around 40,000 high school students (Institute of Education Sciences, 
2013).  The sample includes a larger number of highschool students than cited by either 
the state Department of Education or NCES.  The discrepancy in the sample sizes is 
most likely due to student mobility and the fact that these data were collected at different 
times throughout the year.46  Given that all traditional high schools are included in the 
data and that the sample size is similar to those provided by the state Department of 
Education and NCES, the study concludes that the sample is adequate in representing the 
district’s student population of high school students.     
Calculating per-pupil TREs.  This section describes several challenges 
encountered while cleaning the data and calculating per-pupil TREs.  Teacher salary data 
were not straightforward because the financial file contained line-item expenditures 
allocated to individual teachers for various purposes.  In determining teacher salary, I 
included all salary expenditures that were directly re ated to instruction and that reflected 
how much districts pay teachers for instructional purposes.  I included regular, leave, and 
performance pay, and other stipends granted for instructional purposes.  I did not include 
salary expenditures that were indirectly related to instruction or that involved activities 
not related to instruction, such as professional development and athletic coaching.  I also 
excluded salary expenditures that were allocated for summer school or other instructional 
purposes outside of the regular academic school year.   
I also examined whether specialty “classroom teachers,” such as ESOL, special 
education, and reading teachers were included in the course enrollment files.  All 
                                                
46 Student mobility refers to students leaving the district as well as transferring to another school within the 
district.  This study doubly counts students who appear in the course enrollment data more than once, as 
long as complete course enrollment information is avail ble for the student at each school.  This study 
roughly counts 3% of students twice.   
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“classroom teachers” were found in the course enrollment files except for five ELL, 32 
special education, and two reading teachers.  These teachers’ salaries were evenly 
allocated to ELL, special education, or all students within the school to produce accurate 
per-pupil TREs.  It should also be noted that some non-“classroom teachers,” such as 
resource teachers and guidance counselors, were identified as teaching courses in course 
enrollment files.  For these teachers, I allocated th ir salaries to the courses that they 
taught and then examined if the small teacher loads resulted in abnormally large course 
expenditures.   
There were abnormalities in the high school data.  I reviewed the total number of 
courses taught by individual teachers.  The average teacher course load was around 5.5 
course credits, with some elective teachers responsible for up to nine course credits.  I 
reviewed teachers with course loads of less than four credits and tagged cases where the 
course expenditure was abnormally high for the school, or more than one and a half times 
the average expenditure for that course in a particular school.  This analysis identified 
3.6% of courses, and for these courses, I allocated the teacher salaries as if the teachers 
taught five course credits total.  The rationale is that these teachers likely have other 
responsibilities other than teaching fewer courses and if their salaries are fully allocated 
to the few courses, the course expenditures would be inaccurately too large.  For special 
education and ESOL teachers, I allocated their salaies s if these teachers taught four 
course credits total, as special education and ESOL teachers generally have lighter 
teaching loads and teach four courses each.  I also reviewed courses with very small class 
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sizes, and it did not appear that there were any mistakes after the initial cleaning of the 
data.47   
The choice whether to code a course as a core-academic course was heavily 
dependent on the district’s course guidebook.  If a course such as creative writing was 
listed in the English department, it was coded as acore-academic course.  In summary, I 
used the district course guidebook and coded all courses offered in the English 
department as English courses.  The same approach applies to courses in other academic 
departments.  There were a few exceptions, however; th  district considered yearbook 
and school newspaper courses as English courses, and I coded these courses as elective 
courses instead of core-academic courses because they were often offered after school.48   
Missing data.  Nine high school teachers were missing staff identification 
numbers and 120 teachers (out of 2,277 total high school teachers) could not be linked to 
a valid teacher identification number and thus were missing salary information.  The 
financial data containing salary information for teachers included staff identification 
numbers that are five digits in length.  However, in course enrollment data, 120 teachers 
had staff identification numbers that were between 9 a d 11 digits in length, and these 
teachers could not be identified in the financial dta.  Thus, it was impossible to link 
these 120 teachers to their salaries.  These 120 teachers were scattered across schools, 
and every school had at least one teacher who could not be linked to his/her salary.  
Further, there was no pattern as to the types of courses that teachers with missing salary 
information taught.  These 120 teachers likely had miscoded staff identification numbers, 
and the miscoding of staff identification numbers likely occurred in the district office.  
                                                
47 I originally cleaned the data by school to correct any obvious errors.   
48 The full data diary, which is available upon request, lists all courses coded as core-academic courses. 
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As a result of the total 129 high school teachers with missing salary information, 
5.5% of all high school courses could not be linked to a teacher’s salary, and 31% of 
high school students were taught by at least one teacher with a missing salary.  For 
courses linked to teachers with missing salaries, I imputed the course expenditures based 
on school and district average course expenditures.  If possible, the missing course 
expenditure was imputed from the school-level averag  expenditure for the specific 
course; in this case, if a student was taught by a teacher with a missing salary, the student 
received the school-level average expenditure for that particular course.  53.5% of the 
missing course expenditures were imputed in this manner.  If school-level average 
course expenditures were not available for the particular course, then the course 
expenditure was imputed from the school-level averag  expenditure of all the courses in 
the course category (math, English, etc.).  I imputed 38% of the courses with missing 
course expenditures in this manner.  Finally, for the remaining 8.5% of courses with 
missing expenditures that could not be imputed withsc ool-level averages, I imputed the 
district-level average expenditure for that particular course.  Imputing course 
expenditures using school-level average expenditures is preferable to using district-level 
average expenditures because district-level expenditures are confounded by within- and 
between-school differences in course expenditures.  The imputation of missing course 
expenditures may have either reduced or increased within-school variation in per-pupil 
TREs.  However, given that only 5.6% of course expenditures were imputed, the 
estimated per-pupil TREs are likely reliable indicators of how much money is spent on 
teacher salaries for individual students.   
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 Outliers.  As a result of the imputed missing course expenditures, per-pupil TREs 
were able to be estimated for over 99% of high school students.  However, outliers 
clearly existed; for example, one student was estimated to have a TRE of $148,010.  Such 
large expenditures for a few students potentially distort true average per-pupil TREs for 
the large majority of students.  Thus, this study excluded outlier cases, and outliers were 
identified by the residuals ( ) of the following multip e linear regression model: 
Ǹ  3  3pqrstuvwN  3rxxvyyN  3z{|sr}~wvN  N 
Where:  
Ǹ: per‐pupil TRE for ith student 
3: intercept, or base spending per-pupil in 9th grade 
tuvwN : student receives special education services (0=no, 1=yes) 
vyyN : student is English language learner (0=no, 1=yes) 
~wvN : set of dummy codes for students in grade k, (0=no, 1=yes) 
3pqrs: differential dollar amount allocated to special education students, on average 
3rxx: differential dollar amount allocated to English language learners, on average 
3z{|sr} : differential dollar amount allocated to students in grade k, on average 
N: residual for the ith student. 
 
Outliers were identified after controlling for grade level and special education and 
ELL status, hence taking into account that certain students typically cost more to educate 
than others.  Outliers were identified if the residuals from the previous model were 
further than three standard deviations from the mean.  Roughly one and a half percent of 
all students were identified as having outlier expenditures per student for both total per-
pupil TREs and core-academic TREs per pupil.  Thus, the final sample included 
approximately 98% of high school students.  Outlier cases were spread across all schools, 
and the percentages of outlier cases in each school are provided in Table 48.  Histograms 




Table 48: Percent Missing Per-Pupil TRE and Core-Academic TRE Per Pupil By School 
 




1302 1.4 1.5 
2308 0.7 0.8 
5311 3.2 3.2 
6303 1.2 1.0 
6331 1.2 1.2 
9308 6.6 7.1 
10308 0.2 0.3 
11303 0.4 0.4 
12309 1.2 1.2 
12317 1.1 0.5 
12320 4.9 5.1 
13314 2.7 1.6 
13327 0.8 0.8 
14309 4.6 4.5 
14323 2.8 2.7 
15302 1.5 1.2 
15319 1.4 1.5 
17308 2.1 1.4 
18306 1.2 1.3 
18310 0.9 0.5 
19309 4.5 5.2 





Figure 6: Histogram of Per-Pupil TREs, All Values 
 
 





Appendix II: High School Profiles 
 This appendix provides demographic and resource for ach school.  Specifically, 
Table 49 outlines high school characteristics for each school, and Table 50 provides 
means and standard deviations of resource variables for ach school.  
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Table 49: High School Characteristics 
 
 





































































22 0 9 3,106 70 6 24 69 72 65,419 9 11 8 
School 
11303 
24 0 9 1,207 87 3 9 63 68 66,179 7 12 9 
 
2nd Quartile Poverty High Schools 
School 
15302 
29 0 9 1,149 93 2 4 61 61 70,884 11 15 8 
School 
9308 
31 0 12 1,000 93 3 3 53 52 68,128 6 11 10 
School 
15319 
31 0 10 2,900 93 3 3 61 59 62,588 6 15 6 
School 
21314 
32 3 7 2,844 63 10 27 78 79 68,948 12.5 15 16 
School 
5311 
32 0 13 1,663 90 5 4 52 54 66,268 6 16 8 
School 
12309 
36 4 6 1,934 82 8 9 60 58 71,019 
 
9 13 15 
School 
13327 
37 0 8 2,721 96 2 2 70 72 67,652 
 
7 9 6 
School 
13314 
38 0 8 1,420 96 1 1 59 57 70,541 
 












































































44 6 10 1,986 70 16 14 60 66 68,078 10.5 21 8 
School 
6303 
45 0 10 2,720 96 2 1 53 57 62,434 9 18 6 
School 
12317 
47 5 9 1,501 88 9 3 54 56 67,968 7 26 8 
School 
14309 
50 7 11 1,748 80 16 3 52 61 64,912 8.5 3 10 
 
3rd Quartile Poverty High Schools 
School 
6331 
52 0 12 918 96 2 1 48 56 64,596 7 14 7 
School 
18310 
53 11 12 1,165 89 9 2 47 53 65,508 6 29 5 
School 
12320 
54 0 11 1,348 98 1 1 40 42 69,706 8 25 6 
School 
18306 
59 0 15 1,000 94 5 0 40 46 64,961 7 1 5 
School 
1302 
59 18 11 2,321 42 49 8 52 58 69,073 10.5 1 9 
School 
19309 
60 12 10 2,241 53 39 8 54 59 70,144 9 13 7 
School 
17308 
60 14 9 2,710 47 47 5 54 57 67,026 8 21 7 
School 
2308 





Table 50: Means and Standard Deviations of Resources By School 
 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix III: Regression Results By School 
 This appendix provides regression results for each school.  Table 51 provides 
regression results for the models predicting per-pupil TREs and core-academic TREs per 
pupil.  Table 52 provides regression results for specific instructional resources.  Table 53 
provides regression results for peer achievement.  
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Table 51: Regression Results for Per-Pupil TREs and Core-Academic TREs Per Pupil By School 
 















































  -316* 
(128) 























    45.0% 


















   592* 
(298) 




















     -321’ 
(193) 
    88.0% 
Table Notes: 
(a) The slope coefficients are in terms of dollars. 
(b) African American and 9th grade students are the reference groups for the race and grade level dummy variables. 
(c) “10th Passed English” is the slope coefficient for the int raction variable, the 10th grade dummy variable multiplied by the PassELA dummy variable.   
(d) The models also control for grade level.   
(e) The p-values are as follows: ‘ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, and standard errors ae provided in parentheses.  Slope coefficients that are not 
statistically significant are excluded for ease of interpretation.   
(f) This analysis is conducted in Mplus7 with the maximum likelihood with robust standard errors estima or.  This estimator is chosen due to slight deviations 















































































  -298’ 
(152) 




























  -288’ 
(158) 















































































  -211’ 
(117) 


























































































































































   902*** 
(223) 









   265* 
(134) 


























   35.5% 












    345’ 
(180) 









      800*** 
(195) 































































  1,296’ 
(670) 














     320’ 
(167) 























































   283* 
(138) 



















































Table 52: Regression Results for Specific Resources By School 
 





ELL FARMS Latino White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 














  35.5% 
Math class size -10*** 
(.81) 
  1*  
(.50) 
  12th: -2.4*** (.68) 11th: -1.1’ (.67) 
12th: -1.5* (.72) 
15.8% 





   0.7** 
(.10) 
 10th: 0.6* (.22) 
11th: 1.9** (.23) 
 15.8% 
Odds of new 
math teacher 
      10
th: 0.7’ (.23) 10th: 0.5’ (.46) 
12th: 0.1* (.86) 
39.2% 
Log odds of 










11th: 0.9*** (.26) 
12th: 1.0*** (.24) 
11th: 1.3*** (.32) 
12th: 0.9*** (.24) 
 
Table Notes: 
(a) The models also control for grade level unless otherwise noted, and they also include an intercept.   
(b) African American serves as the baseline student race.   
(c) The p-values are as follows: ‘ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, and standard errors ae provided in parentheses.  Slope coefficients that are not 
statistically significant are excluded for ease of interpretation.   
(d) The slope coefficients of the interaction variables between achievement and grade level are combined into two columns.   
(e) The models predicting teacher experience estimate the probability of having an inexperienced teachr.  The slope coefficients represent the odd ratios of 
having an inexperienced teacher.  The standard errors a e in terms of log odds.   
(f) For the models concerning the number of AP courses per student, these models account for the fact th t he dependent variable is a count variable, and an R 
squared value is not available.  The slope coefficints represent the average log odds of number of AP courses taken by students in the category.  Only 11th and 
12th grade students are included in this analysis, as the vast majority of 9th and 10th grade students are not enrolled in AP courses. 
(g) This analysis is conducted in Mplus7 with the maximum likelihood with robust standard errors estima or.  
(h) Finally, when estimating the models with categorical and count dependent variables (new teachers and number of AP courses), occasionally the model dos 
not converge, typically because there are a few students in a category or inadequate variance on a vari ble for a particular student group.  In this case, Mplus7 









ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 










     10
th: 2.5*** (.65)  30.3% 
Math class size -11*** 
(1.3) 
   -1.3’ (.74) -0.9* 
(.43) 
12th: -3.4* (1.5) 11th: 2.3* (1.2) 
12th: -3.5* (1.5) 
20.1% 





       33.7% 
Odds of new 
math teacher 
      10
th: 2.3* (.33) 
11th: 0.4** (.32) 
12th: 0.3** (.44) 
11th: 1.7’ (.32) 
12th: 0.3* (.48) 
18.0% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 




11th: 1.6*** (.40) 11th: 1.0* (.40) 
12th: 0.9’ (.47) 
 







     12
th: 1.6* (.78) 12th: 1.5* (.73) 36.7% 
Math class size -11*** 
(1.2) 
   -2.1’ (1.1) -0.8* 
(.42) 
 10th: 1.9* (.80) 
11th: 2.1* (.98) 
12th: -3.3** (1.1) 
19.1% 
Odds of new 
English 
teacher50 
        60.2% 
Odds of new 
math teacher 
     0.6** 
(.13) 
11th: 1.8’ (.322) 11th: 0.6’ (.32) 
12th: 0.3** (.38) 
6.5% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 
     1.0** 
(.32) 
11th: 2.1** (.72) 




                                                
49 Due to convergence problems, the interaction variables between achievement and grade level are removed from the model.   








ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 










    -1.4* 
(.75) 
 10th: 2.4’ (1.4) 22.7% 
Math class size -10*** 
(1.2) 
      10
th: 2.6** (.90) 
11th: 2.4* (1.1) 
31.7% 
Odds of new 
English teacher 
     0.6** 
(.16) 
10th: 0.5* (.39) 
11th: 0.4* (.41) 
11th: 0.2*** (.39) 25.2% 




      12
th: 5.7** (.65) 22.8% 
Log odds of 




     11
th: 0.7** (.23) 
12th: 0.9** (.30) 
11th: 0.8*** (.21) 








    -1*** 
(.24) 
 11th: -1* (.51) 35.5% 
Math class size -9.5*** 
(.65) 
   -1.5* (.58)   12
th: -1.1’ (.58) 25.8% 






   10th: 0.7’ (.20) 10th: 0.6** (.20) 2.5% 




     11
th: 0.6’ (.21) 
12th: 0.6* (.23) 
10th: 0.6’ (.24) 
11th: 0.7’ (.20) 
12th: 0.3*** (.22) 
16.9% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses51 
     0.6*** 
(.16) 
11th: 0.6* (.28) 
12th: 1.3* (.54) 
11th: 0.8** (.26) 
12th: 1.0* (.41) 
 
  
                                                







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 












  -0.5’ (.27)  10th: 1.6** (.55) 10th: 0.9’ (.54) 17.6% 




   10th: 1.8** (.65) 10th: 1.3’ (.66) 
11th: 1.2’ (.72) 
7.2% 







   10th: 0.7’ (.20) 10th: 0.6** (.20) 2.5% 




     11
th: 0.7’ (.21) 
12th: 0.6* (.23) 
10th: 0.6’ (.24) 
11th: 0.7’ (.20) 
12th: 0.3*** (.22) 
16.9% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 




 11th: 1.8*** (.45) 
12th: 0.9** (.26) 
11th: 1.1** (.43) 








   -1.3’ (.76)  12
th: -2.0** (.71) 12th: -1.8** (.69) 48.9% 
Math class size -12*** 
(.91) 
  1.3’ (.75)    12
th: 1.8** (.63) 26.8% 










11th: 0.6* (.27) 10th: 2.4** (.30) 
12th: 0.5* (.30) 
28.1% 




      10
th: 0.3* (.43) 
11th: 0.4* (.46) 
12th: 0.2* (.84) 
41.7% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses54 






11th: 1.6*** (.33) 
12th: 0.8* (.33) 
11th: 1.3*** (.36) 
12th: 2.0*** (.42) 
 
  
                                                
52 ELL status is removed from this model due to convergence problems 
53 ELL status is removed from this model due to convergence problems.     







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 


















11th: 0.2* (.09) 
12th: 0.2* (.09) 
11th: 0.1’ (.08) 36.9% 




   0.6* 
(.28) 
10th: 1.7** (.56) 
11th: 1’ (.58) 
11th: 3*** (.55) 18.1% 
Odds of new 
English teacher 
      10th: 3.6*** (.29) 
11th: 0.5’ (.34) 
10th: 2.4** (.29) 
11th: 0.6’ (.32) 
60.6% 






    11th: 0.5* (.29) 
12th: 0.4* (.37) 
11th: 0.5’ (.27) 
12th: 0.2*** (.33) 
12.2% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 
  -0.4** 
(.14) 
 0.3*  
(.13) 
 11th: 1.4*** (.33) 
12th: 1.9*** (.40) 
11th: 1.1** (.32) 














10th: 4*** (.63) 10th: 3*** (.63) 
11th: 1’ (.53) 
12th: 4*** (.99) 
40.9% 






 0.6’ (.30) 10th: 2** (.69) 
11th: 3.2*** (.83) 
10th: 1.4’ (.72) 
11th: 1.6’ (.85) 
28.5% 






   10th: 0.1*** (.62) 
11th: 0.3*** (.31) 
12th: 0.5* (.27) 
11th: 0.5* (.34) 
12th: 0.4*** (.26) 
40.0% 




   1.6’  
(.28) 
 10th: 1.7* (.22)  6.8% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses55 
    1.0*** 
(.20) 
0.2’ (.12) 11th: 1.5** (.45) 
12th: 2.3*** (.56) 
11th: 1.2** (.46) 
12th: 0.8** (.28) 
 
  
                                                







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 










   2.4*  
(1.0) 
  12th: 1.7**  (.61) 31.9% 
Math class size -11*** 
(.74) 
     11
th: 1.7* (.76)  22.2% 




    0.7* 
(.13) 
10th: 0.4** (.30) 12th: 0.5* (.36) 20.6% 




       63.2% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 
-1.9’ (1.0)     0.4’ (.18) 11
th: 0.8* (.38) 
12th: 0.7* (.33) 











 -0.1’ (.06) -0.2*** 
(.04) 
11th: -0.5*** (.10) 
12th: -0.3* (.12) 
 21.9% 








 11th: -2.8** (.88) 
12th: -1.6’ (.89) 
12th: -2.8** (.83) 23.0% 









  0.6*** 
(.12) 
11th: 0.3* (.46)  62.5% 






0.8’ (.12)  0.5** 
(.19) 
 10th: 0.3*** (.30)  18.0% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses58 
    0.8*** 
(.17) 
 11th: 1.8** (.63) 
12th: 0.6* (.30) 
12th: 1.2** (.40)  
  
                                                
56 Student race is removed from this model due to convergence problems.     
57 Due to convergence problems, the interaction variables between achievement and grade level for 12th grade students are removed from the model.     







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 










 0.6’ (.31)    10
th: 1.3’ (.65) 
12th: -2** (.75) 
11th: -2* (.89) 15.5% 
Math class size -12*** 
(.75) 
   -2.7’ (1.6)  11
th: 1.7’ (.97)  22.8% 






  0.8** 
(.10) 
10th: 1.5* (.19) 
11th: 0.4** (.31) 
12th: 0.5* (.30) 
12th: 0.5* (.30) 28.3% 




     10
th: 1.7** (.19) 
 
 6.7% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 




0.3’ (.19) 11th: 1.2** (.36) 
12th: 1.3** (.45) 
11th: 1.1** (.35) 












    34.7% 
Math class size -11*** 
(1.1) 
   -4* (1.6)  12th: -3.6** (1.3)  16.9% 




     10th: 0.4’ (.46) 
11th: 0.3** (.49) 
12th: 0.4* (.36) 
12th: 0.4** (.36) 23.5% 




    10th: 0.5* (.32) 
 
 11.2% 
Log odds of 












11th: 0.5** (.17) 
12th: 0.80** (.27) 
11th: 0.3’ (.17) 









ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 












    10th: 1.4* (.67) 10th: 2.4** (.76) 26.9% 




  -2.3’ (1.3)  11th: 1.4’ (.77) 10th: 1.4* (.70) 
11th: 2* (.82) 
25.1% 






 0.7’ (.22)   10th: 3.1* (.46) 
12th: 4*** (.38) 
10th: 5*** (.38) 56.2% 






 1.3’ (.15)    12th: 0.3** (.38) 16.8% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses59 




0.2’ (.13) 11th: 1.2*** (.29) 
12th: 1.3*** (.31) 
11th: 1.1** (.34) 
12th: 0.8* (.31) 
 







  -2’ (1.2)  1.1* 
(.43) 
10th: -3.4** (1.2)  53.2% 
Math class size -10*** 
(.90) 




  24.7% 




      11
th: 0.3’ (.66) 
12th: 8*** (.48) 
69.0% 




      11
th: 2.2’ (.45) 
12th: 2.6’ (.50) 
16.5% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses60 




11th: 1.3** (.42) 11th: 1.1’ (.56) 




                                                
59 SPED status is removed from this model due to convergence problems.   








ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 














  10th: 1.7* (.67) 
11th: 1.9** (.57) 
12th: 1.4* (.62) 
11th: -1.3* (.59) 28.1% 




   0.5’ (.30) 12th: -2.3** (.84)  21.8% 








  10th: 0.2*** (.35) 
12th: 0.3*** (.37) 
10th: 0.2*** (.40) 36.8% 






    11th: 0.6’ (.32) 10th: 0.5* (.33) 
12th: 2.2’ (.48) 
22.5% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses61 
-1.2’ (1.0)      12







 0.5’ (.29)    12
th: 1.4* (.54) 12th: 1.0’ (.56) 36.1% 
Math class size -16*** 
(.80) 
     12
th: -2.3** (.74) 10th: 1.1’ (.62) 
11th: -1.7’ (.95) 
12th: -2.3** (.72) 
40.0% 




  0.5* 
(.40) 
  12th: 8** (.65)  56.6% 




     12
th: 2.1’ *.38) 11th: 2.3* (.34) 
12th: 1.9’ (.25) 
11.2% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 
-0.9’ (.50)    1.1*** 
(.28) 
 12th: 0.7’ (.35) 11th: 1.0*** (.26)  
  
                                                







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 










      10
th: -2.9** (1.0) 27.1% 
Math class size -6*** 
(1.3) 
     10
th: 2.1’ (1.2)  7.8% 





       47.8% 




  2.0’ (.40) 4.3’  
(.80) 
   15.8% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 






11th: 1.0*** (.26) 11th: 1.4*** (.35) 












   10th: 1.9** (.68) 
11th: -1.7* (.69) 
10th: 1.7* (.69) 36.1% 








10th: 1.4** (.52) 11th: 1.3* (.53) 
12th: -1.6* (.72) 
28.9% 




    10th: 0.2’ (.85) 
12th: 0.1**(1.1) 
 61.5% 




  0.5* 
(.32) 
  10th: 0.1’ (.63)  55.3% 
Log odds of 








11th: 0.6* (.25) 
12th: 0.4* (.20) 
12th: 0.9*** (.24)  
  
                                                







ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 












   -1** 
(.31) 
10th: -1’ (.54) 10th: 1’ (.56) 
12th: -1.5’ (.84) 
32.8% 






  12th: -1.9* (.77) 11th: 2.1** (.71) 22.2% 





      11th: 0.1* (1.0) 35.7% 




 1.3’ (.16)   10th: 0.1’ (.94) 
11th: 5.2** (.56) 
10th: 0.3’ (.69) 51.6% 
Log odds of 
number of AP 
courses 
-1.8* (.71)     0.3’ (.13) 11th: 1.0** (.31) 
12th: 0.8** (.28) 
11th: 0.9** (.33) 










   0.7** 
(.28) 
10th: 2.0** (.69) 10th: 1.5* (.70) 
12th: -1.5’ (.87) 
37.0% 








  11th: -1.8* (.88) 
12th: -4.9*** (1.2) 
 9.7% 






   0.8* 
(.09) 
10th: 0.6* (.20)  16.2% 






     10th: 0.6* (.18) 13.8% 
Log odds of 












11th: 1.2*** (.27) 
12th: 0.9*** (.23) 
11th: 0.7* (.28) 
12th: 0.6** (.21) 
 
  
                                                
63 Due to convergence problems, the interaction variables between achievement and grade level for 12th grade students are removed from the model.     








ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 
Female 10th, 11th, or 12th 
Pass English 














   11th: 1.7* (.79) 
12th: 3.8*** (.77) 
11th: 2.2** (.86) 
12th: 2.5** (.64) 
22.7% 
Math class size -3*** 
(.70) 
    -0.7’ 
(.40) 
10th: 3.3*** (.92) 
 
10th: 2.0* (.81) 
11th: 5***(.93) 
11.2% 






 0.8’ (.12)   11th: 1.9* (.26) 
12th: 0.2** (.54) 
10th: 1.9* (.26) 40.9% 






  11th: 0.4** (.36)  24.1% 
Log odds of 








11th: 1.2*** (.31) 11th: 1.7** (.52) 






Table 53: Regression Results for Peer Achievement By School 
 
 Dependent Variables Grade 
Level  
Intercept SPED  
 
ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 




% of peers passed 
English test  






















% of peers passed 
math test 






















% of peers passed 
English test  













 -4.0* (1.8)    8.8*** 
(1.0) 
47.6% 
% of peers passed 
math test 























(a) African American serves as the baseline student race.   
(b) The p-values are as follows: ‘ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, and standard errors ae provided in parentheses.  Slope coefficients that are not 
statistically significant are excluded for ease of interpretation.   
(c) Each model is run for either all 11th graders or all 12th graders.  Given the structure of the state assessment program, analyzing student achievement within 
each grade is the most compelling analytic method. 
(c) This analysis is conducted in Mplus7 with the maximum likelihood with robust standard errors estima or.   
(d) The results are similar if the average raw score in English or math is used instead of the percentage of peers who passed the English or math standardized tests.  





 Dependent Variables Grade 
Level  
Intercept SPED  
 
ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 





% of peers passed 
English test 




    5.2* (2.1) 12*** 
(1.3) 
48.6% 

































% of peers passed 
English test 







































% of peers passed 
English test 




 -2.3’  
(1.2) 














% of peers passed math 
test 





























Intercept SPED  
 









% of peers passed 
English test 






























% of peers passed 
math test 






























% of peers passed 
English test  


















% of peers passed 
math test 




















% of peers passed 
English test  





















 3.5’ (1.8) 13*** 
(.79) 
68.7% 
% of peers passed 
math test 































Intercept SPED  
 








% of peers passed 
English test 















    2.3’ (1.3) 9.5*** 
(.65) 
48.5% 
% of peers passed 
math 
























% of peers passed 
English test 


















% of peers passed 
math 






















% of peers passed 
English test 



















   2.6’ (1.5) 10*** 
(.71) 
59.0% 
% of peers passed 
math test 





























Intercept SPED  
 








% of peers passed 
English test 




















% of peers passed 
math 


















% of peers passed 
English test 
























% of peers passed 
math 


























% of peers passed 
English test 
























% of peers passed 
math test 





























Intercept SPED  
 
ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 




% of peers passed 
English test 




    4.9’ (3.0) 11*** 
(1.9) 
52.7% 




     8.4*** 
(1.7) 
48.3% 
% of peers passed 
math test 




    5.9* (2.6) 10*** 
(1.7) 
52.2% 









% of peers passed 
English test 






















% of peers passed 
math test 






    9.5*** 
(1.2) 
38.9% 











% of peers passed 
English test 




















% of peers passed 
math test 





















                                                
65 Student race is removed from the model for this school because the model does not converge and the school is mostly comprised of African American students.   







Intercept SPED  
 








% of peers passed 
English test 




  6.3* 
(3.1) 
  12*** 
(1.3) 
56.5% 











% of peers passed 
math test 




















% of peers passed 
English test 
























% of peers passed 
math test 


























% of peers passed 
English test 

















   3.3* (1.5) 9.8*** 
(.95) 
51.6% 
% of peers passed 
math test 























                                                
67 Student race is removed from the model for this school because the model does not converge and the school is mostly comprised of African American students.   
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 Dependent Variables Grade 
Level  
Intercept SPED  
 
ELL  FARMS Latino  White/ 
Asian 




% of peers passed 
English test 




















% of peers passed 
math test 


























% of peers passed 
English test 


























% of peers passed 
math test 




























Appendix IV: Model Assumptions and Fit 
 This appendix provides evidence that model assumptions are mostly met and that 
model fit is adequate for all models employed in this study.  This appendix first addresses 
the model assumptions for the multilevel models.  Second, it addresses the model 
assumptions for the multiple linear regression models.  Third, it addresses the model 
assumptions for the binary logistic regression models.  Finally, it addresses the model 
assumptions for the Poisson regression model.  In highlighting potential violations of 
model assumptions, this appendix also provides technical limitations to this study.   
Multilevel Models (MLMs).  MLMs require a number of assumptions to be met: 
(a) Level-1 residuals are independently and normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a 
constant variance within each school; (b) level-1 predictors are independent of the level-1 
residuals; (c) level-2 random error vectors are independent among the level-2 units and 
are multivariately normally distributed with a mean of 0 and constant variances and 
covariances; (d) level-2 predictor variables and residuals are independent of one another; 
(e) level-1 and level-2 residuals are independent of one another; (f) level-1 predictor 
variables are not correlated with level-2 residuals, nd level-2 predictor variables are not 
correlated with level-1 residuals (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 2012).   
Most of the MLM assumptions appear to have been met for both the models with 
TRE and TRE_CA as the outcome variables.  However, two assumptions appear to have 
been violated.  First, there appears to be slight deviations from homogeneity of variance 
within each school.  In other words, the variation in the level-1 residuals appears to differ 










In addition, the non-constant variance of the level-1 residuals across schools 
appears to be at least partially due to the atypically large variation of level-1 residuals in 
two schools (see Figure 7).  However, even with the exclusion of these two outlier 
schools, there is still some variation in level-1 residuals across schools.  I attempted to 
model the heterogeneity of variance of level-1 residuals across schools, and no available 
variables statistically significantly improved the terogeneity of variance.  Finally, 
special education status appears to be related to level-1 residuals (see Figure 8), and there 
is more variation in level-1 residuals for special education students than for non-special 













Given the violations of these three assumptions, it may be the case that the level-1 
and level-2 models are mis-specified and that relevant ariables that predict per-pupil 
TREs are missing from the models.  In conclusion, MLM results should be interpreted 
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with caution, and these assumption violations should be considered when generalizing 
results.  
Regression models with continuous dependent variables.  For each school, 
multiple linear regression (MLR) models are employed to evaluate the equity of the 
allocation of per-pupil TREs, core-academic TREs per pupil, and both class sizes and 
peer achievement in students’ English and math classes.  MLR models assume that the 
residuals of the model are independently and normally distributed and that the variance of 
the residuals does not depend on the values of the independent variables.  For the models 
that gauge the equity of the allocation of per-pupil TREs and core-academic TREs per 
pupil, scatterplots of the predicted values v. the residuals demonstrated that the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance and independence of observations were met.  
However, when examining histograms of the residuals for these models, it appeared that 
some deviations from normality existed.  For this reason, the models were estimated with 
standard errors that are robust to non-normality.  Hence, the standard errors are unbiased 
despite the potential violation of the assumption that he residuals are normally 
distributed.  For the models with class sizes and peer achievement as the outcome 
variables, all MLR assumptions appear to have been m t.   
Regression models with binary dependent variables.  To gauge model fit for 
the models that predicted binary dependent variables–n w English teacher flag and new 
math teacher flag–R squared values of the models were examined because R squared 
values are one indicator of model utility.  For models with R squared values that were 
less than 0.10, noted in Table 54, the results from these models were excluded from the 
study’s findings.  No other model fit indices were available for these models in Mplus.  
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Table 54: Models With Binary Outcome Variables and Low R Squared Values 
 
School Dependent Variable R Squared 
School 15302 New Math Teacher Flag 6.5% 
School 15319 New English Teacher Flag 2.5% 
School 21314 New English Teacher Flag 2.5% 
School 13327 New Math Teacher Flag 6.8% 
School 6303 New Math Teacher Flag 6.7% 
 
Regression models with a count dependent variable.  For the model with the 
count dependent variable–the number of AP courses–Mplus only provides Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) values, which indicate rlative model fit and are most 
appropriate for comparing two or more models.  However, no AIC value appears 
unusually large, and these AIC values are provided n Table 55.  
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